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
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
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




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ACTIVE PRINCIPLES;

OR,

Elements of Moral Science.

MENTAL FEELINGS—VOLITIONS—
MORAL PERCEPTIONS AND SENTIMENTS.

BY

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etc.*


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Part I.

MENTAL FEELINGS.

Part II.

VOLITIONS.

Part III.

MORAL PERCEPTIONS AND SENTIMENTS.

"God created man in His own image."

GEN. i. 27.

**"Man in honour, and understanding not,
Is like the beasts that perish."**

PSALM xlix. 20.

"You then shall be perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect."

MATT. v. 48.

PREFACE.

ALL men wish to know what is Best for them, and evidently this requires some knowledge of themselves, and of what is around them. Such knowledge to be useful, must include the whole of human nature—that which is *spiritual*, as well as that which is *material*. The best for the Body depends on its whole nature, and cannot be learnt by the examination of only a part; and the best for the Soul depends on all its capabilities, and requires a knowledge of Intellectual and Active Principles. These are many, and of different kinds. Pleasure and pain are not the only sensibilities. There are other objects of Desire and aversion; and the most important of these respect Persons. The welfare of Man depends on what he is, and may be; and his relations to other persons are not less important than his relations to the visible world. The most serious errors in Psychology, as in many common subjects, come from taking a part of human nature for the whole. If men know not themselves, they cannot know what they need, nor attain to what is Best.

Emotions, Desires, and Affections of various kinds, have a primary place in the study of Man. They are the chief springs of action, and are requisite to all human excellence and happiness. These feelings have some counterpart in

the nature of animals, but their susceptibilities are fewer and lower, as their capacities of knowledge are more limited. Volitions follow Feelings, and the great superiority of Man is found in his Will. All human improvement and progress, the continuance and increase of all that is good for Men, depend in some degree on what is chosen by them. This subject therefore requires separate consideration. Moral perceptions and sentiments come after states of knowledge, feeling, and choosing; and refer to acts of Will, of which men are capable, but animals incapable. Mental Feelings, Volitions, Moral Perceptions and Sentiments, belong to the inner and higher nature of Man. They are experienced by all, and are known by consciousness. Their nature and laws, causes and effects, can be learnt only by reflection on what is within. They have *corporeal* accompaniments, which become *signs* of what is *spiritual*, when this is already known. But alone, they have no more meaning than the letters of an unknown language.

No examination of the Brain and the Nervous system can show anything of joy and sorrow, hope and fear, love and admiration, duty and honour, right and wrong. Human knowledge, affection, and choice are inward experiences, of which much may be learnt by internal inspection, but nothing by external. The highest forms of human intelligence, feeling, and action, unseen but conscious, give some knowledge of the Divine Spirit, invisible and universal. But certainly nothing can be learnt of any Spirit, finite or infinite, by looking merely to cerebral forms, nervous impressions, and muscular contractions. Nothing of the sky is seen by looking on the ground. The best things cannot be weighed and measured, they are intangible and invisible.

The Brain is often spoken of as the *organ* of the Mind in thought, feeling, and action ; as the eye is the organ for seeing. There is certainly some connection between *cerebral* and *mental* states, and they have many correspondencies. But it is so with other portions of the body, and *material* expressions for *mental* objects are commonly understood figuratively. The *heart* is said to be moved, when no reference is made to the organ. Material objects are *organs*, when their structure is adapted to the *effects* they produce. But nothing in the Brain has an apparent fitness to produce thought or belief, affection or choice. No *mental* qualities are ever perceived in *material* objects, nor any *material* qualities in *mental* objects. From connections and correspondencies no *identity* can be inferred, for they are found as frequently in different objects, as in the same. Where some agreement appears, there may be more ; and where there is some difference, there may be more ; but the greater the apparent differences, the less reasonable is the inference of further agreement, or sameness of substance. The grey and white particles which are ever changing, cannot be the knowing, thinking, feeling, choosing Self ; of which every one is conscious, and which is the same from childhood to old age. No correspondencies can show that mental powers and properties belong to the Brain. Why should not it be, as the vessel which supplies ink to the writer ? Without this there could be no writing ; according to this, is the quantity, the colour, and in some measure the form and quality of the writing. But the ink has nothing to do with what is written. No mental states, nor anything like them, can be found either in the ink or in the nerves. What is written comes entirely from the invisible, conscious Self of the writer, and not out of his inkstand, or his brains.

The *uses* of Analysis in the study of Nature are very great, and so are its abuses. Much is always found in *composite* objects, which never appears in their *elements*; and there is much in *consequents*, which cannot be known from *antecedents*. This is admitted in Material Sciences, and is equally true in the Mental and Moral. Worth and dignity are not the most obvious properties of Natural objects, but they are the most important. The *living* are superior to the *lifeless*; and those who have more Life, are nobler than those who have less. The Bible speaks, more emphatically than any other book, of the worth and capabilities of Man, as well as of the wrong and misery of men; and it is full of hope for all. "Honour all men," is one of its chief precepts. Poets and philosophers, with but very partial views of the dignity and destiny of men, have often repeated the lesson, "Respect one another." This is a primary duty of all to all, and it is a good for all.

Agnosticism and Materialism result from the assumption of false principles. These are disproved by the conclusions to which they lead, which are contrary to the consciousness and common sense of mankind. They who deny or disregard their own *personality*, cannot acknowledge that of any other being. If the personal I, the conscious Self, is a delusion, nothing can be known. In the present work, as in the preceding, the writer has sought to be intelligible to all; and to direct attention to important truths respecting human nature, which all may, by reflection and consideration, discern in themselves.

J. H. G.

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INTRODUCTION.

1. **T**HE various capacities of human beings for Knowledge and Intellectual progress, are of universal interest and importance; and equally so are their capacities of enjoyment and suffering, of affection and action, of Moral culture and improvement. Knowledge begins with what affects the bodily senses, but soon passes to other and higher regions; and so it is with all Feelings. Sensations are limited and transient, and in them Man has no superiority over animals; but Emotions and Affections are as extensive as Intelligence, and not less enduring. They are the chief sources of human happiness, and the prime motives of human action. More than the sensations and movements of the body they are subject to control, and dependent on habitual conduct. Intellectual enlargement and improvement are alone of comparatively little value. Knowledge is not for itself, but for the Feelings and Actions which follow, and which should be regulated by Reason and Conscience. Hence the worth, dignity, and advantage of Moral Science.

2. **MORAL SCIENCE**, according to the narrower use of the term, respects only some dispositions and actions—those which result from reflection, and show the character of the agent as apprehended by Conscience. But this part of human nature cannot be understood, without the considera-

tion of other active principles. Conscience surveys and estimates all the various tendencies to action of which we are conscious, and is exercised and known only in relation to them. Therefore Moral Science, according to its etymology and the broader use of the term, includes all the sources of voluntary action. It has nothing to do with unconscious or involuntary changes in mind or body, but it takes account of all that are voluntary. Feelings of various kinds are the primary springs of all voluntary action, and produce directly or indirectly all volitions. Voluntary actions, internal and external, are the objects of Moral approval or censure. Mental Feelings and Volitions are, therefore, included in Moral Science, as well as those perceptions and sentiments which are peculiarly Moral.

3. ACTIVE PRINCIPLES are various, and they differ both in *dignity* and in *strength*; as material objects differ both in *weight* and in *size*; and both kinds of difference are equally obvious and certain. Bodily sensations, which are all limited and transient, must be inferior to the *mental* desires, which are immeasurably greater in extent and duration, objectively and subjectively. The latter require more intelligence and sensibility, and have more influence on human happiness. For the same reasons, the susceptibilities which regard only the enjoyment and welfare of the individual, must be inferior to those, which equally belong to the individual, but respect also the enjoyment and welfare of others. The power of choosing only bodily motions, must be inferior to that which chooses mental states also. To choose according to present appearances and feelings, must be a *lower* condition, than to choose according to all that may be known and anticipated. These truths are self-evident on a little reflection. Prudence is a higher principle than Passion, and Benevolence is higher than the Prudence *which* regards exclusively selfish pleasures and interests.

Justice and Fidelity are always superior to appetite and inclination. To yield oneself to the lower principles of action, opposing or neglecting the higher, is brutish and not human. Such a course leads speedily to ruin and destruction; and is in every way injurious to the agent and to others. To live according to the higher principles of action, secures a large measure of health of body and of mind, safety, prosperity, progress, honour; one's own happiness and welfare, and that of family and friends. Nothing can be more contrary to human experience, and the common judgment of mankind, than the statement that all active principles are of the same rank, and each to be followed in turn as it has the greater strength. The power of knowing and choosing what is most for the permanent good of each and all, must be superior to any single principle of action. Nothing can be *morally right* which is known to be not the *best*; and all is *morally right* which on full consideration appears to be so.

4. All that is Morally right or wrong is more or less dependent on Choice; and all that is voluntary is connected, directly or indirectly, with some Mental Feeling. Feelings always precede Volitions, but do not always produce them. There may be the former without the latter, but not the latter without the former. Volitions in like manner precede all Moral apprehensions, but do not always produce them. We therefore begin with what is most simple and is first known—the Mental Feelings. We shall then consider the Volitions which they occasion; and finally, the Moral judgments and sentiments, which follow when there is any reflection on what we choose and do, and on what we are capable of being and doing. Man is not to be valued simply by what he is, but by what he is capable of becoming. The whole of human nature should be considered, and each part separately. Nothing of the sky and the luminaries of

heaven can be learnt by looking to the earth and sea ; and nothing of the higher nature of Man is known by the simple study of the lower. No faculties and susceptibilities are known apart from their objects. Little can be known of the Eye by the bare examination of its structure, and this shows nothing of visible objects. And so Conscience is not known by self-inspection, without the presentation of the objects on which it is exercised. The use of the lower principles cannot be understood, unless the higher are also regarded. And the higher cannot be known, without some prior knowledge of the lower. All Active Principles must be considered, that the nature and office of Conscience may be understood. We therefore begin with Mental Feelings.

PART I.

MENTAL FEELINGS.

Division I.

SIMPLE EMOTIONS.

JOY, GRIEF, SURPRISE, WONDER.

Division II.

PROPENSITIES AND PASSIONS.

DESIRES, AVERSIONS, HOPE, FEAR.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY.

Division III.

SOCIAL AFFECTIONS.

PLEASANT AND ATTRACTIVE, PAINFUL AND REPULSIVE.

COMPOSITE AFFECTIONS.

Division IV.

OTHER AFFECTIONS.

REFLECTIVE, RELIGIOUS, INDEFINITE.

Part I.

MENTAL FEELINGS.

1. **M**ENTAL FEELINGS are of various kinds, but all are produced by Mental causes. They are thus distinguished from Sensations, which are states of body as well as of mind, and which occasion Mental Feelings only when they are objects of Thought. Sensations are primarily and generally produced by outward material objects; they have locality and extent, and belong to particular times and places. But Mental Feelings require only the presence of Thought; they have no apparent locality or extension; they are the same in all times and places; they have corporeal expressions and effects, but no material properties. Joy and sorrow, hope and fear, love and hatred, have no shape or size. A very small part of the happiness or misery of human life consists of pleasant and painful sensations, and their influence comes chiefly from remembrances and anticipations. Few voluntary actions result merely from simple sensations, or refer to bodily pleasures and pains. Mental Feelings are the causes of all that is important in the conduct, character, and condition of human beings.

2. The greatest differences in Mental Feelings are found always in the nature of the Objects by which they are excited, and in the relation of Feelings to Actions. Some Feelings have no immediate and constant connection with choice, they are simply Contemplative; others are Practical, always tending to some action. The most important of the Feelings are those which regard *animate* beings, having some intelligence and sensibility, and especially persons who have a moral nature. There is much diversity

of usage in the names given to different Feelings. Those which are *contemplative* are often distinguished as Emotions; those which are *practical* as Desires and Aversions; and those which regard *animate* beings as Affections. These are states of Feeling which are evidently very different, though they are commonly combined. The other Feelings are contained in the Affections, which are the main sources of happiness, the chief motives of action, and that which is most esteemed in human character.

3. All are conscious of Mental Feelings as well as of sensations, and discern their difference. They are not sensations, nor their material shadows, or reflections, or impressions; nor are they simply states of Intelligence. There are Intuitions, Thoughts, and Beliefs, without any Emotion, Desire, or Affection. The latter result from the former, and include them; but they contain more. Feelings must be experienced to be known; they must be repeatedly considered to be rightly distinguished. They are often combined. As bodily pleasure and pain accompany most other sensations, so some mental pleasure or pain accompanies most other Feelings. The Contemplative Feelings are more simple than the Practical, and are therefore to be considered first. Those which respect self alone must precede those which respect others, for others can be known only through a prior knowledge of ourselves. Emotions, Desires, and Affections are three classes of Feelings, which may be best studied in the order in which they arise.*

* Mental Feelings have been named and classified in many various ways. Some of these differences are merely *verbal*, and affect only the convenience of arrangement; but others are *real*, and depend on the supposed nature of the Feelings. This is known chiefly by reflection, on that which is discerned in consciousness. The simpler states are seldom alone, but they are easily distinguished from the complex. Where the *objects* are different the *feelings* also differ, and these diversities are always important. The classification of Feelings, according to their *nervous connections*, is mainly fanciful, and serves only to give prominence to materialistic conjectures. Feelings are the same, whether their objects are in the past, the present, or the future.

DIVISION I.
SIMPLE EMOTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

JOY OR MENTAL PLEASURE.

JOY is one of the most common of Mental Feelings. It is a universal experience, appearing in different degrees from infancy to old age. The name is generally given to the stronger feelings of pleasure which are not of long duration ; but the feebler and enduring are of the same nature. The joys that are felt when a truth is discovered, a friend is restored, a scheme succeeds, differ only in degree from the pleasures which these objects afterwards give whenever they are considered. The pleasant *emotion* is very different from any pleasant *sensation*. The highest joy is felt without any agreeable sensation, and when all sensations are disagreeable. It may awaken *desire* for continuance, or repetition, or increase, and so prompt to action ; but this is not always the effect. Alone the emotion often has no such tendency. Joy is felt in the consideration of the past which cannot be changed, and of the present and future with which we have nothing to do. The highest joys belong to the Affections ; but these are founded on the pleasures which belong to each individual separately. The susceptibilities of others can be known only by our own prior experience. The primary causes of joy are (1) pleasant sensations and their objects ; (2)

knowledge of any kind; (3) every description of exercise; and (4) every degree of effectiveness.*

I. Sensitive Objects.

When pleasant sensations cease, there is some pleasure in thinking of them, much more in anticipating their renewal. This pleasure is not itself a sensation. It may come from the remembrance of one, but more frequently it comes from the effects of many, these making *objects* more delightful and desirable than any single *sensation*. Children have joy when fruit and cakes are given them, or money for their purchase; and this mental pleasure precedes the sensitive enjoyment of eating; it is always different, and is often much greater. They rejoice when a holiday is announced, because of the pleasure which has been and will be found in fresh air and free exercise. So men find some mental pleasure in remembering past pleasant sensations, and in anticipating their renewal. This pleasure comes more from thoughts of the Objects which have caused the sensations, than from thoughts of the sensations. Perceptions are more readily recalled than sensations, and by many associations outward objects acquire a greater influence than single sensations. There is a manifest difference in the pleasure of thinking of former *sensations*, and that of thinking of the objects which produced them. The latter requires more intelligence, and gives more enjoyment. The remembrance of past bodily pleasures may increase the pain of present privation, but the anticipation is always pleasant. Sensations do not become more pleasant by sympathy, but the emotions which they occasion are much increased when shared with others. The joys of children in sports, those of men in social feasts, concerts and spectacles, are greatly enhanced by participation with others;

* Other names are given to the same emotion, some being more appropriate to certain degrees and occasions. Delight, Gladness, Pleasure, Contentment, Satisfaction, Rapture.

and the increase of pleasure is according to the degree in which it depends on mental rather than on bodily impressions. Only sensualists care much for the simple gratification of the senses, either in remembrance or anticipation.*

2. Knowledge.

Knowledge of every kind affords a pleasure which is different from any sensation. It belongs to the higher nature of man, is enduring, and progressive, and is increased by participation. All knowledge is not equally pleasant. The joy it gives may be low, slight, and transient; or high, intense, and permanent. All objects of knowledge give more or less pleasure according to certain relations, and some objects give a higher pleasure by their superior nature.

1. Novelty, variety, proximity in time and place, and personal connection, are the chief causes of the greater pleasure which may belong to knowledge of every kind. Novelty is not always pleasant; it makes what is pleasant more pleasant, and what is painful more painful. Many

* Sensations are all on the same level, differing only in the duration and intensity of pleasure. The superiority attributed to *sight* and *sound*, belongs to the *mental* representations and associations. Pleasure and pain are the only *sensations* which belong to the Active Principles. The others, both the general, pressure, temperature, motion, and resistance—and the special, taste, scent, hearing, and seeing—lead to voluntary action, only as they are pleasant or painful. Without these accompaniments, the other sensations are useful only for the knowledge they give. The nervous energy, which produces involuntary muscular contraction and movement, belongs to Physiology and not to Psychology. Sensitive pleasure and pain are felt in all parts of the nervous system; the former resulting from the slight action of corporeal parts, and the latter from their injury. These sensations differ from Mental Feelings in that they have some definite locality and extent; they are like them as motives to action, but not rules to be always followed.

things give a little pleasure when first seen, heard, or read ; but there is no wish to continue or repeat the experience. Some interest is awakened by everything that is new enough to secure further notice, if it deserves attention ; but that which pleases only when it is *new*, has little real worth. Variety pleases, partly by the increase of knowledge thus given, every change showing something new ; but principally from associations. Sameness is often suggestive of restraint and feebleness, while variety is agreeably suggestive of freedom, and the easy exercise of power. Proximity increases the influence of all objects on feelings of every kind. What is near is regarded with more interest and pleasure than what is remote, by men as well as by children ; and what is recent affects us more than the distant past. Remoteness and antiquity may give a peculiar interest to some objects, but in general what is far off in time or place is regarded with comparative indifference. As distance lessens the effect of all objects on the senses, so does it diminish their influence on most Mental Feelings. It is not natural that we should be as much affected by what belongs to China, as by what belongs to our own neighbourhood ; by what happened a thousand years ago, as by the events of yesterday ; nor would this be beneficial to any. But the most distant objects, as well as the nearest, will interest and delight, if they have some special connection with ourselves. This always increases greatly the pleasure of knowledge. Little things, however remote, will interest and please, if in any way connected with ourselves ; much more objects which are really great, and whose relation to us personally is not affected by time and place.

2. Besides the *relations* which belong to all objects of knowledge, and increase the pleasure they afford, there are peculiar properties which give a higher and more permanent pleasure. Some of these are found in inanimate objects, others only in animate. These properties are

pleasant to the mind, primarily, as others are pleasant to the senses; and they also please by the mental exercise connected with them, and by their associations. Symmetry, order, and regularity are naturally agreeable in themselves, apart from any use or association. Fitness and utility are in like manner pleasant when simply seen or thought of. Resemblances and analogies of every kind give a peculiar mental pleasure. Common classifications, as well as those of Science, and common comparisons, as well as those of Poetry, are interesting to all. General truths, especially those respecting causes and effects, give a pleasure far exceeding that of any single separate objects. Magnitude increases pleasure, because more is known; but small objects please more if they are more fully known. Objects of a higher nature interest and please more than those of a lower nature, partly because of the multiplicity of their parts, but principally because of their superior properties. The *living* is nobler far than the *lifeless*, and that which has most *life* is nobler than that which has less. It is more interesting, it does more, enjoys more, and gives more enjoyment. Thus the knowledge of plants gives more pleasure than that of stones, the knowledge of animals is better than that of plants, and the knowledge of man is still better. All signs of intelligence, the lowest as well as the highest, are viewed with some pleasure. All forms of sensibility are attractive, especially the pleasant. Energy in animals is always interesting to spectators. This appears most in their conflicts, and the observer is pleased, not with the suffering shown, but with the activity, ingenuity, power, and perseverance displayed. Human intelligence, sensibility, and energy, far exceed in variety and extent all that is ever found in animals, and therefore the knowledge of men is more interesting than that of other objects. Human joys and sorrows, hopes and fears—human wisdom, kindness, courage, and fidelity—interest and please more than any

other knowledge.* Things little and low may become for a time the occasions of much delight, from the special attention given to them ; but they can never yield the full and abiding satisfaction which nobler objects afford. The pleasures of knowledge are open to all, and to some extent they are possessed by all. But those which are obtained without any effort seldom continue. The best and most enduring are the reward earned by patient and strenuous exertion. All knowledge is pleasant in some degree, and that is generally both most pleasant and profitable which respects the best objects, and requires the most full and varied exercise of the mental faculties. Knowledge of every kind is more pleasant when shared with others. All like to make known to others what they have learnt, and find the pleasure of knowledge increased by participation.†

3. Exercise.

Exercise of every kind, when not excessive in degree and duration, gives some mental pleasure. All find some enjoyment in talking, in the observation of people, pictures, and objects of every description ; and most find pleasure in

* The more in *quantity*, and the more in *certainly*, are not the same ideas as the higher in *dignity* ; but the latter is, to every rational being, always connected with the former. They give increased *worth*.

† Mirth is a kind of joy caused by the combination in speech or action of unexpected congruities and incongruities, likenesses and differences. It is occasioned by what is comparatively trivial, depends much on sympathy, and soon passes away with the expression to which it prompts. It is shown in smiles and laughter. It belongs to the higher nature of Man ; but not to the higher exercise of human faculties. Man alone is capable of Mirth, and it is a refreshment provided for all ages and conditions. But when much sought for, it unfits for the business of life, and indisposes to better pursuits. That which causes mirth in general is *ludicrous*, and that which belongs to human conduct is *ridiculous*. Ridicule is useful for the correction of small faults, as Resentment is for greater ; but both are very liable to abuse. That which amuses some, often gives pain to others.

reading and writing. Mental activity always gives more pleasure when there is health. Arranging, comparing, combining things or thoughts, remembering, imagining, reasoning, are occupations more or less agreeable. They are not only a relief from uneasiness, but they give a positive pleasure, similar to that afforded by bodily exercise; and pleasant emotions are combined with most pleasant sensations. Children delight in every species of activity, and all persons find pleasure in doing something. A large portion of the enjoyment of life comes from mental exercise. It is not however true that *occupation* is the chief thing, and that it matters little to human happiness what the occupation may be. Some pursuits are much more agreeable than others, as well as more advantageous. Those are most pleasant, apart from the influence of the affections and any anticipation of results, which employ in succession all our faculties. The higher faculties yield a higher enjoyment than the lower, and their exercise is more useful. It is more pleasant as well as more useful to act with a purpose and plan than without, with the exercise of many faculties than with one alone. The most profitable occupations, and those which yield the most satisfaction, are not the most easy; but require a kind and measure of exertion not always agreeable. Industry is always better than idleness, but not always more pleasant at the time. The sports of children and of men please chiefly by the occasions which they present for mental exercise. All exercise becomes more pleasant when shared with others. Children and men often delight in doing with others what they find no pleasure in doing alone. Companionship aids exertion, and makes it more agreeable.

4. Effectiveness.

Effectiveness is another primary cause of mental pleasure. Animals find enjoyment in exercise, though it produces nothing. Children delight in activity, without any aim or

effect; but they find more pleasure in that which is manifestly effective, and this is required in later life. In most pursuits the pleasure of *effectiveness* adds much to that of *exercise*; and makes work pleasant which would otherwise be unpleasant. Very much of human happiness comes from this source. The common labourer is pleased when he views the quantity of work done in a day. The artisan and artist rejoice in the better quality of their works. Parents are especially pleased with the growth and progress of their children, in consequence of their care and toil. So teachers are pleased with the advancement of their pupils; speakers with the influence of their words on the opinions and feelings of others; authors with the results of their writings; rulers with the power they exert over the conduct and condition of many. All productive labour pleases. To cultivate a garden, to increase the fertility of fields, to plant forests, to turn rivers, to pierce mountains, to build houses or ships, to add to one's own wealth, to promote the prosperity of others, to contribute to their improvement—these are effects of labour which make daily exertion pleasant, and are abiding occasions of joy. They are a sufficient recompense for years of privation and toil. A lower and transient pleasure comes from works of a contrary character—pulling down, defacing, destroying. The mischievousness of children is sometimes the result of restlessness, the want of proper occupation; and is a manifestation of healthy but misdirected energy. The pleasure of effectiveness is more easily gained by destruction than by construction. That may be put down in a minute, which required many hours to raise. It is often more easy to give pain than pleasure, to injure than to benefit. Power is known only by its effects, and the extension and multiplication of these increase in some degree the pleasure and honour of Power, whatever the nature of the effects. Ineffective labour is a severe punishment, but effective

labour is its own reward. The greater and nobler the work, and the greater the difficulty overcome in accomplishing it, the greater the satisfaction and delight it affords. Knowledge pleases most when it presents symmetry, order, fitness, likeness; intelligence, enjoyment, energy, and goodness. Effectiveness pleases most when it produces the same. The high satisfaction of doing any work *well*, results from the full exercise of mental faculties, combined with thoughts of usefulness and approbation.

These four are the primary Causes of Joy. They precede all others, continue in combination with them, and are directly known, being experienced by all.

The emotion of Joy, by whatever cause it may be produced, is evidently different from any pleasant sensation. If the pleasure of remembering or anticipating pleasant *sensations* might be of the same corporeal nature as its object, this cannot be supposed of the pleasures of Knowledge, Exercise, and Effectiveness, which are not connected with any pleasant sensations, and are in every respect dissimilar. Joy is not a condition of the body, though it requires some cerebral action, as all other conscious states; and it often has a corporeal expression. It is shown in the brightness of the eye, the smile of the countenance, the quick movement of the limbs, the more rapid circulation of the blood; it often occasions speech and song, and always conduces to a healthy nervous condition, thus increasing strength. These are all corporeal *effects*, showing the connection of the Mind with the Body; but not their identity, or the material nature of the emotion. That Joy is in the brain, or the result of any change there, cannot be inferred from the fact that all mental activity, and every state of consciousness, now require the nervous force which is supplied by the brain.

Mental *pleasure* may awaken *desire*, and so prompt to action; but it is not always so. Objects please before they

are desired; they are desired because they have pleased; and they please the more when they have been desired. Association transfers the power of pleasing from the primary *causes* to what is connected with them, either as a *means* for their attainment, or a usual accompaniment. Thus objects once regarded with indifference become occasions of much Joy, without any present thought of that which makes them pleasant; and through many associations they may give more pleasure than any single primary cause. Money pleases from its association with many uses; it pleases when these are not thought of, and the simple possession may give more Joy than has ever come from any use.

The chief secondary causes of Joy are Riches, Authority, Society, Superiority. These please because they contain the primary causes of pleasure, or because previously connected with them. The secondary causes of Joy will be considered with the secondary objects of Desire. The highest Joys belong to the Affections, but other pleasures are fundamental to these.

All pleasures are good in themselves, but those which are low and transient are no gain, if they occasion the loss of the higher, the more extensive and enduring. These give the best direction to activity, and contribute to the welfare of the individual and of society. It is said by some that pleasures differ only in degree and duration, and that the greater and stronger must be preferable. But *intensity* and *extent* are not the only things by which enjoyments are estimated. Those which belong to the *animal* are inferior to those which belong to the *human* nature, and those which are common to the uncivilised and uncultured to those of civilised and educated men. Those pleasures are to be preferred which belong to the higher faculties and sensibilities of men, for they have a corresponding excellence; they are also most capable of enlargement and continuance, and are most increased by participation with others. Therefore

mental pleasures are better than any sensitive gratifications. These require little intelligence; they are brief and incapable of continuance or increase; and they have the littleness of all that pertains exclusively to self. Social affections give a larger and higher Joy than the pleasures which precede and prepare for them. In material objects and the pleasures of sense, we are impoverished by expenditure and by giving to others; but in mental objects and pleasures we are enriched by use and communication. Our personal experience is needful to the knowledge of the similar nature and experience of others. The Joy of conscious worth, of progress and improvement, is of all pleasures belonging only to self, the most comprehensive and certain and enduring.

CHAPTER II.

GRIEF OR MENTAL PAIN.

1. **G**RIEF is a state of Mind, the opposite to Joy. In some form and degree it is felt by all, and it belongs to human life from the beginning to the end.* It is produced by the loss of any causes of Joy, and by the presence of objects of a contrary character. Children are grieved by the loss of any causes of sensitive gratification, and by the prospect of any bodily suffering. All persons have some mental pain in the anticipation of bodily pain. The same emotion is produced by mental causes. Grief is felt in some degree when what was supposed to be knowledge proves to be ignorance and error, when curiosity is baffled, when we cannot learn what we wish to know. So in all engagements some mental pain is experienced, when exercise is checked and restrained, when efforts are opposed and rendered ineffectual. Men are grieved when hindered and stopped in any mental employment, when they find they cannot remember, imagine, reason as they once could; when their exertions are frustrated and their schemes fail. They are miserable when they have nothing to do. As Joy is increased when its object has been desired, so Grief is increased by contrariety to desire and expectation. Disappointment is always distressing. As association makes some objects pleasant, so it makes some unpleasant. As the

* It has many names—Distress, Sadness, Pain, Discontent, Dissatisfaction, Anguish, Regret, Sorrow.

greatest joys come from the Affections, so do the greatest griefs; but those which are not social in their nature precede those which are, and must be first experienced and known. As Grief is occasioned by the loss of causes of Joy, so is Joy caused by the removal of occasions for Grief.

2. The secondary causes of Grief correspond to the secondary causes of Joy. The loss of Riches, Authority, Society, Superiority produces much mental distress. As the greatest Joys may be felt without any pleasant sensations, so the greatest Griefs are felt without painful sensations. Grief is not a sensation, it is produced by Thought; but it has effects on the body. They appear in the dimness and tears of the eye, in the gloom of the countenance, in the slow movement of the limbs, in the depression of the nervous system. This aids the progress of disease, and lessens the power and disposition for exertion. It may give occasion for action, but it prompts none.

3. Grief is increased by sympathy, but gains some relief by expression. It is better often to suffer alone, than to suffer with others. When companionship in sorrow gives comfort, it is by the exercise of Compassion. Grief is alleviated by kindness given or received, but it is aggravated when the losses and disappointments of others are added to our own. Some little relief may be obtained by companionship in sorrow, when no compassion is given or received. Attention may be diverted from our own troubles, to those of others which are not so distressing.

4. Pain of body is in various ways beneficial, conducing to the preservation of animal life, to the development and exercise of its powers, to its health and strength; so it is with mental suffering. Grief has its manifold uses, contributing to mental activity, to the right use of all faculties and susceptibilities. Human nature would be defective without the capacity for sorrow, and is improved by some experience.

Both bodily and mental sufferings are for Moral discipline, and improvement. Mental pains, like those of the body, are often signs that something is wrong or wanting; and they are useful in the same way. They should lead to consideration, and to change, when the pain of grief may be properly lessened and removed. All griefs are not to be avoided. An incapacity for bodily pains would be hurtful and not beneficial; and in like manner mental insensibility to pain would be a degradation preventing improvement, and tending to the destruction of what is noblest in human nature. The griefs which are the common lot of mankind, are a part of the discipline now required by all. They are to be avoided and removed, wherever this is both possible and proper. But they are to be borne patiently with trusting hope, where they are inevitable. None need be in vain. For all there is either cure or consolation; and all may be occasions of present good and future joy, contributing to the welfare of the sufferers and their associates, and to the general progress of mankind. If the design of existence were present enjoyment, the whole constitution of Nature would be different from what it is. The present state is good, chiefly because it is a preparation for a future which is better.

CHAPTER III.

SURPRISE AND WONDER.

THESE are Mental Feelings occasioned by some kinds of knowledge. They are frequently experienced by all, though less common than the other emotions. They have a peculiar character and importance. Both are generally pleasant, but occasionally painful.

I.

SURPRISE is caused by *contrariety* to expectation, not by what is merely unexpected. We are surprised on meeting a friend whom we supposed to be in a distant country ; on hearing that anyone said or did what seems contrary to his known ways and character ; when persons fail whom we expected to succeed, or succeed when we expected they would fail ; when any objects appear to be different from what they were thought to be ; when any events occur which are deemed unnatural. Special interest is excited by what is surprising, and it receives more attention. Therefore it pleases by the addition to previous knowledge, and makes the pleasant more pleasant ; but it also makes the painful more painful. Children have a small experience, and meet with much that is contrary to their expectations. They like to be surprised, and to surprise others. In after life *surprises* are less frequent and less agreeable. They often show some error. If the lessons of past experience were rightly used, there would be few occasions of surprise ; and to perfect knowledge there can be none. Great surprises

give a shock to the whole system, and are sometimes very injurious. Smaller surprises may occasion pain by producing perplexity, showing some erroneous judgment, causing mental confusion. Surprise is of great use, in drawing attention to that which is an enlargement of prior experience, a correction of wrong inferences. What surprises is generally remembered.

Surprise has its natural expression in the eyes and face, in the sudden movement of the limbs, the utterance of the voice. Amazement and Astonishment are combinations of Surprise and Wonder, in different proportions.

II.

WONDER is awakened by greatness of any kind, material or mental. We view with wonder the height of a lofty mountain, the expanse of the ocean, the number of the stars, buildings of extraordinary dimensions. The same emotion is caused by considering the magnitudes, distances, and movements of the heavenly bodies; the force of gravitation, steam, electricity; the unseen power which regularly renews the verdure and fruitfulness of the earth, and sustains every living thing. Wonder is produced by what is mental and moral—by large attainments in knowledge, great intellectual ability, much energy of will in doing or suffering. Wonderful is the vast power exerted by governments over many millions of families, and still more so the greater influence of a few minds on many generations. Extraordinary courage, generosity, faithfulness, the highest examples of moral excellence, are also wonderful. When very small objects occasion wonder, the feeling is not caused by their littleness, but by the great ability and skill shown in their curious structure and exquisite finish.

Where experience is small, *wonder* may be felt when large houses and gardens are seen, large pictures and statues.

To feel wonder on such occasions shows some ignorance and inferiority, and therefore all *wonder* has been disparaged as a sign of deficiency ; but intelligence and culture increase the capacity for *wonder* in the contemplation of all that is truly great. The world is full of wonders, which require only attention and consideration to afford delight. Surprise comes from ignorance, and is transient ; wonder comes from knowledge, and is permanent. The common delight in the marvellous has led to much exaggeration, to descriptions and tales which only the credulous can believe. These are often designed merely for amusement, and their easy acceptance is no reason for rejecting all testimony to what is greater and better than any thing before known. They who know most expect to know more, and are best able to distinguish between reality and delusion, truth and deception.*

Wonder is sometimes shown by the open eyes and mouth, the more difficult breathing, the repression of speech and action.

In some things all emotions are alike.

Joy and Grief, Surprise and Wonder, are felt by all, though not in the same degree, or from the same causes. All men are capable of the same emotions, but they differ in mind as in body, some being more sensitive and vigorous than others, and some less so. Thus natural capacities differ much ; but the differences in the happiness and welfare of men come chiefly from their different use of the faculties and opportunities given to all.

The health of the Body prompts to the reception of food, and to the exercise of the limbs and organs, and is thereby preserved and promoted ; and so it is with the health of the

* The *invention* of some marvellous histories would be quite as contrary to experience as the *occurrence* of the events. All *fictions* have the marks of human imperfection, as well as indications of the age, country, and character of the writer.

Mind. And as bodily health is worth more than any pleasant sensations, so is mental health more precious than any pleasant emotions.*

Emotions differ as their causes do, and vary according to differences objective and subjective. The following are some of the principal Laws :

I. Greater objects affect more than the less, and the near more than the distant. But commonly the little when near, affect more than the great when distant.

II. Emotions being caused by what is thought of and believed, the more clear and complete the Idea, and the more it is considered, the greater its influence on the feelings. And the more sure the Belief in the reality of the occasion, the greater the emotion.

III. Feelings come more readily as they are wont to come; but all objects soon lose the power of novelty; and all sensibilities are lessened by disuse or misuse, neglect or excess. They may be repressed by resisting their tendencies to expression, and by attending to other objects.

IV. All emotions are increased by Sympathy. Small occasions of Joy and Grief produce great effects when many see and hear, think and feel together.

V. Emotions, when dependent on Association, are according to the closeness and frequency of the connection of the natural causes with associated objects.

* Animals appear to have some capacity for the emotions of Joy, Grief and Surprise; but only in connection with sensations. They are incapable of Wonder, which requires human intelligence and reflection.

DIVISION II.

PROPENSITIES. DESIRES AND AVERSIONS.

CHAPTER I.

PRIMARY DESIRES. PLEASANT OBJECTS.

1. **D**ESIRES are Mental Feelings tending to some Action. They are sometimes pleasant and sometimes painful, but they always incline to some movement of mind or body, and thus differ from Emotions.* There is no real Desire where there is not a disposition to do something for the attainment of the object—a feeling which prompts and facilitates action. Emotions precede Desires, and Desires precede and produce Volitions. No object can be desired unless known and thought of; and nothing is *desired* that is not like, or connected with, what has already *pleased*. But *pleasure* is not the only, or the chief object of Desire. Most Desires, the strong as well as the weak, do not respect pleasant sensations or pleasant emotions. The *objects* which cause

* Other names are Aspiration, Eagerness, Inclination, Longing, Yearning, Wish. Desire refers to the future. We *delight* in the past, present and future; but we do not *desire* what has been, or is; only what may be. The good that *pleases* when remembered in the past, or perceived in the present, is not *desired*, nor is it generally so described. The simple pleasure of anticipating any good is, like that of remembrance, only an *emotion*, though it is sometimes called *desire*. When the past or present is unknown, what is *desired* is *knowledge*; and for this something may be done.

these *feelings* are chiefly thought of, and often alone. It is so with the bodily appetites. Food is thought of and desired, more than the pleasure of eating and drinking. The things seen and heard are thought of and desired, more than the pleasures of seeing and hearing. Knowledge, exercise, effectiveness, are much more desired than the pleasures they give. As Pleasures differ in kind, so do Desires, and desires correspond in character to the pleasures from which they spring. Bodily pleasures produce desires of one kind, and Mental pleasures cause desires of another. No amount of bodily enjoyment would alone produce any mental emotion or desire. The pleasures of the senses, of the intellect, of the affections, are very different, and so are the corresponding desires. When *pleasure* alone is regarded, *desire* is limited to one's self; and when the pleasure is sensitive, the desire must be low, gross, and tending to selfishness. As *desires* are directed to pleasant *objects*, they have a higher nature, being of larger extent, requiring more intelligence, and admitting participation with others. The supposition that Pleasure is the sole, or chief, object of Desire, is contrary to common experience. Pleasure *alone* is seldom desired, or thought of. The *objects* which please are causes of *desire*, as well as the *pleasure* they give; equally so at first and more so afterwards. Pleasure makes objects desirable; but they are more desired, attract and please more when, not the *pleasure*, but the *object* itself is regarded and desired. Desires are not increased by the remembrance and anticipation of pleasant sensations and emotions, so much as by the consideration of their objects.

2. The primary desires correspond to the primary causes of pleasant emotions. All desire for a time the continuance or renewal of pleasant *sensations*—pleasant tastes and scents, sights and sounds, impressions and movements. The bodily appetites are desires for objects, which have given such pleasures, and removed the uneasiness caused by natural

wants. All have some desire for *knowledge*, for all have some experience of the pleasure it affords. All desire some kinds of mental *exercise*, for thinking in some way or other is pleasant universally. And so some *effects* of activity are desired by all, for all have found pleasure in making some change, in seeing that they have done some work. In all primary desires, that which gives pleasure and the pleasure which is given form one object of desire.* The desire for pleasure does not precede and produce the desire for its cause; but both are in thought combined. Only in the secondary causes of Desire, is there at first a separation in thought and feeling of the one from the other, and generally they are united.

3. Some have supposed that all operative desires are unpleasant, and that Pain is the only or chief motive of all action. Uneasiness is no doubt the cause of many actions, but certainly not of all. Desires are often effective, when they are entirely pleasant. Pain is not in animals the only or chief cause of exertion; they are more influenced by pleasure. In human beings Pain is not always the strongest motive. Desires become painful when excessive, when inoperative, when ineffective for the attainment of their object. But moderate desires, directed to proper objects, and prompting to some exertion, are always pleasant.

* We desire knowledge, not merely the pleasure of knowing; exercise, and not merely the pleasure of exercise; the effects produced, and not merely the pleasure of production. Delight and Desire are supposed by some to result entirely from the *association* of the object with previous pleasures. Association is one *cause* of these feelings, but not the principal. When any object is believed to have the *power* of pleasing, feelings come from what is expected of the *power*, more than from what has been enjoyed. The Joy of having a *cause* of many pleasures is *greater* than any single pleasure; and is of a *higher* kind, being the product of higher faculties. It is the same with Desire.

They contribute much to the happiness of every human life, being pleasant before they are successful ; and they enhance the enjoyment of every good. Whatever pleases gives more pleasure, if previously desired ; and every gratification of desire is pleasant. Some transient pleasure is found in seeking and gaining worthless things, if in any way they have become objects of Desire. The momentary pleasure is according to the intensity of Desire. Whatever is desired is supposed to be pleasant, and to be possible. No sane person desires what is known to be impossible.

Desire refers to Ends desired for themselves, and to Means desired only for the sake of something else. Means and Ends are often so connected that the same Desire includes both. Only what is agreeable is chosen and desired for its own sake ; but what is disagreeable may be desired and chosen, for that which is united to it. When the *means* and the *ends* are always thought of together, they form one object, and the desire is one. But if the *desire* for the means continues, when the end is disregarded, there has been a transfer of desire by association, from one object to another. When both *ends* and *means* are agreeable, the desire is stronger ; if the *means* are disagreeable, the desire is *diminished* and may be overcome by aversion.

4. Desire has by many been identified with Volition, and the latter is said to be merely a kind of the former,—directed to certain objects. But there is evidently a great difference, which will be subsequently fully considered. We *desire* directly the conduct of others as well as our own ; but we can directly *will* only our own. Our objects of thought may be alike objects of Desire, but only changes in our own bodies and minds are immediate objects of Volition. We first desire some object, and then choose to do something for its attainment.

The excitement of Desire is attended by an increase of nervous energy, so that with the disposition to Action the

requisite strength is spontaneously supplied. This causes restlessness and aimless movement, when not employed for the desired object. Earnest desire invigorates both mind and body, it facilitates and sustains effort; while weariness soon comes in the absence of desire. The energy given by Desire appears in all animals. Every passion causes some rapid movements.

Moderate Desires have no marked expression, but when they are so violent as to be called Passions, the outward signs are manifest. The eager look of the eye, the flushed countenance, the quick circulation of the blood, the rapid motion of the limbs, are produced by the increased nervous energy which supplies strength for vigorous exertions.

Desires are more enduring than Emotions, and they are more subject to control. We more often choose the objects we desire, and the measure of feeling with which they are regarded; as well as the ways and means by which they are to be attained. The most important Desires belong to the Affections, and will be considered with them; but all that we can know of others, and all feelings respecting them, must be according to what is first known of ourselves.

CHAPTER II.

SECONDARY DESIRES.

SOME objects are pleasant and desirable of themselves, simply because of their nature and the corresponding susceptibility; while others are pleasant and desirable from connection with these. The former must precede the latter, for no things could be desired on account of others, if some were not desired for their own sakes. We proceed to consider the objects which become desirable by Association. When any object is desired which is not to be gained by mere effort, the *means* of its attainment will be also desired; and when *means* and *ends* are closely and frequently combined, the *means* are themselves desired, first consciously for the sake of the *ends*, but afterwards alone, without any thought of their use. Money is a clear example of the power of Association. It is at first regarded with indifference; then it is desired for its many uses, and lastly it is desired for itself. The increase of money is often desired when it cannot be of any possible advantage, and when all the benefits are sacrificed for the sake of which it was primarily desired. A similar transfer takes place with other desires; and not only *means*, but mere *accompaniments* in the same way become objects of desire. The chief secondary desires, apart from the affections, are for Riches, Authority, Society, Superiority, Reputation, Freedom, Happiness.

I. Riches.

RICHES are in some degree to all the occasions of pleasure, and the objects of desire. Houses and lands, flocks and herds, merchandise and money—whatever can be made an exclusive possession—are objects generally desired. Some have therefore supposed that *acquisitiveness* is a principle in human nature, as it is in some animals; and that objects are sought and accumulated without any experience of their pleasantness and use. But this is without any evidence, for all desires may be fully accounted for by the common principles before mentioned. Riches are never valued before there is some experience of their advantage. They are known to procure many sensitive enjoyments, and to prevent many privations and pains; they facilitate and multiply the means of knowledge; and increase some kinds of exercise and effectiveness. They are visible and abiding representatives of many enjoyments in the past and in the future. For some cause or other they are universally desired, and the feeling of each person is increased by the sympathy of many. At first Riches are always prized as *means*, on account of their use; but by association they become *ends*, and may be desired irrespective of any pleasure or profit, when all the uses of wealth are lost or neglected.

That Riches are to some extent desirable to nearly all is quite certain; but it is equally certain that the common desire much exceeds their real worth. They are to be valued as means of obtaining for ourselves and others bodily and mental pleasures, and escaping bodily and mental pains. But while they increase some pleasures, they cause the decrease and neglect of others; and while they preserve from some pains, they produce others. Common experience shows that the rich are not the most happy, and that little wealth is required for the possession of the best joys.

Riches have some value in connection with the social affections. They obtain some honour, and may be used for the benefit of others. But the honour given to the possessors of wealth proceeds generally from a false estimate of its value; and the greatest usefulness belongs to the character and conduct, and not to material possessions.

2. Authority.

AUTHORITY is also universally desired. It is Power over others; the ability to determine their condition, or control their conduct. Power of every kind pleases, because exercise and effectiveness are themselves pleasant; and because it is the means of obtaining many advantages. Authority is thus pleasant and useful, and more so than any other power, because it is larger and more enduring. The least and the lowest find some pleasure in commanding others. Most desire to have at least one under them, to whom they can say, Go and come, Do this and that. Some like to have many servants and dependants, over whom they have some authority. To be master in a house, ruler in a village, or governor in a country, are common objects of ambition. To direct the movements of armies, the affairs of nations, is deemed desirable; and pleasure is supposed to increase with the extent of the dominion. This is only partially true; for personal authority is often lessened by this enlargement of rule; and the wise regulation of a few will do more for individual happiness, than the subjection of millions. Riches are sometimes desired for the authority they bring, and authority is sometimes desired for the riches it obtains.

Many advantages are obtained by the assistance of others, and the service of others releases from inferior occupations. But very often it is more pleasant and beneficial to do some work, than to order it to be done. The value of Authority for happiness and improvement is, like that

of Riches, much over-estimated, and from the same causes.*

3. Society.

SOCIETY is agreeable and attractive to all. It affords the highest pleasure by the occasions it presents for giving and receiving social affections, kindness and respect. But apart from these there are pleasures entirely personal, which are enjoyed by the most selfish. Sympathy increases, in some degree, all enjoyments, the lowest and the highest. Eating and drinking are more pleasant in society than in solitude. The companionship of children adds much to their happiness, by increasing in various ways their knowledge, exercise, and effectiveness; and it is so with men and women. Few can be merry alone. Sights and sounds, fancies and facts, that have little to interest or please in themselves, will often for a time give much delight in company. In all society there is something to be observed in the dress, speech, and behaviour of others, and often something to be learnt from them. In all social intercourse there is much to promote the easy and pleasant exercise of the faculties in conversation; much to help to some effective action, in pleasing and benefiting others; or even in annoying them. Observing how others speak and act, we are drawn and assisted to do the same. Imitation is one of the most common and agreeable modes of exercise. Though not a primary principle of action, it is of great importance. Examples show what may be done, the desirableness of doing it, and the way and means. Thus they give instruction, encouragement, and assistance; and imitation follows. Men are not *gregarious*,

* The *covetous* seek to have more than their share of outward possessions; the *avaricious* desire riches beyond their possible use; the *miserly* deprive both themselves and others of the advantages of wealth, in order to increase it. The *arrogant* claim, the *ambitious* seek, more authority than is due to them, or beneficial to any; the *tyrannical* use their power to the injury of others.

as some animals are; but they desire Society, partly for the many pleasures and advantages it affords; and partly for the exercise of those affections in which most human happiness is found. It is at first desired for the sake of those things, and afterwards it is desired though they are not expected or even thought of.

4. Superiority.

SUPERIORITY is a common object of desire; not the being above all, which is impossible, but above those with whom there is a frequent comparison. Children desire to be above companions in their classes and sports; artisans and artists desire to excel their associates: many persons desire to be stronger or fairer, wiser and wittier, than others; richer, more powerful, more honoured. So far as anything is itself pleasant and useful, it is naturally and properly desired; and more is to be desired, if there will be an increase of pleasure and usefulness. But mere *superiority* is not rightly pleasant, and is not to be desired. Comparison with those who are inferior gives the more complete apprehension of any good possessed, and so increases joy; but the joy comes from the measure of good perceived or supposed, not from the superiority. The consideration of *superiority* to the blind, the deaf, the maimed, the ignorant, the diseased, the poor, the afflicted, may cause joy and thankfulness; but these feelings come from consideration without any comparison. Comparisons increase knowledge, and contrasts deepen impression; but they are not always desirable, and they do not change facts. Superiority is lost when others are advanced to the same level; but this does not lessen any proper pleasure. When competition is for the general good—the progress and welfare of many,—and the prize can be gained only by one, it is right to desire and strive for *superiority*; but not for itself alone. In other cases *superiority* is not a proper object of desire; for the success of

others should be desired as well as our own. The *superiority* of one is the *inferiority* of another; and both are equally gained by increase, improvement, and exaltation on one side; or by decrease, deterioration, and degradation on the other. We have not more of any good because others have less, nor have we less simply because they have more. The common excessive desire for Superiority results from wrong associations, and an undue regard to the opinions of others. If it were natural and proper to desire our own *superiority*, it would be equally so to desire the *inferiority* of others; but this is a selfishness of which most would be ashamed. It is natural and proper to desire and seek our own progress and success, and it is natural and proper to desire also the progress and success of others. Superiority has no real value. They who have superior advantages of any kind have cause for joy, according to the worth of their possessions, and the use made of them; not according to the relation of their possessions to those of others. To surpass others in dress, equipage, furniture, entertainments, in social rank and popular esteem, can give little satisfaction, and should be little desired. But to desire a large measure of any real good is beneficial to each and to all. Emulation, the pursuit of good with others, is right and noble, beneficial to all; but Envy, the pain caused by the superiority of others, is base and wrong, injurious to all.

5. Reputation.

REPUTATION gives much pleasure through the social affections, and on this account is most to be desired; but it is desired also from other causes. The favourable judgment of others pleases as a confirmation of our own; and it is a means of obtaining many advantages. Reputation is some evidence of worth, and has many uses; and therefore is properly desired. They who are rich or noble or clever or learned, or powerful or wise or brave or good, desire to

be so esteemed. But some wish to be considered what they are not. The reputation may be more easily gained than the reality, and may seem for a while equally useful ; and therefore this alone is desired by some. Through association the opinions of others are desired, when they are known to be erroneous. Men wish to be thought rich, when they know themselves to be poor ; and to be supposed able and good, when they are conscious of weakness and wrong. When appearances and opinions are chiefly regarded, truth, honesty, and comfort are sacrificed to reputation.

Fame is the wide reputation which can be desired by comparatively few, but is to them often the object of the strongest desire. The fame of discoveries and inventions, of great physical achievements, of oratorical, artistic, or literary success, of victories and conquests, are deemed by some the noblest objects of human ambition. The numbers by whom these things are known and celebrated, who regard them with admiration, and esteem them glorious, increase indefinitely the pleasure they give, and make them attractive and apparently desirable. Small pleasures become great by present sympathy with many, and things of little worth are highly prized when it is known that they are so regarded by thousands. But popular honour is often given to the worthless ; and those who one day are extolled, another day are despised. Fame not deserved by true excellence, and real services to mankind, is a vapour whose brightness and beauty soon perish, and leave only darkness and disappointment.

6. Freedom.

FREEDOM is the absence of peculiar restraint on choice and action. He is free, who can choose and act as others—going or staying, doing this or that, working or resting, as he pleases ; so that he respects the rights of others. Physical liberty is the absence of physical

restraint; personal liberty the absence of those limitations on choice as well as action, which are imposed on some for the advantage of others. Political liberty is the absence of restraints on speech and action, not required by the welfare of the community, and according to laws directly or indirectly approved by the people. Freedom is not a positive good, but the condition of all progress, individual and social. It is desired as a deliverance from many losses and pains, and as that which is necessary to the most pleasant and profitable employment of human powers. There are restraints on choice and action which are natural and unavoidable; and these are beneficial; but others are degrading and injurious, hindrances to industry and improvement; designed to benefit some at the expense of others, but really injurious to all. Men are debased by bondage, ennobled by the use of Freedom.

Freedom, personal and political, is justly prized by all, and is worth all that has been done and suffered for its attainment and preservation. The love of Liberty may be one of the strongest and noblest of human passions, prompting to the greatest efforts and the largest sacrifices for the general good. The intensity of the feeling is according to the magnitude of the object, and the multitude who have the same interests and aspirations. But Liberty is not to be desired, apart from the uses to which it gives opportunity; and the passion which it has excited is sometimes owing more to the sympathy of many, than to expected benefits. It may be base lawlessness. Patriotism may be a hypocritical profession, the mask of low selfish aims; but the principle is not less praiseworthy. They who fought and died for freedom were often the benefactors of the world, deservedly honoured, and held in grateful remembrance.

7. Happiness.

HAPPINESS has been regarded by some as the chief, or even the sole, object of human desire. The term often comprehends all that is in any way good and desirable, bodily and mental, present and future. Persons are called happy whose wants are all satisfied, who have many present enjoyments, and only pleasant expectations. The present is too short to content any; and the distant future too uncertain or too indefinite to be regarded with strong desire by mankind in general. Nothing can be more contrary to experience than the saying, that all men do and must desire most of all what seems most for their happiness. This is in fact little thought of. Appetite, passion, custom, desires for particular objects, and affections for particular persons, generally determine the conduct of all. What has been described as the only, or the strongest, motive of human action, is comparatively rare and feeble. Few are much influenced by the consideration of their whole welfare or happiness. This is not often considered, or much desired. All objects please most when they are themselves regarded, and not the *pleasure* they give. Health of body should be desired, more than any sensitive enjoyment: and health of soul, more than any other possession. Without this, nothing is permanently good; and with it there is always good. Men err more by regarding too little, than too much, their own true Happiness.

Social Affections form a principal part of human nature; and therefore it is impossible that the Happiness of any one should be independent of that of others. Happiness, our own and that of others, will often supply a rule for conduct, and a motive; but it is never the only rule or the only motive, nor is it ever the best rule or the best motive. It is a great advantage to be assured always that in seeking the good of others, and in the performance of duty, we

cannot be losers ; but that our own happiness will also be thus promoted. But it is not good to be thinking always that we shall ultimately gain ourselves by what we do for others, and that Righteousness will bring us Happiness.*

Desire contains the three elements of Thought, Feeling and Impulse. These are combined in various degrees, and they act and react on each other. Thought must precede Feeling, and Feeling increases Thought. Feeling prompts to Action, and Action preserves Feeling. It is easy and pleasant to choose according to any strong Desire, but difficult and painful to choose in opposition. The tendency to Action increases with compliance, and decreases with resistance. It is easy to repress desires habitually regulated, but hard to overcome those habitually indulged.

* Happiness—*Eudaimonia*, which Aristotle says is generally understood to mean welfare, *living well* and *doing well*, (*τὸ εὖ ἔχειν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν*). This includes all that is desirable, and differs much from Pleasure (*ἡδονή*), which, he says, is chiefly pursued by the young, and the baser sort of men. (*Ethics*. I. c. 4.)

CHAPTER III.

AVERSIONS.

1. **A**VERSIONS are opposite to Desires, as their objects are. Feelings of one class are pleasant and attractive, drawing to their objects ; while those of the other class are painful and repulsive, driving from their objects. They thus differ in nature and tendency, but they are often combined. When we desire any pleasure we shall be averse to its loss, if this be thought of ; and when averse to any pain we may desire its removal. But it is not the same thing to regard what is pleasant, and what is painful ; to feel the attractive influence of the one, or the repulsive influence of the other. The difference in human life is very great, as the bright side of objects or the dark side is habitually thought of ; as attention is given chiefly to what is liked, or to what is disliked ; to what is to be done to ensure success and obtain good, or to what is to be done to avoid failure and escape ill. Aversions have their uses, but are inferior to Desires. They are more than painful feelings ; they prompt to the removal of what is adverse, and facilitate choice and effort for this end. When strong they have some involuntary expression in look, speech and gesture ; but they are not sensations, or states of the brain. As with Desires there is a supply of nervous energy to strengthen for pursuit, so with Aversions there is the same to prepare for resistance or flight. The most vigorous exertions are made by animals when striving to escape from some foe, or to overcome some opposition. Their contests

contribute to the development of intelligence and power, and are not generally unpleasant. There is some increase of strength, when effort is required for the removal of inanimate objects; but much more when some living power is resisted. Energy is lessened by irresistible opposition, and by inevitable pain; but it increases with the prospect of successful effort.*

2. Objects of Aversion correspond to objects of Desire, bodily and mental, primary and secondary. We think with aversion of the endurance of any expected pain of body, or the loss of any accustomed pleasure; and regard with the same feeling ignorance, interrupted exercise, inefficient labour. In like manner we regard with aversion the loss of riches, power, society, superiority, reputation, liberty; and still more the contrary conditions. The apprehension of these objects is painful, we shrink back from them, search for some way or means of escape; and strive by renewed and increased exertion to avert anticipated ill. Aversions are entirely painful when the offensive objects are alone regarded; but they become in some measure pleasant as they prompt to activity and produce exertion. The stimulus of pain is often requisite to urge to action, and action at once gives some relief. It is generally pleasant to resist and overcome opposition, to do what will remove or prevent suffering. The conquest of difficulties adds much to the enjoyment of life, and is a discipline for mental and moral improvement. As the bodily frame requires for its perfection something more than ease and enjoyment, so does the whole of human nature require some similar training.

3. Aversions are transferred by Association, especially to the *causes* of loss and pain, but they extend to other

* Other names for Aversion are Abhorrence, Abomination, Disinclination, Disgust, Displeasure, Detestation, Repugnance.

objects. Strong dislikes are often felt for things, places and persons, which have not in themselves anything unpleasant or injurious. They become disagreeable and repulsive through combination, in experience or in thought, with what has caused pain of body or mind. Aversions as well as Desires are to some extent voluntary and subject to control. The regulation of these feelings is of the greatest importance; for character, conduct, and condition depend on habitual Desires and Aversions. Desires may be directed to the highest objects or the lowest, to what is really desirable or what only seems to be so, to what is attainable or to what is unattainable. Well-directed Desires lead to success, happiness, and honour; while those which are ill-directed bring failure, misery, and disgrace. And so Aversions to all that is evil, according to the evil, are proper and beneficial, needful in the struggles and strifes we encounter; while those which may be felt for what is harmless, or useful and good, are profitless self-inflicted pains.

The strongest and most important Desires and Aversions belong to the Affections.

4. Some of the laws of Desire and Aversion are similar to those of simple Emotion; others belong to Active principles. All Feelings vary according to the proximity and magnitude of their *objects*; and according to the clearness and completeness of *thought*, the strength and steadiness of *belief*. All are increased by sympathy; and those which come from association are according to the closeness and frequency of former connections. But Desires and Aversions become stronger as they are obeyed, and weaker as they are resisted. Through repetition, less of pleasure or pain may be felt; but yielding to any desires and aversions gives them more power, while resisting them takes some away. The power of the appetites is increased by indulgence, though they give

less enjoyment; and so it is with all Desires. Passions become imperious when allowed to rule, submissive when required to obey; they are good servants, but bad masters. All natural propensities are good in themselves, but none can be always followed with advantage or safety. They secure good, when wisely controlled; but cause much ill, when ungoverned. Men are capable of self-control, and are therefore the subjects of Moral government.

CHAPTER IV.

HOPE AND FEAR.

1. Hope.

1. **H**OPE and Desire contain the same elements, but they differ in character. Material substances are often very dissimilar, when composed of the same elements in different proportions ; and so it is with mental states. Desire always has some belief respecting a future good, with some feeling, and some tendency to action. But with strong desire there may be little expectation of good, and much feeling to cause disturbance and distress. Hope has similar thought and feeling and inclination ; but it is distinguished by more belief and more reference to action. We *hope* for the good consequent on what we do, when we have a strong expectation of success. Hope is therefore always pleasant and invigorating ; and increasingly so, as it seems sure. Desire is not always pleasant, and often becomes painful. Desire regards chiefly the qualities of some object ; Hope regards the result of some effort. The degree of Desire is according to the supposed worth of the object, and the consideration given to it ; but the degree of Hope is according to the probability of success, and its dependence on our exertion. Hope is sometimes the name of a *judgment* respecting some good, without any *feeling* ; and sometimes of a pleasant feeling, without respect to any *action* ; but more frequently and properly it is used as the name of the feeling, with which we anticipate the success of our endeavours. Children *hope*

to succeed in their games, students in their studies, men in their efforts to obtain wealth or honour, or any reward of exertion. The measure of hope is not so much the desirableness of the object, as the effort made for its attainment, and the expectation of success. Much hope may be excited when the object is of the smallest possible value ; as in the games and sports of children and of men. The *expectation* of receiving wealth by the bequest of another, is very different from the *hope* of gaining it by persevering industry. The prospect of a release by the expiration of the term of imprisonment, is very different from the *hope* of effecting one's own deliverance by continued efforts. The *anticipation* of good, for one's self or others, will give no strength, if it tends to no exertion ; and is very inferior to the Hope which invigorates by prompting to exertion, and makes future delight a present possession. Hope lessens every burden, makes all labour pleasant, and brightens every lot. It gives strength and patience, courage and perseverance, contentment and a joy which remains when every other fails. It contributes much to the happiness of every life, securing always the pleasures of exercise, and often those of effectiveness also.

2. Hope is not a blind instinct, but the lesson of Experience rightly or wrongly used. We expect the good we have found, and it may be much more. If no good had been experienced, none would be expected. When former pleasures and successes are more remembered and regarded than former pains and failures, we think the future will be better than the past ; and it may be so, by the correction of errors and faults. Hope leads to disappointment when the lessons of experience, that of others as well as our own, are disregarded ; when we expect what is rare and exceptional, and look for results without using the proper means for their attainment. Sooner or later all reap as they

slow ; but there must be working and waiting, for any harvest worth reaping. There is a wise hopefulness, which grows with experience, and is confirmed by reflection ; and an unwise hopefulness, which comes from choosing to regard pleasant fancies more than real facts. The best hopes rest on testimonies and promises, human and Divine. Hope respects all the objects of desire and aversion, longs for the attainment of the one, and the avoidance of the other. It is much increased by Sympathy, and thus many hopes are raised far beyond any actual experience, any possible fulfilment. The pleasure and the benefit of Hope are offered to all ; and it need not end in disappointment.

3. Hope has its expression in the brightness of the eye, the smile of the countenance, the cheerfulness of the voice, the briskness of the motions. It has its bodily expression ; but is not an affection of the senses, or of any part of the nervous system. Pleasure precedes and produces Desire, and this precedes and produces Hope. But they differ in nature, and in degree. Hope is not always according to Desire, nor Desire according to experienced Pleasure.

2. Fear.

1. FEAR is related to Aversion, as Hope is to Desire. The term is sometimes used for a simply intellectual, or emotional state ; but commonly and more correctly it denotes the feeling excited by some expected ill, and tending to some action. Pain is the occasion of Aversion, and this produces fear. All are conscious of Fear when they encounter some new peril. They *fear* a fall when they have to walk in dangerous places ; they *fear* some injury when a wild beast approaches ; they *fear* when there is the alarm of fire, the apprehension of shipwreck. Children may be afraid of shame and punishment, when called to recite their lessons ; most persons are afraid of accidents and harm,

when they move in darkness ; they are afraid of failure in new work, of awkwardness in a new position. There may be much *fear*, when the *ill* is very small, but the risk of acting improperly is great. Young persons fear much a little awkwardness, or ridicule. Strong men may tremble when they have to speak before a large audience, or in the presence of the sovereign, if unaccustomed to such performances.

Fear urges to the avoidance of what is dreaded, and is itself painful. It lessens strength, and incapacitates for any exertion, but that of seeking some way of escape. When this is found, the enfeebling influence of *fear* is removed by the invigoration of *hope*. It is better to stand still in danger, till we know where to flee for safety ; to do nothing, till we know what it is proper to do. The prospect of any ill is beneficial, either by giving the opportunity of escape, or preparing for patient endurance. Danger may be escaped by flight, or overcome by resistance ; and consideration is requisite to discern which of these is to be preferred. When we should flee, and whither ? When we should resist, and how ?

2. Fear may be reasonable and beneficial, or unreasonable and injurious. It is right, if according to the magnitude of the ill, and the probability of its occurrence ; right, if it leads first to consideration, and then to proper action. It is wrong, if disproportionate to the occasion, if debilitating and disturbing in its effects. It is wrong, unmanly, and immoral, if allowed to prevent consideration, to determine conduct, to overcome the dictates of prudence, affection, and conscience ; if it prevents the doing what ought to be done, and occasions the doing what ought not to be done. The dread of pain, as well as the desire of pleasure, may be injurious and destructive ; and Courage as well as temperance is necessary for permanent well-being. Fearlessness

may result from ignorance, inconsideration, insensibility ; and then it is a deficiency and disadvantage. Courage is the result of knowledge and choice. It is deservedly honoured ; because without it men cannot do what is best for themselves or others, in many of the most important conditions of human life ; and it is not maintained without some moral culture. Fear is much increased by sympathy, and the flight of one may cause many to flee, as the courage of one will cause them to stand. It has often caused cruelty ; the lives of others being sacrificed for self-preservation in the panic of fear. Less fear is often felt when the ill is known to be certain and inevitable ; as there is less desire for what is found to be impossible.

3. There may be fear, not because danger is seen, but because safety is not known. This is the instinct of all timid animals, who are frightened by what is strange, though they have never been hurt. So little children are afraid of strange people and places. Caution is natural and proper in unknown circumstances. We should choose the less ill, and flee from the greater ; but never choose the greater, to escape the less.

"I dare do all that may become a man ;
Who dares do more, is none."

Fear has its signs and effects in the wandering eye, the pale face, the trembling limbs ; in the faintness of the heart, the feebleness of the arm, the cry of terror. In various ways it disturbs the nervous system ; and many ordeals owe their value to these effects. The guilty are often betrayed by their fears.

"Conscience makes cowards of us all."

Fear affects the nerves more than other feelings, but it has no shape or size, nor any material properties. It is in the body, only as the Mind is.

DIVISION III.

SOCIAL AFFECTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

AFFECTIONS. GENERAL NATURE.

1. **T**HE difference between *animate* and *inanimate* beings is universally acknowledged; the marks are generally obvious, important, and permanent. The former are distinguished by some knowledge, feeling, and voluntary motion, of which the latter are destitute. As the properties of these two classes of objects differ, so do the *feelings* differ with which they are regarded. Many are common to both, but others are peculiar to *animate* objects, and are called Affections. The lower of these are felt *for animals*, and appear to be felt *by* some; but the higher require more than animal intelligence and ability. They belong to human beings, and to those who have the same or higher capacities; and are felt only *by*, and *for* such beings. Common pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, always precede the Affections, and are included in them; but they do not constitute the Affections. These are peculiar active principles, all tending to and facilitating some choice and action. They are either pleasant and attractive, or painful and repulsive. The objects of some affections are always *pleasant*, and *pain* is only an occasional accompaniment; while the objects of others are always *painful*, and *pleasure* is only a temporary addition.

2. Affections can be known only as they are experienced and examined. Their nature is not to be learnt by the study of common feelings. Earths are known before Metals; the two are commonly combined and not easily separated; the latter are more precious than the former, but less abundant; they have a different nature, origin, and use. So it is with common feelings and affections. The analysis of common feelings will no more give the nature of *affections*, than the analysis of Earths will give the nature of Metals. It is as impossible to make *affections* out of common *feelings*, as it is to make *metals* out of *earths*. Neither in what is material, nor in what is spiritual, do *elements* and *antecedents* show all that may be known, or that which is most important. This is universally allowed in Material Sciences, but is often disregarded in Mental, though equally true in both.*

* Every one who has felt any affection is to some extent conscious of its peculiar nature. One of the obvious characteristics is, that Affections find in their objects a sufficient end. We may desire one thing entirely for the sake of another, but we do not love or hate one person for the sake of another, or for the sake of any object. Affection, as well as Desire, is transferred by association; and so one may be loved more, because of some connection with another; but the affection regards only its proper object. We do good to one for the sake of another, but we cannot love one for the sake of another.

One Feeling may *precede* another, and *prepare* for it; but if they differ in nature, the one does not *produce* the other. Sensitive *pleasures* precede the *affections*, and *pains* precede *compassion*; but the former are not the *causes* of the latter. Liking may lead to loving, by drawing attention to personal qualities; but no increase of *liking* will cause *loving*. The use of *copper* may lead to the possession of *gold*, but no art will change the base into the precious metal. They would not be the same, if chemical analysis showed no difference. So all Mental states are known by what consciousness may show; not by their antecedents. Seeing is known to be different from Hearing, by the difference of which we are conscious, as well as by the difference of the outward organs. So Affections are known to be different from common feelings by consciousness; and they prove a different capacity. It would be as reasonable to suppose, that repeated *sounds* would produce *visions*, as that repeated *liking* would produce Love.

3. Affections belong to human nature, as much as sensations. All are capable of them, and have some experience and knowledge of them. They are the sources of most happiness, the motives of most actions, the most important objects of moral judgment. Affections form the principal part of every character, and give the chief value to human life. They therefore deserve separate and careful consideration.

Social Affections are those which are first known ; and these are divided, either according to their general character, as pleasant and painful ; or according to their special objects. Their principal combinations are also made distinct classes. We shall first consider the simple Social Affections which are pleasant and attractive, and form a large part of the worth and welfare of Mankind.

CHAPTER II.

PLEASANT SIMPLE AFFECTIONS.

I. Benevolence.

1. **B**ENEVOLENCE, or Goodwill, or Love, in its simplest form, is the most extensive of the Affections; being found in some degree in all men, and including all beings who possess any similar intelligence and sensibility. It is a *delight* in, and a *desire* for, the good of another, like the feelings which respect only one's separate good. It does not require the previous reception of any favour, as Gratitude; nor the present need of any relief, as Compassion; but it has respect to all who have a similar nature and condition, and are in any way associated. It is awakened by the consideration of *likeness* and *connection*; while it is hindered by all that prevents the recognition of affinity and union. It is as natural to find some pleasure in the good of another, and to desire it, as it is to have these feelings for what respects self only. Children are pleased by seeing the pleasure of others, and wish to please; parents delight in the health and happiness of their children, and seek their welfare; friends rejoice in the prosperity of each other, and desire this. To be pleased with any good we ourselves possess is one thing; to be pleased that others have the same good is surely another thing. To be pleased with the remembrance of our own former joy, and to be pleased with the present joy of another, are certainly different states of mind. The objects *are different*, and so are the feelings. Benevolence always

regards another being, distinguished from the conscious self: and without this loses its nature as an Affection. Some Benevolence is shown in the common intercourse of society, whenever persons wish to please and benefit others. There are few, if any, who live only for themselves, never caring at all for the enjoyment and well-being of others. The earliest social affections regard those who are nearest, whose common human nature and close connection are daily seen and felt; but Benevolence extends with knowledge, and embraces more and more. Wherever there is Benevolence, some pleasure is found in regarding the object, and in receiving Gratitude in return. They who care nothing for the *affection* of others, do not really regard the *welfare* of others: for this requires a proper reception of benefits. They do good for their own sakes; but this is not Benevolence.

2. Benevolence is increased by all that promotes a recognition of that which is common to individuals, and of all that connects one with another; and it is lessened by all that is adverse to this. A special *good will* is felt mutually where there is any companionship,—by children of the same school, workmen of the same shop, sailors in the same ship, soldiers in the same company,—by those who have the same pursuits, who have experienced similar difficulties and dangers, joys and sorrows. Not only members of the same family, but those of the same society or profession are often called *brethren*. So those of the same class, or clan or country, are most inclined to help one another. On the other hand, differences of colour, of language, of race, of religion, of social position, of state and occupation, will often prevent kind affection; by causing a disregard of the nature and condition which all alike share. Benevolence is most completely repressed by opposition and hostility. Then attention is restricted to what is adverse and repulsive. But that which belongs to all men still remains, and therefore Benevolence should never wholly cease.

3. Facts, innumerable and indisputable, prove that Benevolence is a part of human nature ; but it is only one of its active principles. It is generally feeble and partial in its operation. Unquestionably it would be better for each and all, if there were more of mutual kindness ; but there is no reason to suppose that it would be better for mankind, if Benevolence were the only motive of action ; or if there were the same measure of regard to the good of all. It is natural, reasonable, and right, that goodwill to some should be much stronger and more exercised, than towards others. Equality of affection is impossible, and would not be for the good of all, or of any. As Benevolence is based on the common nature and condition of all and their union, so most is felt when there are the most manifest correspondences, and the closest and most manifold connections. These are the causes of simple Benevolence, while other affections respect special objects, and have other causes.

4. If Benevolence were not a natural principle, it could never be promoted. It exists in all, but requires care and culture. It should be cherished, strengthened, and extended ; but too often it is neglected, repressed, and restricted. Self is naturally first regarded ; much that respects *self* is always near, and appears very great ; it requires no effort for consideration, its attraction is strong, its choice easy, its partial attainment speedy and sure. That which respects *others* is comparatively remote, and apparently small ; it requires some effort for consideration ; is generally less impulsive, and therefore requires more effort for choice, and for attainment. It is therefore quite natural, though not necessary, when the pleasure and advantage of others are opposed to our own, that the social affection should be overcome. This is so often felt in ourselves and seen in others, that the power of example and habit soon increase the primary tendencies to self-regard ; and render it difficult to seek the

good of others as we seek our own. As the deficiency of Benevolence comes from inconsideration, disregard of the feelings and interests of others, self-indulgence, and bad examples; so its increase is obtained by consideration, exercise, self-denial, and the example of those who properly regard the pleasure and welfare of others.

5. Generally more good is done to those who are near and dependent, than to others; more to those who are like, than to those who are unlike; more to those who are willing to receive good, than to those who are unwilling. Benevolence is especially felt towards those whose nature and condition, whose wants and relationship, we *choose* to regard; who are the objects of frequent voluntary consideration. It may be increased by the pleasant *associations* which draw attention to the *objects* of kind affections—the qualities and relations by which they are produced; and by *sympathy* with those who are animated by them. But most of all is Benevolence increased, confirmed, and improved by *doing* something for others. All active principles are strengthened by practice. The power to do good to others, the disposition to do good, and the delight in doing good, grow with exercise, and can be known only through personal experience. It is so with the simple efforts made to please others and gain their approval; and the largest endeavours to advance the prosperity of a nation, or the good of mankind. They who habitually, in things little and great, seek to please and benefit others are never miserable; they have some life-long good. Benevolence finds joy in all the good it produces or promotes, and some pleasure in all that is purposed or seen. It is not less real and pure, because it is pleasant and profitable; but so far as these ends are the motives of action, there is less of Benevolence and less of its joy. What is said of Mercy is true of Benevolence. “It is twice blessed. It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.” It is a

good to all, partly by the gladness it diffuses, but principally by the kindness it promotes, indefinitely extending. Its objects are to be found everywhere and always, and are boundless. When what is done for the good of others is always made to coincide with what is for our own ease and pleasure, advantage and honour, there is no evidence of Benevolence. But it is increased by any self-denial for the good of others. The good nature shown by an easy compliance with the wishes of others, and a wish they should share our pleasures, is the lowest form of Benevolence, and is not beyond the capacity of animals. It is often combined with an utter disregard of what is really beneficial, as well as of what is prudent and just.*

Some attribute all present Benevolence to other principles — Association, Sympathy, Imagination. But these causes never produce all the effects attributed to them, and are often entirely absent. Association only transfers what already exists. Liking one thing causes the *liking* of another: but no kind or quantity of *liking* can ever lead to *loving*, unless there be a higher nature in both subject and object. Liking regards what pleases and profits oneself. Love regards what pleases and profits others. We *like* those who please us, and *love* those whom we seek to please. Love always regards the good of another, as different from our own. It may be transferred by Association; but there must

* A few have denied the reality of Benevolence, and have described it as mere pretence and delusion. It is said that men love Pleasure and Power, and not one another; and that in some way or other, they always seek their own gratification or advantage in what they seem to do for others. But this is a caricature of human nature, contrary to universal experience. No doubt some apparent Benevolence is thus fully accounted for; but not all. There is joy in the good of others, when there is no exercise of power, no prospect of pleasure or gain. The former increases without any increase of the latter. The pleasures of Power are to be gained by injuring others, as easily as by benefiting them.

be an affection not produced by Association, to account for that which is thus produced.

Sympathy increases every feeling, and reproduces in one person what appears in another; but it does not change any, or excite any not already experienced. Sympathy increases pleasure or pain, love or hatred; but cannot transform pleasure into love, or pain into hatred.

Imagination aids Benevolence by representing fully the wants and welfare, feelings and affections of others; not by causing us to fancy that they are ours, as they are not. Benevolence regards the good of another *as* it regards its own; but it does not mistake it for its own, and not another's. Love makes the good of another to be our good, but not by the false supposition that it belongs to us, and not to another. It is not, as some describe, the greatest of all delusions, but the best and surest reality. If the pleasures and desires belonging to Self produced unconsciously the feelings of Benevolence, it is impossible that the recall of the former should lessen the latter. But the delight and desire felt in considering and seeking the good of others, are entirely lost, if we regard ourselves and not others. Disinterested affection is commended by all, but there is nothing to be praised if the selfish and the unselfish are seeking in various ways the same object.

2. Gratitude.

1. This is the most common and earliest of the Affections. It appears in little children, and is not entirely absent from the most hardened and degraded of mankind. It is one of the forms of Love, when this term is taken in the widest sense—*delight* in, and *desire* for, the pleasure and good of another. The *pleasures* and *desires* of others cannot be known till there has been some experience of these mental states; but when there has been the consciousness of them, there may be some knowledge of the affections

prior to experience. The development of affection in the mind of an infant is aided by the mother's love. With the earliest knowledge of outward objects, the child can see that the parent delights in its presence, and desires its pleasure; and this is sufficient to the awaking of Love. The nature, the power, the joy of Affection, cannot be known until they are felt. Then the Love of another is fully known; and produces more love in return.

2. Gratitude is caused by the knowledge of kindness; it is the return of Love for Love. It has been said to be merely the transfer to an *agent*, of the feelings which actions have produced. Common pleasures and desires *precede* affections; but the latter are very different from the former, they have a higher nature, and other causes and laws. A child's *love* for its mother is not to be classed with its *liking* for the fire which gives a pleasant warmth, the cup which gives pleasant food, the rattle which gives a pleasant sound. Liking is by association transferred, and one object is liked because of its connection with another; but no degree of pleasure and desire caused by things, will alone produce Love. Gratitude is increased by whatever increases the manifestation of kindness. The enlargement and multiplication of benefits will produce more Gratitude, if thereby more Love is shown; but not otherwise. None are grateful to houses for the shelter and comfort they give, nor to books and pictures for the enjoyment they afford, nor to machines for the useful work they do. We are grateful to agents on account of what they have willingly done, and still more on account of what they have willingly suffered, for our sake. Their sufferings can give no pleasure, and their actions may give very little; but both are valued for the affection they show. The smallest gifts, which are expressions of love, are more prized than the largest which have not this origin. *The labours and sufferings*, which prove to be vain for out

ward benefits, are not less signs of love, and causes of gratitude. With the pleasure given by any benefits, there is an additional and greater pleasure caused by the kindness of the benefactor. Many complain of ingratitude, because they do not receive much affection in return for the material favours conferred; but persons generally receive what they give. Love is returned for love. Gratitude prompts to please and serve the benefactor; and is pleasant in itself, and its influence. The expression of thankfulness in speech and conduct is always pleasant to the grateful person, to the benefactor and to spectators. It does much to promote the happiness and welfare of mankind, but is not produced by such considerations. Gratitude is not esteemed a great virtue, because it only shows that there is not unusual insensibility and selfishness.

3. Gratitude is increased by the consideration of kindness, by expression and sympathy. The sympathy is with those who have received the same or similar expressions of kindness, and who are also grateful; not with the benefactor who is the object of gratitude. Children have sympathy with children, in gratitude to their parents; pupils sympathise with pupils, in gratitude to teachers; and all who receive benefits have sympathy with one another, in gratitude to their common benefactor.

Kindness is estimated chiefly by what is done, sacrificed, or suffered, for the good of others. The magnitude of the good proffered, received, and enjoyed; the nature, number, and duration of the benefits bestowed; are some measures of the love from which they proceed. The *purity* of Love appears in the absence of all other motives; and its *strength*, in what it overcomes. More gratitude is due to benefactors, when there has been opposition, and when there is unworthiness, and when no profitableness is possible.

3. Compassion.

1. COMPASSION or Pity, is an affection which is felt by all, on some occasions, when regarding the ill, the danger, the wants and pains of others. It could not exist in human beings, without some prior experience of *ill* in themselves; but then it is naturally awakened by the ill of others, and prompts to their relief. Parents feel pity for the sickness and suffering of their children, and desire to help them. All persons feel compassion, when they see others in peril of being drowned or burned, and desire to rescue them. The poor pity those who are poorer than themselves, and wish to assist them. It has been said that in all this men are seeking their own relief and pleasure, that sympathy causes them suffering, from which they desire to be free. Sympathy has its influence on all, and its province and power will be subsequently considered; but evidently it is not Compassion. The characteristic of this affection is, that it regards the ill of *others*; and all are conscious of the difference between desiring to lessen the pains of others, and desiring to lessen the uneasiness these pains cause to themselves. The pain of others, when merely the cause of pain to us, is repulsive and drives away; but when it causes compassion it attracts, and draws nearer that aid may be given. If compassion were simply the suffering caused to one by the suffering of another, there would be the same compassion, whether one withdrew from suffering to relieve himself, or approached to give relief to another. They who are compassionate do not wish to lose the pain of sympathy, when this makes their service more effectual. The suffering of sympathy does more than urge to relief, it shows how this may be best given, and adds to the exercise and expression of kindness.

2. Compassion is caused by considering the privations, pains, and perils of others; and is a desire for their relief.

It has respect to those who need our help, as Gratitude respects those from whom we have received help. If any *ill* be regarded alone, whether it belongs to ourselves or others, it will occasion only pain; but the prospect of its removal is pleasant, the accompanying desire and hope are pleasant, the exertion to which they prompt is pleasant; and still more pleasure is found in the exercise of Compassion as a Benevolent affection. Any real desire for the good of others is pleasant to the agent, to the object, and to all who take merely a common human interest, in what is felt and done by and for their fellow men. They who feel no compassion for any are by all judged to be inhuman.

3. Compassion, when active and wisely directed, is profitable to all as well as pleasant. If there is no resulting *action*, the *feeling* may be slightly pleasant to the subject; but it becomes unhealthy and injurious, and can never be agreeable to the object or to others. Compassion, when inconsiderate, is often more hurtful than beneficial. It is so when it prevents a painful operation that might restore health, or the proper chastisement to correct faults, or the deserved punishment required for the protection of society; or when by relieving present wants, it promotes indolence, improvidence, intemperance. There is no Compassion in removing one ill, if thereby a greater is occasioned. Compassion should regard the unseen and the future, as well as the present and seen; and when directed to the whole welfare of any, it is pleasant and profitable to all.

Compassion is generally painful in some degree. The pains of others cause pain, as the pleasures of others give pleasure. Pain is most felt when compassion is ineffectual; but pain may precede pity, being produced by involuntary sympathy, and prompting to some exertion for the removal of an ill, in which the spectator has some share. But involuntary sympathy may cause Aversion.

4. The pleasure often found in spectacles and tales of suffering, has been thought by some to show that the *ill*, as well as the *good* of others, is naturally agreeable. But the cases are very different. The *good* of others is itself pleasant, more than the accompaniments; while the *ill* of others becomes pleasant by these. Spectacles and tales of suffering interest and please, by exciting curiosity and speculation respecting the course and issue of events; by displaying skill and energy, and courage, and fidelity, love and devotion; by causing sympathy with those who succeed, and compassion for those who fail. Compassion is pleasant, as all benevolent Affections; and some slight enjoyment attends it, even when it is useless. This becomes less, when the *feeling* leads to no *action*; and a stronger stimulus is needed to produce the same excitement. Operative compassion increases sensibility and benevolence; but inoperative decreases both. The former is pleasant and good to all, but the latter is a small self-indulgence, giving little pleasure to the subject, and none to others. Besides all this, tales and spectacles often please by the graces of composition, artistic skill, and the excitement caused by the presence of many seeing, hearing, feeling together.

5. SYMPATHY, or feeling with another, is etymologically the same as Compassion; but they are very different, though not always distinguished. Compassion is Pity for the Ill of another. Sympathy is not a peculiar affection, but belongs to all *feelings*, as increased by participation. We have sympathy with joy as well as with grief, with mirth, surprise, respect, and resentment. There is Sympathy, when the same feeling is excited in two or more persons, by the same or similar causes. It requires a similar nature and occasion; and we have more sympathy as our former experience is like the present experience of another, and is remembered. We may be gladdened by the joy, or grieved by the sorrow of

another, without any sympathy. So we may be pained at the foolish mirth of others, amused at their needless fears; or surprised at their astonishment, angry because of the resentment of others. There are *similar* feelings not only without Sympathy, but because there is none. Only in reference to *suffering* is there said to be *sympathy*, when the feelings have not similar causes, but the pain of one causes the pain of another. Sympathy results from *likeness* of nature and condition; there is little or much sympathy as there is little or much agreement, and as this is thought of. They who have experienced any sorrow, most fully know the similar sorrows of others, and most readily sympathise with them. What they now witness in others recalls what they once experienced themselves. Sympathy leads to Compassion, but they differ in nature. They often correspond, but there may be much Compassion and little Sympathy, and much Sympathy with little Compassion. Sympathy in pleasure increases pleasure, and sympathy in pain increases pain. Love and trust and admiration are increased by sympathy, and so it is with every emotion and desire.*

6. Sympathy tends much to promote Compassion, and therefore they are often confounded. It *directly* increases Compassion, when there is present sympathy with those who pity the distressed; *indirectly* when the sympathy is with those who are in distress. Compassion is according to the *ill*

* From the limitation of human intelligence, there cannot be a full knowledge of any *ill* without some similar experience; and from the incompleteness of human action, some suffering attends the exercise of Compassion. But pain becomes less, as the work to be done, and the good to be given, are more regarded. When the reasons and results of suffering are fully seen, and all is done that can properly be done for its removal, then it is quite possible that the greatest Compassion should be without pain. Sympathy with men requires the limitations of humanity, and cannot be without some experience of suffering; but this is not necessary to Divine Compassion.

of another. Sympathy according to the *similarity* of experience. The remembrance of a former distress is made more complete and painful by what is seen in another; and the state of another is thus more fully known, and causes more pity. Sympathy in any human feelings requires some regard to the *personal* nature of others, which is the object of all affections; and thus contributes to Compassion and Benevolence. They who are naturally, or habitually, more *sympathetic*, are generally more *benevolent*; but not always. Sympathy alone is no virtue; but it is a most important aid, when rightly used.

4. Emulation.

1. Besides the three Affections which tend directly to the good of others, there are also three which are properly described as Benevolent. The first of these respects those who have the same or similar aims and pursuits. It regards the action of another and prompts to similar action. They who are companions in the same school, students in the same class, workmen in the same shop, artists in the same galleries, barristers in the same court, competitors for the same prize, are naturally drawn together. They have more than the sympathy of common possessions and experiences, because they seek the same ends, use the same means, encounter the same difficulties, are mutually helpful in guidance and encouragement. Men as well as children work more cheerfully and vigorously in society than in solitude. When the work requires that the agent should be alone, it is always pleasant and useful to think of those who have been, or still are, engaged in the same way. Animals work more readily and strenuously, and run more eagerly and quickly, when they work and run with others.

2. Example, imitation, association have contributed much to progress in art, science, literature, commerce, and in every

kind of industry. Emulation aids in the advancement of individuals and communities; and properly used promotes the happiness and welfare of all. It tends to increase Goodwill by multiplying connections and correspondences; and by manifold occasions for giving and receiving assistance and encouragement. Competition gives the chief interest and enjoyment to many games and sports; and has a beneficial influence in all engagements, by producing diligence and perseverance. Where the success of one helps to the similar success of another, the increase of mutual kindness is the only natural result of emulation. But not unfrequently the gain of one must be the loss of another; and if the loser is selfish, this pain will prevail over every other feeling, and be regarded as an injury. Where there is no loss, the contrast between success and failure may make the latter more painful, and cause aversion to the former. This is Envy, which is different from Emulation, and contrary in its cause and character.

3. In the best pursuits all may succeed, and the gain of each is a gain to others. When there is but one prize, and only one can gain it, all have the benefit of Emulation; and Benevolence makes the success of one, as it were, the success of many. The whole school will rejoice in the leader's success, though many are losers. The abuse of Emulation is seen in the excessive desire which it often causes for things of little value, and in the undue regard paid to mere appearances. Both these result from the abuse of Sympathy. What is sought for by many, is much desired, though comparatively worthless; and common judgments and feelings are often according to outward signs which are far from the truth. Emulation produces most disproportionate desires in the pursuit of riches, power, rank, and fame; and frequently leads to the sacrifice of the best objects of life, in the endeavour to surpass and outshine others.

5. Trust.

1. Trust is not always an Affection, for it often refers only to propositions, or to inanimate objects. It always includes some belief, feeling and choice; and when these respect *persons*, there is a peculiar Affection, more or less agreeable. It regards those on whom there is some kind of dependence, whose help is needed and desired. When directed to worthy objects it is an affection most pleasant and useful. It regards the better qualities of its object,—strength, steadfastness, intelligence, truthfulness, kindness, integrity; and their relation to ourselves, or those for whom we have to choose and act. Persons who have these qualities are trusted. They are agreeable and attractive to those who have anything to do with them. It is always pleasant to trust, and it is pleasant to be trusted. Some mutual confidence is necessary to all society, and scarcely anything contributes more to its peace and prosperity. Those who are inferior have to trust their superiors, and the superiors have in many things to trust their inferiors.

2. Some are to be trusted only in certain things, others may be trusted in all. Some are to be trusted, so far as veracity and honesty are concerned; others for judgment, in all that respects their particular profession. Where Trust is properly placed it is confirmed by experience, and strengthened by exercise. The truthful and steadfast are ready to trust, supposing others to be like themselves. They sometimes lose by this; but not so much as they would lose by habitual distrust. Some become trustworthy by being trusted. Trust and belief are founded on some evidence supplied by experience. They are never wholly produced by choice and action, but are thereby increased and established. The early confidence of children, is according to their limited experience; the more discriminating confidence of after life, is according to a larger experience. We love those whom we can trust, and we trust those whom we love.

3. All progress in what is good depends on some Faith in a power, wisdom, and goodness, higher than our own. These attract, encourage, elevate, and gradually assimilate. None are independent of others. Independence in all things is impossible and undesirable. It is better for all that they need some help, and can give some. But it is not good to be needlessly dependent, and still less to be burdensome to any.

6. Respect, Admiration, Reverence.

1. These are Affections of the same nature, often differing only in degree. Respect is felt for persons who have the ordinary measure of human intelligence, ability, industry, sobriety, courage, and goodness. Inanimate objects are not respected, nor any animals; but some respect is due to all who have and use the higher endowments of human beings. They cease to be respectable when they do not act as men, but as brutes. It is pleasant to respect, and to be respected. Children who behave properly are respected, partly for what they are, but more for what they will be; and the prospect of the future makes men more worthy of respect than the present alone. Character is the proper object of respect. Single actions, outward condition, social position, titles and ornaments, cannot alone make anyone worthy of respect. These are commonly signs of some personal qualities which deserve respect; and they are so esteemed, though often by association the respect is given to the sign alone. Thus the base are deemed noble, and they receive much honour who deserve none. Those who hold any office may rightly claim and receive honour, not for their character, but entirely for their office. The representatives of Law and Justice, of Order and Government, are always to be honoured.

2. **ADMIRATION** is felt for persons of more than usual strength and beauty, skill and industry, abilities, attainments

and achievements ; for extraordinary virtue of any kind. It is pleasant to admire, and to be admired. Works of art are also admired,—pictures, statues, buildings, books and music,—but the higher feelings with which these objects are regarded come from the personal qualities of which they are the expressions. These are often consciously regarded, and the author's genius, power, and sensibility are admired in his works. When these qualities are not thought of, some of their influence comes by association. It is the same with the works of Nature, which are objects of the highest admiration, for their exquisite finish, their transcendent beauty and grandeur, their endless variety, their inapproachable perfection. The admiration felt and expressed by all intelligent persons, on beholding and considering the countless objects which Nature shows to all, as well as those which Science has discovered, are a testimony to the presence of Mind everywhere. There is nothing admirable in Matter alone,—in an atom, or any aggregation of atoms,—without thought or purpose, sensibility or intelligence.

3. REVERENCE is felt for the greatest mental power, the highest moral goodness, for those who have the largest influence on the conduct, condition, and character of human beings. Material greatness will produce *wonder* and *awe* ; but no *reverence*. Man's spirit cannot revere any nature inferior to itself. Some animals are capable of a measure of respect ; they know something of the superiority of Man. They feel and acknowledge it ; sometimes with painful fear and reluctant submission ; and sometimes with grateful trust and cheerful obedience. Respect, admiration, and reverence are no signs of inferiority, if felt towards objects worthy of these feelings. To be without respect for others, to have no admiration for excellence, no reverence for greatness or goodness, is a manifest proof of incapacity, ignorance, and *insensibility* ; and shows an habitual preference of the low

pleasures of sensuality or selfishness, to the higher enjoyments which are intellectual, social, and moral.

4. The objects presented to us for admiration and delight are innumerable,—the great and good of all countries and ages, all the works of human art and genius, and the more wonderful works of Nature. Admiration, less than other feelings, is affected by the lapse of time. We cannot be much moved by the joys and sorrows of those whose lives are far removed from our own; but we may feel the same admiration for the great and good, that was felt by their contemporaries; even when there is no present personal connection, but more easily, if this is the same to us and to them.

5. Gratitude, Compassion, Emulation, and Trust regard some special relation of the objects to ourselves; but Benevolence and Respect regard only the nature of their objects. Gratitude is felt towards those from whom *we* have received kindness; Compassion, towards those to whom *we* may give relief; Emulation, towards those with whom *we* have the same pursuit; Trust, towards those on whom *we* depend for something. But Benevolence, Goodwill, is felt for all, and we delight in the happiness we do not share and cannot increase. Respect and Admiration are also universal. Genius, goodness, excellence, are esteemed and please, though the objects have no special relation to ourselves. It is enough that we know them. All the Benevolent Affections are agreeable and attractive, they readily coalesce, and are generally combined. We love those whom we pity, trust, respect; and pity, trust, respect, those whom we love. These feelings are pleasant from the nature of their objects, and painful only from occasional accompaniments. They are capable of indefinite enlargement, and are increased by ever widening sympathy. They are good and produce good to each and to all.

CHAPTER III.

FORMS OF BENEVOLENT AFFECTION.

I.

FAMILY AFFECTIONS.

1. **A**FFECTIONS may be classified according to the objects to which they refer, or according to the persons to whom they belong. The character of any single affection is according to the nature of its special object ; but the affections of persons are composite, and are according to their various relations. Having noticed the Benevolent affections separately, we proceed to consider some of the most important forms in which they are seen : and begin with those of the Family.

The love of parents for children, of children for parents, and the mutual love of the children, are the earliest and strongest of human affections. They are the common experience of mankind, and are the foundation of all that is best in human character and life. The importance of the family affections appears in the natural provision made for them,—in the conditions favourable for their development, and the manifold pleasures and advantages which are a preparation for their existence, and a reward for their exercise.

2. Parental love, estimated by its effects, is the strongest and most useful of human affections. It secures the preservation of infant life, and what is needful for its progress. The early connection of children with parents

is close and constant, their helplessness and dependence are entire and manifest; they often excite compassion, and give at first great joy. Their well-being delights much and awakens earnest desire. Innumerable cares, labours and sacrifices are cheerfully accepted for their good. Parental feelings may be at first limited and low, and combined with pride and other kinds of selfishness; but not the less there is genuine love, when the good of another being is alone regarded. If this love is cherished, preserved, and enlarged, it becomes a true, noble human affection. Without reflection and self-control, the parent will care for the present ease and enjoyment of the child, and not for its permanent well-being; and will seek more the pleasure which the child gives, than the good it needs. The increase of trouble may soon produce aversion, and affection may quickly pass away. It is thus with the affection of animals for their offspring, which is always limited and transient. When human affection is cherished by the consideration of its proper object—the needs and capacities of a human being—it will be increased by the daily ministrations of love, the new benefits continually bestowed. Liking is increased by the pleasure received, loving by the pleasure given; and still more by the communication of any lasting good. Liking may lead to loving, or be mistaken for it. The parental fondness which regards children as objects of enjoyment and amusement, and the parental ambition which values them as means of social distinction and advantage, are only modes of selfishness. Children soon distinguish those who really love them; and true parental affection is seldom without the return of some gratitude, and the reward of some success.*

* The affection of animals for their young is strong, and prompts to much service and sacrifice; but it regards only what is present and sensible, and is not the result of reflection and choice. It soon ceases, and is simply natural, not having any moral quality.

3. Filial affection is distinguished by the gratitude, respect, and trust, which are combined with goodwill. The closeness of early connections, the reception of countless benefits, the expressions of parental love, the consideration of superior strength, wisdom and goodness, the consciousness of manifold dependence, all combine to produce that love of father and mother, which is the commencement of all goodness, the foundation and safeguard of all virtues.

4. The love of brothers and sisters has its source in their natural relation, and early associations. It is sustained and increased by their common participation in many outward benefits, in possessions and pursuits, in joys and griefs, in hopes and fears. They who live for years in the same home, know most of one another, and have most of the sympathy which belongs to sameness of condition. They will have more affection, if their many connections are occasions for mutual service, for the expression in little things of mutual respect and kindness. But these connections may occasion much that is unpleasant in petty self-assertion and opposition; and thus cause irritation and vexation, and so produce aversion instead of love.

II.

1. FRIENDSHIP is a *voluntary* relation, the association of persons who prefer one another to most others. There is a special delight in and desire for the presence, the pleasure, the welfare, of those thus related. The connection is chosen because of many *agreements*, through which there is more than common sympathy; and some *differences*, through which there is more than common mutual helpfulness. Frequency of intercourse, and fellowship in many possessions and pursuits, pains and pleasures, produce more than common goodwill, which is increased by benefits given and received. There cannot be friendship without some mutual respect and

confidence; and those most known will be naturally most esteemed, though not supposed to be superior to all others. Friendship adds much to the happiness of life, to its success, dignity, and usefulness.

2. The most important of these relations are those formed for life by men and women, united to be over one family. The preferences which lead to this union have often no proper and permanent cause or reason. Mutual agreeableness in occasional intercourse, combined with the mutual attraction of the two sexes, may give rise to an affection which for a time invests the object with imaginary charms, and produces the most passionate desire, prompting to the sacrifice of everything. But the enchantment of passion, resulting from the concentration of attention, and the delusions of fancy and feeling, soon passes away. Experience shows that preferences, however strong, are unreasonable, if not founded on reasons which respect the duties and trials of wedded life, as well as its pleasures and amusements. The passion which bears the name of Love may be merely an animal propensity, tending only to the gratification of self, indifferent to the injury and ruin of its object; this is easily changed into aversion. But when associated from the first with true affection, passion contributes to the growth of that real love which becomes stronger with increased knowledge, mutual service, and companionship in all the labours and sorrows of life, as well as in its joys and hopes.

3. The passion of the sexes belongs to the nature of animals, and is an instinct designed to secure the preservation of the species; but man is more than an animal. Human affections are immeasurably superior to any bodily appetites; and family relations are necessary for all that is best in the condition and character of human beings. Experience shows that the welfare of individuals and society requires that the

connection of the sexes should be permanent and exclusive, according to the affections of human beings, and not as the appetites of brutes. Permanence and exclusiveness are naturally desired, commonly purposed, professed, and promised. Thus from the first nature gives the lessons, which experience confirms and enforces.

III.

1. PATRIOTISM is an affection for one's country or nation. It primarily respects the people and not the land, though this too becomes dear on account of its inhabitants. There is a special delight in, and desire for, the safety and prosperity of those who belong to the same race, speak the same language, have the same laws and literature, share the same perils, enjoy the same advantages. The affection is strong because the object is great and near, and innumerable benefits have been received from it; but still more because so many share the feeling, and there is sympathy with the present and preceding generations. The memory of those who in former ages have lived and died for the good of their country, increases the patriotism of their descendants. Men are bound to preserve and improve for their children, the inheritance received from their forefathers. This is noble and honourable, while indifference to the welfare of one's country is mean and disgraceful.

2. But Patriotism has often led to great crimes, because of its exclusiveness. To seek the good of one's own country at the expense of another country, can be no more proper, than to seek one's own advantage to the injury of our neighbour. Injustice can never be for the good of a nation. Miscalled patriotism has caused cruel and destructive wars, the oppression of the weak by the strong, the contempt of those who differ in speech, race, and complexion. The name of Patriotism has also been given to the affection which regards only a

small portion of the people, the ruling class; the maintenance of their privileges and authority being taken as the good of the whole nation. The welfare of all classes ought to be alike considered, for as it is with the natural body so it is with the political; and if one part suffers the rest must suffer also. Patriotism sometimes needs to be promoted, but it always requires regulation. It is ever praised, for it is of general advantage. But its popular character proves that it cannot pretend to be always wise and right. It has often been highly honoured, without any proper cause.*

IV.

1. PHILANTHROPY (*φιλανθρωπία*) is the affection which regards every human being; the love of all men, simply because they have the common nature, condition, and destiny of men. Benevolence is the goodwill which respects individuals, Philanthropy is the same affection when it

* Christian Brotherliness (*φιλadelphία*) partakes of the nature of Friendship and Patriotism; having respect to personal qualities and relations, to special privileges and duties; to the members of one Body, the subjects of the same Kingdom. It is not often excessive, but it is often improperly exclusive; not including all Christian brethren. Sectarian partizanship is a low attainment, often hurtful, fostering pride and uncharitableness. Christian love is the highest of the social affections, and it is beneficial to all. It has respect to the objects, qualities, and relations, which are highest and best and most enduring. It recognises and acknowledges the fellowship of all Christians; and desires that all men should receive the one Lord and Saviour of all.

Patriotism is not specially commended in the Bible, being not always a virtue; but it presents the noblest examples. Moses, Samuel and the Prophets were eminent for their Patriotism. He who is the example of all virtues, laboured primarily for the good of His own people. Notwithstanding their ingratitude He sacrificed Himself for them. He wept over Jerusalem; and directed His followers to begin their work in the place where He was crucified. S. Paul ever retained a passionate preference for his countrymen; seeking first their good, and then that of all nations.

embraces all mankind. According to the magnitude of this object, the affection would be above all others ; but not so, if estimated as it should be, according to its power and use. The special affections, which regard particular objects, have in all men far more power than those which respect the largest collections. The benevolence which regards a few who are near, is more useful than that which respects many who are far off. It is the dictate of nature, that benevolence should be primarily and principally directed to those who are near ; that it should begin in one's own house and neighbourhood, with one's own family and associates, and be chiefly concerned with them. The principle of action is thus strengthened, and the best ways of its exercise are learnt. There is the requisite preparation for labour in wider fields of usefulness ; and indirectly, through transmitted influence, the greatest benefit to all mankind.

2. Schemes for the greatest good of the greatest number may be warmly supported, for the pleasure in various ways afforded to the advocates ; and many plans have been proposed for the renovation of society, equally foolish and fruitless. Christianity is distinguished from all previous philosophies and religions by its universality. It was from the first proclaimed to be for all men, disregarding all limits of race or country or class. But by His example and directions Jesus Christ showed, that the *quality* of any work of benevolence was more to be regarded than its *quantity* ; that a personal influence on a few, by words of truth and deeds of love, was the mightiest force that could be used for the good of the whole human race. He never neglected the present for the sake of the future, or the few for the sake of the many, or those near for the sake of those far off. By doing good to those who were with Him, He established a society to include all classes of men, and to embrace all nations of the earth. His kingdom of truth and

love has extended beyond all the empires enlarged by fraud and violence, and will endure for ever.

3. Affections which are pleasant and attractive are always *good* in themselves, and in their general influence ; they constitute much of human excellence, and contribute much to the happiness and welfare of all. They are to be always cherished ; and to be followed, unless adverse to something similar or higher. But not unfrequently these affections are opposed to one another, in their particular tendencies. Benevolence and Gratitude to one may urge to injustice to another. Compassion may prompt to a relief which is hurtful to the sufferer, and unjust to society. To trust and help one, is to distrust and hinder others. The Affections cannot be taken as a sufficient rule of conduct, any more than other Desires. The inferior should yield to the superior, and all tendencies to action be regulated by Reason and Conscience.

Affections are increased by the consideration of their objects, by sympathy, by expression and action. Transient *emotions* pass away more rapidly after some expression ; but the Affections are always promoted by proper expression, and can be preserved only by corresponding conduct.

4. The Social Affections, which are the springs of our best joys, are also the occasions of much sorrow. The pains of the body are small compared with those of the mind, and the sufferings of solitude are less than those of society. As we rejoice in the good condition and conduct of the objects of affection, so we must be pained by their ill condition and wrong conduct. As we delight in the presence of those we love, so must we be grieved by their absence, and afflicted when they are taken away. As we desire their affection, so we must regret when it is withdrawn. Simply to be deprived of the objects of affection,—to lose the

kindness, gratitude, confidence, and esteem we have been accustomed to receive and give,—will cause more distress, than the loss of all the pleasures that riches can secure. Some sorrow is the inevitable accompaniment of kind affections; but the joys they give far exceed the griefs they occasion. There is often a selfishness in sorrow which makes it more intense; and an excess which results from the improper restriction of affection, a concentration on one of the regard which should have been extended to many. Few need to lose altogether any of the objects of love; and none need lose all. If what we have of any good were regarded as a temporary possession, to be used for the benefit of others,—and this it really is,—then less pain would be caused by its removal. It may be better for those whom we love, that they should not stay with us. Affection is purified and elevated by the discipline of sorrow. There is the best consolation in the assurance, that all events are ordered by a Will wiser and kinder than ours. In the present life it is found partially, and hereafter it will be seen fully, that there is good in all ill. “They who sow in tears reap in joy.” In many of the sorrows of life no comfort can be gained if we look only to what is “seen and temporal,” but some is always to be found in what is “unseen and eternal.” The latter are not less real than the former; and Man is made to look upward and onward to the Invisible.

CHAPTER IV.

SOCIAL AFFECTIONS—PAINFUL AND REPULSIVE.

1. **T**HESE Affections are contrary to those already noticed in their causes, character, and effects ; but they also belong to human nature, and deserve consideration. Benevolence, a delight in the *good* of others, is a common endowment of all ; but Malice, a delight in the *ill* of others, is the acquired disposition of comparatively few. Gratitude is awakened by kindness, and returns love for love ; but Resentment is excited by opposition, and returns ill for ill. Compassion is grieved by the *ill* of others, and seeks to remove it ; but Envy is displeased by the *good* of others, and wishes it less. Emulation is helped by the similar exertions of others, and rejoices in their success ; but Jealousy is pained by their endeavour to obtain what is desired, and still more by the loss caused by their success. Trust is an agreeable affection, for those from whom we expect any *good* ; but Suspicion is a painful feeling, towards those from whom we feel some *ill*. Respect and Admiration are felt for those who please by some excellence ; but Contempt is felt for those who are willingly offensive by deficiency, who prefer the bad to the good, the base to the noble. All these Affections are *natural* in one sense, being according to natural laws ; but some are *unnatural*, being acquired by voluntary associations. They are not *original*, but opposed to the primary affections, and the better principles of human nature. The natural Affections—Resentment, Jealousy,

Suspicion, Contempt—require to be guarded and governed ; but acquired dispositions—Malice and Envy—are to be always resisted and destroyed.

I. Anger and Resentment.

1. All animate beings in this world are subject to adverse agencies, which they have to avoid or resist. Their well-being is not secured simply by seeking what is pleasant and profitable, but they have to strive against what is painful and injurious. They therefore need *aversions* as well as *desires* ; and as the one class of feelings are naturally pleasant and attractive, so are the other painful and repulsive. ANGER is excited in human beings as it is in animals, by any pain coming from an *animate* cause. When the cause of suffering is *inanimate*, there is *aversion*, but not *anger* ; and when this is excited by sticks or stones, they are regarded for the moment as living creatures. It is unnatural, as well as unreasonable, to be *angry* with senseless objects ; and the brief anger of animals and children ceases, when the inanimate nature of the object is perceived. The difference between Pain and Anger is evident in consciousness, and in expression. The cry of pain is different from that of anger, and so it is with all other signs. Pain prompts merely to the removal of its cause ; but Anger urges to resistance and retaliation.

2. Anger is a natural instinct, of great use for the preservation of animal life, and the development of animal capacities. There is an increase of nervous energy, strengthening for action. Timid animals become brave when angry, and fight for themselves, or for their offspring. They who are angry do not seek their own good, or that of others ; they are merely urged to adverse action by a natural propensity. This tendency is sometimes beneficial to both parties, and sometimes hurtful to both ; being destructive and not pro-

tective to the agent. The instinct is simply according to the pain inflicted, there being no regard to the absence of intention, or to its character. Anger is the same whether the pain be intended or not, proper or not; and there is the same indifference to results. Whether the resistance is sufficient or not, the retaliation equal or not, the consequences useful or not, the blind passion presses on in the same way. Animals have no better rule than to yield to all their passions, as to all their appetites. But human beings can consider, compare, reflect, and anticipate; and simple obedience to instinct is for them improper and injurious. The feeling of anger is involuntary, but its expression is voluntary, its continuance, and its influence on conduct. Anger is improper and injurious when it exceeds the cause in degree and effect; and when it continues beyond the occasion. It is abated by withdrawing attention, by considering its unreasonableness and uselessness, by contrary or incompatible feelings. Kindness, contempt, mirth, fear, will lessen anger.

3. RESENTMENT is an abiding adverse feeling—the persistency of anger resulting from the supposed persistency of its cause. Adverse *action* is generally brief, and so is the *anger* it occasions; but adverse *intention* often continues, and so does the *resentment* it produces. Intentional injury is the only proper object of Resentment; and therefore it is improper and injurious, when the *pain* received is accidental, without *intention*; and when the intention is proper. Resentment is often felt when there is no adverse intention; and it is often greatly in excess. Persons are naturally pained by the action of others, if it occasions to them any loss and suffering; but there is no just cause for resentment, if the action is fair and just. Partiality and passion lead to an overestimate of what respects oneself, and an underestimate of what respects others; so that resentment is commonly

excessive in degree and duration. No more is proper where we are concerned, than we should deem proper in similar cases that concerned others only.

4. Resentment is naturally and properly felt and shown, for the injuries done to others. Respecting those which directly affect ourselves, the feeling is often excessive; but it is seldom so when others are injured, not closely connected with us. Injustice, oppression, cruelty—all forms of wrongdoing—need be restrained; and a simple regard to future welfare would be inadequate to secure proper restraint and punishment, if not supported by resentment. Retaliation, the rendering ill for ill, is a natural instinct, but no rule for human conduct. It may show the *measure* of deserved punishment; but it does not give a *reason* for conduct, to make the infliction right. The expression of proper Resentment is beneficial to all, as a testimony against wrong. Hatred, in which only the ill of another is desired, results from the extinction of Benevolence; and must be always wrong.

No ill occasioned by another, nor any intended injury, should entirely repress the feelings which every human being should have towards another. Resentment therefore should never exclude Compassion and Benevolence. It should never cause disproportionate suffering, nor any that is useless; nor should it continue, when the adverse intention no longer exists. Within these limits, it is beneficial to all; but beyond them it is hurtful and injurious to all.

Resentment is repressed by the remembrance of any similar wrong done by ourselves, by the consideration of what was done to provoke the offence; by whatever may in some measure excuse the wrong conduct, or show that the return of suffering is not required for individual safety or the welfare of society.

Children who are passionate are not always worse than

others. They may grow to be worse, if the strong feelings of their nature are not controlled; but they may become better than others, by discipline and self-government.

Anger is felt towards animals, and is shown by them; but they are not objects of moral resentment, as they are incapable of feeling it.

2. Jealousy.

1. This affection is caused by the experienced, or expected, privation of some good possessed, or hoped for. It is a kind of Resentment, respecting the feelings, aims, and actions of others; it is always painful, and may be right or wrong. Children may be jealous of those who deprive them of notice and affection; and sometimes this passion appears in studies and sports, when resentment is felt towards a competitor for some prize. Youths may become *jealous* of their companions, who strive with them for distinction and reward. Men and women may be *jealous* of others, who compete with them for any possession. Jealousy is often shown in the highest degree with respect to the affection of the sexes. Men are most jealous in regard to the affections of those who are, or may be, their wives; and women in regard to the affections of those who are, or may be, their husbands. No human passion is more powerful than Jealousy, none so painful. Its intensity results from the many causes which combine to increase suffering and aggravate wrong.

2. Jealousy may be produced by imaginary causes, no hurt being done or thought of; and then it must be altogether foolish and wrong. Where there is only a proper competition for a prize, much *pain* may be caused by the efforts and success of another, without any occasion for *resentment*; any cause for *jealousy*. But where the object cannot be sought by another without wrong, or when it is

sought unfairly, then an *injury* is done, and some *resentment* is right. This should be according to the *injustice* done; not simply according to the loss sustained and the pain experienced.

3. Emulation and Jealousy are alike in that both respect some competition for one object of desire, but their character is different. Emulation is pleasant and conducive to esteem and kindness; but Jealousy is painful, and though not inconsistent with Benevolence, is like all Resentment adverse to it.

3. Envy.

1. This is a painful feeling produced simply by regarding the superiority of another in any object desired. Benevolence makes that which one possesses of any good a cause of pleasure to others; this is a natural and primary feeling in all, but it may be changed into the contrary. Children sometimes are *envious* of the superiority of their companions in natural qualities, in the exercises of school, the sports of the playground, the affection of parents, the favour of friends. Men and women also may be *envious* of those who are stronger, more beautiful, more adorned, more wealthy, more admired and honoured. They may lose nothing by what others have, nor be in any way injured; but they see and feel more what is wanting in their own lot, it may be what is wrong in themselves; and the pain thus caused is attributed to that which does not produce the ill, but is merely the occasion of its being more fully perceived. Thus painful associations, in the absence of proper benevolence, will change good into evil; and that which should be pleasant and might be helpful, becomes distressing and hurtful.

2. When *superiority* has become itself an object of desire, the imaginary loss must cause pain; and where the success

of one is the failure of another, there the real loss may in many ways be painful, and possibly injurious. In such cases the feeling excited is Resentment. The proper object of aversion is one's own ill, and not the good of another. Resentment is right, if there has been intentional injury; and is wrong, if excessive, or if there has been no *injustice* in the action, whatever *hurt* it may have occasioned. Envy is always wrong. It is the fruit of selfishness, and is painful to all, profitable to none. It may arise when there has been no previous Jealousy, but more frequently it follows. Resentment may be excited by the pain caused by inferiority; and by that which merely gives the *knowledge* of the fact, and is in no way the cause.

4. Malevolence.

MALICE is the taking pleasure in the pain of another. It is not the common preference of one's own pleasure to that of another, or the willingness to cause pain to others for the sake of one's own pleasure or profit. It is a disposition to delight in the ill of another, when no advantage is expected, and no resentment is felt; and this is justly deemed inhuman and unnatural; but it is possible. Association may make the pains of others pleasant to us, and their pleasures painful. Pleasure is given naturally by exercise and influence,—by the consciousness of power;—and it is often found in a comparison of ourselves with inferiors—the supposition of superiority. These pleasures may be so connected with the pains of others, as to make the latter in some measure pleasant to us; as many things become agreeable through association. The pains of others can never please, when there is any kindness; but when there is none, they may become pleasant; and mere selfishness leads on to Malice. They who begin by seeking their own pleasure, regardless of the pains of others, may come at last to find pleasure in these pains. This degree of wickedness is

deemed monstrous. Much in children has been attributed to a love of mischief, which is only the pleasure of exercise and effectiveness. So in men and women, much that appears to be a desire to abase and afflict others, is probably a desire for the relief from uneasiness, which is gained by petty exercises of power and assertions of superiority. Peevishness and arrogance are bad, and have their penalties; but they are not so bad as the Malice, to which they tend. It is the same with the greater calamities which Ambition causes to armies, cities and nations. The vast misery produced is not desired; but it is selfishly chosen for the increase of power, wealth and honour. It is wrong to be indifferent to the pains of others; still more to cause these pains for the sake of some accompanying gain; but it is most unnatural and wrong to find pleasure in the pains of others.

5. Distrust.

DISTRUST of those with whom we are associated is as disagreeable as Trust is agreeable. When the intelligence, ability, steadiness, fidelity, and kindness of those on whom there is any kind of dependence, are not to be relied on, there is a constant uncomfortableness; and this is especially painful if their goodwill is suspected. The character of such persons is regarded with aversion, and this dislike is increased when any injury is occasioned. There is ever some cause of irritation, vexation, and anxiety, in intercourse with those who are distrusted. They who cannot be trusted are pitied for some things, and blamed for others; and frequent intercourse, instead of increasing, lessens sympathy and mutual kindness. To distrust is painful, and to be distrusted is painful. Mutual confidence is the condition of all pleasant and profitable associations, and it is therefore important that this relation should exist, before social connections are formed; and that it should be confirmed and strengthened; both parties showing that they trust one

another, and are worthy of confidence. Suspicion is wrong when it is without reason, or beyond what is reasonable and just.

6. Contempt.

1. This is the feeling of aversion with which we regard those whose conduct is base and mean, who choose what is low and little, rather than the higher and larger objects which human intelligence readily apprehends, and human ability easily attains. The character thus manifested is disagreeable and offensive, and as what is noble and generous is attractive, so the opposite is repulsive; we turn away from it with dislike and disgust. The proper object of Contempt is some moral wrong, which is degrading and injurious to the subject, though it may seem harmless to others. The wrong which is directly hurtful to others, excites *resentment* and prompts to forcible restraint; but that which appears to be only hurtful to the individual, awakens only *contempt*. Generally every kind of wrong is hurtful to others, and when this result is regarded, *resentment* is felt as well as *contempt*. Children are not despised for the weakness and ignorance natural to them, nor the blind and deaf for their defects, nor animals for their inferiority; but those who choose the lower states of existence and action, rather than the higher.

2. Contempt is wrong when it regards merely the lower condition of others—when the weak, the ignorant, the deformed, the poor and miserable are despised, though they are not to be blamed, their state being entirely involuntary. They are proper objects of Compassion, and the expression of Contempt is cruel as well as unreasonable. Pride is an improper Contempt for others, as well as an over-estimate of Self. The indolent, the intemperate, the improvident, the careless and cowardly—those who are indifferent to their own welfare, as well as to that of others, are proper objects of Contempt.

This is a correction provided in Nature, and is for the benefit of the wrongdoer and for society. Conscience is aroused by the expression of Contempt, as it is by the expression of Resentment. The influence of bad examples is thus counteracted, and the moral sentiment of society is elevated and strengthened, and preserved from corruption. The right expression of moral judgment and feeling is especially important in the education of the young. They do not need to be taught the difference between right and wrong; but if no *contempt* is shown by teachers for what is really base, and much for what is not, the better judgments and feelings of childhood will be prevented and repressed. As those who for some things are objects of Resentment, are for others to be regarded with Benevolence; so those who for some things are objects of contempt, for others are to be regarded with respect. Some honour is due to all men.

The Benevolent affections are those which tend directly to the increase of some good; the Malevolent tend directly to produce some ill. All the former are original, and evidently promote the happiness and welfare of all; but they all need guidance and control. Some of the latter are not original. It is not natural that the good of others should pain any, or the ill of others please any. Envy and Malice are superinduced by bad habits, and are entirely and always evil. But it is not so with Resentment, Jealousy, Distrust, and Contempt. There are objects which naturally produce these feelings, a measure in which they are properly felt, and a manner in which they are rightly exercised and shown. But they always require direction and restraint. Through undue regard to the present and to self, they tend to excess; and unless regulated by Reason and Conscience, they become injurious to all. They are abated by withdrawing attention from the objects by which they are excited; by resisting their tendencies to expression and

action ; by directing attention to the objects which excite contrary feelings ; by choosing the opposite conduct ; and by sympathy with those in whom the better affections prevail. The Affections which cause pain to ourselves or to others, are safeguards to the welfare of mankind ; but in themselves they have no good and produce none. Unrestrained they cause the greatest evil, bringing with them devastation, distress, and destruction.

DIVISION IV.
OTHER AFFECTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

REFLEXIVE.

THE feelings which are natural, proper and useful, when directed to others, must be equally so when directed to Self. They who care nothing for themselves, care nothing for others. A due regard to one's own welfare is requisite to a wise regard for that of others. Only by first knowing ourselves can we know anything of others; and by the experience of our own feelings we become acquainted with theirs. To think and care only for oneself is unnatural and wrong; and equally so, to think and care only for others. Both are always indispensable to human welfare. The chief reflexive Affections are Self-love, Self-esteem, Self-confidence, and Shame. These feelings are first natural, and then moral. Of all there may be too little, or too much. We cannot feel *gratitude*, or *compassion*, or *emulation* for ourselves; for these affections respect others. But we *desire* our own welfare, *esteem* what is good in ourselves, *trust* to our own efforts; because these affections respect human qualities, wherever they exist.*

* The name Love is sometimes used for the affection of which *other* living beings are the object; and when so understood it is impossible to *love* oneself. But generally the term is used to denote the delight in, and the desire for, the welfare of *any living* being; and then it is

I. Self-love.

1. SELF-LOVE is the delight and desire awakened by the consideration of Self, in connection with any present or future good. Besides the pleasure felt when objects alone are regarded, there is an addition when we reflect that they are our own. When objects cease to give pleasure or pain, the consideration that the feeling was formerly experienced will excite some feeling. It will be of the *same* kind, if we consider that it was ours *once*; but of the *contrary*, if we consider that it is not *now* ours. Human beings alone appear to be capable of *reflection*, and it is necessary for their welfare. Too much consideration of Self leads to an undue regard to one's own pleasures, claims and interests; and a disregard for those of others. It produces an excess of *self-consciousness*, which is offensive and injurious. But this excess is the abuse of self-love, and not its proper fruit. Such consideration as is due to another, must be due to oneself. In some cases it is right that our whole regard should be given to others; but it is seldom good or safe for any to be entirely regardless of themselves. Health, life, character have been lost by self-neglect; when they might have been preserved to the greater good of all. They who do not care for themselves, require others to care for them; and thus set the bad example of being burdensome instead of helpful. The greatest self-sacrifice ever proper, is that of lower inclinations and interests at the call of Duty; and then to lose life is to save it. A proper regard to ourselves leads to a proper regard to others; and the latter requires the former. Both are necessary for individual welfare, and for the general good.

proper for the affection, whether it regards ourselves or others. The nature of Self-love, as distinguished from *particular* appetites and desires, is shown by Bishop Butler, who describes it as a principle of *reflection*, belonging to human nature,—a general desire for one's own happiness.

2. The safety, cleanliness, health, and vigour of the Body require and receive daily care; and this is equally needed for the welfare of the Mind. Men are never made by Nature what it is desirable they should become, and this is never attained without much self-culture. Mind, much more than the body, is capable of improvement, and this is the work appointed for the whole of life. To some extent this is universally recognised, though but partially practised. The attainment of knowledge, the discipline of the faculties, the regulation of the desires, the cultivation of the affections, the formation of habits, are the things of most importance to every human being; and they cannot be done for us by others. If men would care for their souls as they do for their bodies, and look to their spiritual well-being as they do to their outward condition, it would be for the good of each and of all. The natural laws of individual preservation and progress are never observed without advantage, nor disregarded without loss and injury.

2. Self-esteem.

1. SELF-ESTEEM is a respect for ourselves, similar to that which is due to others. If all are to be honoured on account of their human endowments and destiny, this honour is due to oneself; and if higher qualities in others deserve more respect, they are not to be less esteemed because they are our own. Self-esteem may be excessive in degree, owing to the partiality which causes an overestimate of what is near and dear; it may be shown ostentatiously and offensively; and it may occasion unjust pretensions and claims. In these ways it is injurious and wrong. But when it is only such as would be entertained for another, and is combined with a proper regard to the worth and feelings of others; when it is free from arrogance, and leads to the consideration of what is due from us to others, more than of what is due from others to us; then it is pleasant

and profitable to all. Without a proper estimate of what we are, many reasons for gratitude and hope will be disregarded; and many duties and obligations will not be discerned.

2. There are several states of mind in which the Reflexive Affections are in various ways combined with the Social. MODESTY results from a *moderate* estimate of oneself, with a higher respect for others. It is *moderation* in regard to any good we may be supposed to possess, reserve in showing or stating our claims on the notice and respect of others. It is especially becoming in youth, when nature teaches some caution and concealment for the sake of safety; and a little reflection shows that trust and respect for others are more suitable than self-assertion. Immodesty of any kind shows a selfish indifference to others.

3. HUMILITY is the lowliness of mind which becomes all finite and dependent beings, especially those who are conscious of defects and wrong. It is not thinking *meanly* of ourselves, or in any way *untruly*, for the highest and best are humble. But it is thinking *truly*; and therefore without any fancied independence, any unreal self-exaltation, any wish to disregard the claims of others. It promotes fellowship, and prompts to self-improvement, inclines to seek and accept any needed guidance and help. Thus it disposes to kindness, and contributes to progress and success. "Before honour is humility."

4. PRIDE is undue self-complacency, an improper assumption of superiority, claiming more than is due to ourselves, and withholding what is due to others. It results from forgetfulness of dependence and deficiency; and causes an exaggeration of the good belonging to oneself, and a depreciation of what belongs to others. It comes from

selfishness, and increases selfishness. It shows a want of kindness and respect for others; and in this way is offensive to all. It gives little pleasure, and causes much pain. The proud are ever subject to mortifications and disappointments; they lose the pleasure of general sympathy and kindness; and neglect the improvement and assistance they need. Persons are proud of bodily and mental endowments, attainments, achievements; of riches, rank, family relations, and social distinctions. These are proper causes of some pleasure, but no reasons for Pride. We have nothing that we have not received; and all we have is for the good of others, as well as our own. The chief worth of everything is in the use to which it is applied, not in its possession. Pride looks to what is below, and is drawn downward. Humility looks to what is above, and is drawn upward. "Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall."

5. VANITY is an excessive regard to the admiration of others. The *proud* are satisfied with their own estimate of themselves; while the vain regard more the estimate of others. This is valued chiefly because it raises the estimate of self, and not for the pleasure which comes with all kind affections. Persons are vain of their beauty and strength, of their possessions and honours. These are valued more for what they are thought to be, than for any experienced pleasure or profit. The objects which occasion *vanity* have generally little worth, and the pleasures of vanity are very small and of short duration; but the power of sympathy appears in their eager pursuit. Vain persons regard appearances more than realities, and are seldom entirely truthful, though often kind. The proud are selfish, the vain are ostentatious.

3. Self-confidence.

SELF-CONFIDENCE is the feeling with which we regard our own abilities, as equal to the attainment of what we desire.

If our own exertions are sufficient for safety and success, we should trust to them, and not seek the protection and help of others. This is best for all. But if our abilities are unequal to the work proposed, then it should be relinquished for the present, or the assistance of others should be sought. Improper self-confidence produces rashness in encountering danger, in undertaking enterprises; it disregards guidance and help and counsel, and leads to disappointment, disaster, and ruin. But a proper self-confidence cheers, strengthens, encourages, ennobles, and gives the best assurance of success. Many fail because they attempt what is beyond their power; and because they do not seek the advice, direction, and aid, of those who have a larger experience, and ample resources. Many do not succeed, because they have not sufficient confidence in themselves to *try* again and again with earnest and persevering effort. They make no attempt, or give up further endeavour, because they have to wait long and work much for success. Proper self-confidence leads to this working and waiting, and thus secures ultimately a sufficient reward.

4. Shame.

SHAME is the painful feeling excited by what is disliked in ourselves, when our pain is increased by sympathy with the supposed aversion of others. It may be occasioned by natural deficiency, as well as by moral wrong. Children feel shame when their defects are noticed by others. They may be ashamed when they do not blame themselves, and are not blamed by any; though there will be more shame, if there is occasion for censure. They are sometimes ashamed when with strangers, thinking their appearance or behaviour may be improper. Many persons feel shame chiefly because their dress, speech, and conduct are regarded by others with dislike, contempt, and ridicule. They are ashamed when their incompetency is seen by others, and causes pity, or it may be amusement; and the anticipation

of this may so enfeeble and bewilder as to cause the dreaded failure. Shame may be felt on account of the present and the past, and even on account of the future, this being regarded as equally real. It is of great use in urging to the correction of faults, the avoidance of wrong; and when it does not prevent ill, it keeps from the publicity which increases bad consequences. But shame is often improper, that which occasions it not being wrong, nor any object for much dislike and dread. It is improper, when sympathy with the feelings of others hinders right speech and action. When speaking to many, or acting in their presence, attention should be given to what is to be said or done; and then sympathy will be helpful. But if attention is needlessly given to the way in which one speaks and acts, sympathy with the criticism of others will be a hindrance. False shame is to be removed by the consideration, that what is said and done is true and right; and by withdrawing attention from adverse critics, thinking only of those by whom what is true and right will be commended and praised.*

* There can be no intelligent action without some *consciousness*; and only where the outward act is of chief value, as in many habitual movements, can consciousness be lessened with advantage. In all higher activity consciousness is increased. It is better to know fully what we are doing, than to act without consideration and reflection. But attention should not be given to what tends to hinder right action, either of body or mind.

CHAPTER II.

RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS.

RELIGION in some form or other is nearly universal. Altars, sacred groves, and temples are found in most lands; and few nations are without priests to aid them in worship, or prophets to declare to them the Divine will. Whether the *objects* are real or imaginary, the *feelings* certainly belong to human nature; and either for good or ill they have had great influence on the welfare of individuals, and on the history of the world. Only human beings are capable of religious affections, and few persons are always insensible to their power and value. There are religious *thoughts*, *feelings*, and *actions*; the first giving rise to the second, and the second to the third. As it is with the social affections, so it is with the religious; the *object* must be known in part before any *feeling* is excited, and then it is more fully known. Nearly all the religions of the world show something that is true, elevating, and beneficial; and also, more or less, what is false, degrading, and injurious. As governments, though always imperfect and often oppressive, show a universal need, and point to what is good for all men; so do religions. In all there is a recognition of unseen Powers indefinitely great, and of some *dependence* on them for good or for evil. Some kind of *superiority* is supposed, and some *hope* or *fear* is felt. Every kind of worship contains some *personal* acts in those who worship,

and implies some *personal* attributes in the object of worship. Prayer and praise, gifts and sacrifices, presuppose in both intelligence, feeling, and will. The religious affections are Fear, Adoration, Gratitude, Faith. These are in nature like the social affections; but they are distinguished by their unlimited character. Their objects are invisible, *indefinitely* great, and so approach towards the Infinite.*

1. Fear.

FEAR is the lowest and most common of the Religious feelings. Many ills are referred to unconscious natural causes, and many to animal and human agents. But the experience of others,—sudden sickness, death, earthquakes, and pestilences,—suggests some unseen cause. They are not to be accounted for as other events, and therefore they are attributed to a cause similar to adverse human agency. This would account for them, and nothing else is thought of. As human displeasure may be averted, so it was supposed might the anger of superhuman powers be turned away. Besides the experience of ill, there is the common consciousness of wrong doing; and as the anger of men is caused by

* No social *affections* exist without prior *thoughts*; and all are according to the qualities, actions, and relations believed to exist. It is the same with the Religious *feelings*, which are always according to the *ideas* received, whether true or false. No feeling is alone evidence of the *reality* of the object, for it only shows what is thought and believed. Some Religious affections are the highest states of human existence; and show more than lower forms the perfections of the Supreme. But the Divine is inferred from the nature and *capacities* of men; not from their *thoughts*, but from the *facts* which are the *objects* of thought. All *effects* show the presence and pre-existence of some Power; and all productions of order, adaptation, usefulness, and beauty, are manifestations of Intelligence also. Children know that these effects often come from Mind, and that all effects have something to account for them. "He that formed the eye, shall He not see? He that planted the ear, shall He not hear?"

opposition to their will, so it was concluded would the anger of all beings be provoked. Hence the natural desire to propitiate any hostile power, comes from the experience of ill, and the consciousness of wrong. This is not entirely unreasonable, and appears in the highest religions as well as in the lowest. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."

2. Adoration.

This sentiment is like the affection felt for human greatness, in power and authority, in intelligence and wisdom, in all that is excellent and honourable. But it differs in that the greatness is without bounds, not restricted to one time, or place, or occasion. The objects of worship may not be *infinite*, but they are *indefinite*; and to human apprehensions these are often the same. The immeasurable power shown in sun, moon, and stars; in the daily illumination of the world; in lightning and thunder, in fertilizing showers and destructive storms, in the expanse of the ocean and the elevation of the sky;—these cannot be regarded without reverence and awe. The very limited and imperfect views of external objects, to which men in general have attained, are enough to give some knowledge of a Power, or powers, surpassing all human control or comprehension. The consciousness of intelligence naturally leads to the recognition of Intelligence, not only in animals and men, but in and over all Nature. The apparent separation, and frequent opposition, of natural objects, would at first cause the belief of many Spirits; but the manifold correspondence, and mutual dependence, of all things lead to the conclusion, that the world is *one*, as a tree, or an animal, is *one*; and so the whole universe is known to be *one*. Thus besides the wonder and awe which are felt for greatness without intelligence, there are the admiration and adoration which are felt only for conscious objects. Men do not worship what is exclusively material and insensible.

They are conscious of intelligence within them, and see signs of intelligence without them ; and when they worshipped sun and moon, or stocks and stones, they regarded these as embodiments or symbols of what is spiritual. This use of natural objects has ever tended to limit, localise, and degrade the object of worship ; and to promote superstition, sensuality and licentiousness.

The worship of human statues, and of beings to whom human forms, appetites, and passions were attributed, evidently arose from the benefits and injuries, which were received from men of extraordinary power and wisdom, influence and authority. When effects were experienced, which could not be accounted for by human endowments, they were attributed to higher powers. Great rulers and conquerors, legislators and benefactors, sometimes while living but more often when dead, were supposed to have some Divine endowments as well as authority ; and therefore received Divine honours. But as the material was not worshipped apart from the spiritual, so neither has the human, apart from the Divine, been the object of the highest worship and adoration. Where no superior wisdom and goodness have been supposed, superior knowledge, strength, and felicity have been attributed to the objects of religious worship. Afterwards abstractions, power, wisdom, love, and war,—were personified ; and represented under symbolical or human forms.

3. Gratitude.

Some acknowledgment of Divine goodness, though very small, was made by the festive songs and sacrifices, which commonly formed a part of religious worship. Good, as well as ill, is naturally referred to the unseen Powers. Men are grateful for the good received from human hands, and find these benefits most precious when regarded as the gifts of affection ; and it is surely reasonable so to regard the

innumerable greater benefits which human kindness has not bestowed. The nature and number of these cannot be attributed to blind chance, or a heartless Fate. The Great Power that gives to every human being parents and friends, with their various abilities and affections, cannot be indifferent to human happiness and welfare. The beauty and fruitfulness of the earth, the provision made for the wants and enjoyments of all animals, the kind affections which are natural to all human beings, the regard to the welfare of others which distinguishes the wisest and noblest,—all show that Benevolence is not confined to Man, but belongs to the Invisible Power, which pours forth ceaselessly blessings on all, unmerited and unsought for.

4. Faith.

1. FAITH, or Trust, in some form and degree, is found in the lowest religions; and is the chief characteristic of the highest. Without some belief there could be no hope, and without some hope there could be no worship. Men trust one another, and mutual confidence is necessary to all society. All the comforts of life, all the advantages of civilization, depend on the confidence of men in their fellow men. If this faith is reasonable and right, and the want of it would be fatal to human welfare, the same faith must be proper, towards any higher wisdom and goodness. Where there is superiority there must be both a reason for Faith, and the occasion for its exercise. Men can never understand fully the conduct of those who are wiser and better than themselves, and therefore they believe when they cannot see. Only if the thoughts and ways of God were not higher or wider or better than those of men, could it reasonably be expected that all would be evidently wise and right and good. Many things unquestionably are so, in the highest degree, and to an immeasurable extent; but not all.

2. The suffering and sin of the world are very partially understood. Neither our own state, or that of men in general, appears always good. Some reasons for ill are evident, but they do not apply to all cases; and in very many we cannot see that all is right. Faith is required for the assurance that it is so. Compassion in men, testifies to the Benevolence from which it springs. God cannot be less merciful than men. Conscience, in requiring equity, shows the Righteousness which is over all. Truth and Right are permanent and progressive, while what is in opposition to them is perishable in its nature, and transient in duration. Often in the history of nations, as well as of individuals, it has been shown that fraud and violence and injustice secure only a brief prosperity; while truth and gentleness and goodness give enduring possessions. It is not the teaching of the Bible, that the *remembrance* of any wrong should destroy hope in God. Despair belongs only to *continuance* in wrong. Nature and conscience encourage all "to cease to do evil, and to learn to do well."

3. The Hebrew scriptures express Faith in the Mercy and Righteousness of God, with a frequency and joyfulness which has no parallel in any other books of religion. Besides referring to human affections, and to common experience, in support of their statements respecting the Divine Mercy and Righteousness, they foretell the establishment of a Kingdom in which all evil will be subdued, and good only will prevail. The Christian scriptures show how these prophecies have been in part and will be fully accomplished. In the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ,—in the character shown in all He said and did and suffered,—we have a declared and attested revelation of the will and love of God, His Father and ours. His human love to men is the expression of Divine love; His human example of faith in God is the declaration of all human duty. God is manifest

in Him, speaks to us in Him. They who learn of Him and follow Him, receive through Him faith, hope, and love. They resist evil in themselves and the world, with the assurance of constant aid and final victory. The cross of Christ has shown to the world that the greatest love is with suffering, endured willingly and patiently; and that the greatest good comes out of ill, opposed and overcome.

4. Human wisdom, love, and righteousness, though imperfect, impart more comfort, encouragement, and delight, than any unconscious objects can give, however wonderful and beautiful. Divine perfections are infinite, unchangeable, and always near. The Creator of all things, the Father of the spirits of all men, is able and willing to guide and help, support and protect, comfort and bless, all who have Faith in Him. Through the Son of God we come to the Infinite, the source of all life, the giver of all good, the Father in Heaven; and rejoice in the hope of the children of God. Right views of the object of the religious affections are in the highest degree delightful and beneficial, in all times and places. But wrong views are ever painful and injurious. As all feelings are increased by consideration, expression, sympathy, and corresponding conduct; so are the Religious Affections. They are strengthened by exercise, as all active principles, but enfeebled by disuse. In religion, as in every other good, *use* is the condition of all progress, of all permanent possession. No law of Nature is more plain and sure than this. "To him that hath more will be given."

As the knowledge of our fellow men is made sure and useful by intercourse with them, so the knowledge of our Father in Heaven is confirmed, and made most pleasant and profitable, by communion with Him. Religion is not to supersede social affections, but to promote, regulate, and

elevate them. All have their place and use ; and contribute to the welfare and excellence of humanity.*

* Religious knowledge cannot be strictly *intuitional*, for *intuitions* are limited to Consciousness ; and all that is directly perceived in ourselves is finite, dependent, and variable. The being and perfections of God can be known only by inference from His works,—which are known by intuitions, internal and external ; and these are the foundation of all reasoning, physical and metaphysical. The simple belief of some *infinite* and *absolute* existence, is of little moral or religious value ; but as our knowledge of the works of God increases in extent and importance, so will our knowledge of His greatness and goodness. Abstractions can lead only to Abstractions, and these have little power to interest, or delight and improve. From the reality of Man and Nature we know the real existence of God—His infinite power and wisdom, His perfect righteousness and love. Wherever there is any goodness it is from Him, and they who rejoice in wisdom and goodness share the happiness of God.

CHAPTER III.

INDEFINITE AFFECTIONS.

MANY works of Nature and of Art, especially pictures and music, have a peculiar power to attract and excite, to delight and sadden. This power is felt almost universally, on some occasions and in some degree; and is generally meant when any object is said to be Beautiful. Very different opinions have been held respecting the nature and cause of this sentiment; but there are some things in which nearly all agree. It is not a *sensation*, though often connected with bodily feelings; but a state of mind more or less pleasant. It differs from common mental feelings, requiring more than animal or infantine intelligence and experience; and it must be felt to be known. It is social in character, having no exclusive regard to self; but it is not practical, prompting only to expressions of delight and admiration. It is not without *thought*, but it is more than can be accounted for by any *present* thoughts. While by some objects all persons are affected in the same way, though not equally; with many others there is a great diversity. What is very Beautiful to some, is not at all so to others. Differences of Taste are found in different countries, at different periods, among different classes; and the same person is not always affected in the same way. Misapprehensions may be corrected, and defective observations made more complete; but no reasoning can ever reconcile those, in whom the same object awakens different sentiments. Beauty is at once seen and felt. Contemplation

improves the view and deepens the impression ; but Discussion commonly lessens the sentiment, even when it corrects the judgment.

Beauty and Sublimity are objects of the same order ; and both terms are extended, from the sensible objects to which they are first applied, to others that are entirely intellectual and moral. The influence of Association and Sympathy, on all states of thought and feeling, has been already noticed ; but these principles are so important in the subject now to be considered, that some further observations will not be unsuitable.

I. Association.

1. ASSOCIATION sometimes reproduces bodily sensations, but it has much more power on mental states. Thoughts and Beliefs of every kind are influenced by it ; and so are all mental Feelings. These are at first produced by some knowledge of the object, by which they are naturally excited ; and are stronger as this is more clearly and completely regarded. But afterwards Emotions, Desires, and Affections arise when their objects are little thought of. The appearance of a friend will cause great joy, before anything is recalled to make it pleasant ; and the sight of some slight memorial of a lost child will cause great distress, before any remembrances show a reason for sorrow. A visit to places where much gladness, or grief, has been experienced, will awaken these *feelings*, in a degree far beyond that which would be produced by what is remembered. As *thoughts* leave in the mind impressions through which they are readily revived, so do *feelings* reappear through associations. Association has a direct influence on all. Cheerfulness and sadness, hopefulness and fearfulness, kindness and unkindness, are *moods* of mind of which we are sometimes entirely unconscious, till the feelings are revived by some association, with or without a remembrance of their primary causes.

Thought produces Feeling, and Feeling produces Thought ; and both are more or less according to associations.

2. The most obvious examples of the power of Association on the Affections, are given by sensible objects. Persons, places, letters, books, clothes, have often a power over *feelings*, which cannot be accounted for by any thoughts suggested. Old tunes and faces and songs have a power to please, which can be explained only by their many agreeable associations ; though these may be forgotten. Affections, having respect to *animate* objects, cannot be fully and consciously transferred to *inanimate* objects ; but this is done partially. Things are not only *liked* because connected with *persons*, but in some measure they are *loved*. Insensible objects become by association the objects of a tender, affectionate, admiring, respectful regard. Feelings which are proper only to *mental* qualities, are produced by *material* objects, through likeness, analogy, or some previous connection. We have some *love* for a house, as well as for the inhabitants ; and speak of flowers and trees as *lovely*, referring to them as *persons*, having personal qualities. Contiguity—previous connections in time and place,—have unquestionably a great direct influence on Feelings, besides that on Thoughts. Analogy probably owes all its influence on Feelings to some prior suggestion of Thoughts ; but afterwards the sentiments appear alone.*

2. Sympathy.

1. SYMPATHY has some power in all Mental Feelings, for they are increased when shared with others. It has peculiar

* The influence of Fashion on the estimate of dress is a striking example of the power of Association. That which is connected with elegance and grace, intelligence and refinement, with wealth and rank, soon appears *beautiful*. But when removed from these connections its beauty vanishes ; and with contrary associations it becomes *ugly*.

power in the Affections, and especially in those which depend on Association. The affection of children for parents, of pupils for teachers, of followers for leaders, of a nation for the sovereign, are always increased by sympathy. The universal gladness, or grief, caused by national victories or losses, are often to be attributed chiefly to the participation of many in the same feelings. The rapture of joy and admiration, caused by public exhibitions and entertainments, have the same cause. Dramatic representations and musical performances, songs and speeches and sermons, owe their surpassing power to the *sympathy* of many, seeing the same sights, hearing the same sounds, having the same thoughts and feelings. A higher and more intelligent joy and admiration may be felt in solitude, than in a large assembly; but it is not possible to have the same intensity of emotion and affection. The faint feeling of one becomes strong, when surrounded by the strong feelings of many: and a critic inclined to censure will often join in general applause. Sympathy requires the intelligence requisite to discern the signs of feeling in others, and to connect them with some former experience.

2. The strength of right affections is owing in a great degree to a sympathy which should be cherished; and that of wrong affections, to a sympathy which is to be avoided. Thousands have willingly sacrificed everything for the pleasure and honour of one, when there has been little in character to produce respect, and few benefits to awaken gratitude. The solitary consideration of distant objects, however worthy, will seldom cause the admiration and devotion which prompt to great exertions and sacrifices; but the regard given and expressed in society soon becomes sufficient for any loss or labour. Personal affection thus produced has little moral value, unless there is moral excellence in the object. But then it becomes the most powerful of

causes, to preserve from all that is evil, and to promote all that is good. Class prejudices and party spirit, with their countless ills, result from the excess of *sympathy* with some, and the want of *sympathy* with others. Sympathy in common feelings prepares for the social affections, by directing attention to personal qualities; and sympathy in affections is one of the chief causes of their increase and efficiency. Sympathy is not confined to those who are visibly present; but comes with all who are thought of.

3. Sympathy is often felt with the *joys* and *sorrows* of others; but it is not confined to those feelings, nor does it come entirely from what belongs to other persons. When we "rejoice with those who rejoice," the *joy* is chiefly that of Benevolence; and when we "weep with those who weep," the *grief* is chiefly that of Compassion. Sympathy results from some similar experience, and this increases our knowledge of the experience of others. We know more of their joys and sorrows, and therefore feel *for* them, and not merely *with* them. Sympathy is according to the measure of our own experience, and is pleasant or painful according to what we have before felt. Benevolence finds the occasion for joy in the good and joy of another; and Compassion finds the occasion for grief in the ill and grief of another. Without some Sympathy, there is little knowledge of what others feel; and therefore little joy in their good, little grief in their ill. Sympathy conduces much to Benevolence and Compassion; but does not always produce these affections, and is always to be distinguished from them. Sympathy has a twofold operation. It adds to our knowledge of the objects presented or represented; and it increases greatly the feelings with which these objects are regarded. Sympathy with the sufferer increases knowledge. Sympathy with the compassionate increases compassion.

3. Beauty.

1. The term Beautiful is not only applied to a great variety of objects, but it is used in different *senses*; and unless these are distinguished there can be no satisfactory consideration of the subject. Sometimes the word is used to express only a high degree of agreeableness or admiration; but generally more is meant. Pleasant and simple *sensations* are rarely said to be *beautiful*, but composite sounds and sights often are; and most things that give *mental* pleasure are at times so described. Pictures and music, descriptions and tales, are frequently said to be *beautiful*, when nothing more is meant than that they are pleasant and excellent. When thus used, the term only denotes that the object is in some way very good. But, more frequently, that which is styled Beautiful has an *indefinite* power, an indescribable charm, which is but partially accounted for by any specified reason. Some qualities and relations may be mentioned, but none of these separately, nor all collectively, are sufficient to constitute Beauty. There is something not thus to be explained. This is the more correct use of the term; and the only one in which the subject belongs to Psychology.

2. All things Beautiful are pleasant, but all that pleases is not beautiful. Beauty has been said to consist of many things, singly or in union: such as symmetry, order, variety, proportion, gradation, moderation, unity in plurality, resemblance, fitness, utility, truth. These objects are more or less pleasant, and their absence may prevent an object from being beautiful; but neither separately, nor in any combination, are they sufficient to produce Beauty. Its cause has been vainly sought in the nature of beautiful objects, and not being found in them, it has been supposed to be some indescribable quality; like the property of material objects by which they produce peculiar sensations, such as

sweetness and bitterness. There is some peculiar nature in the *object*, and some peculiar sensibility in the *organ* of taste; and nothing more is known. So many say, Beauty is some objective quality which affects a corresponding mental susceptibility. It must be felt to be known, and can be known only as the cause of a peculiar sentiment.

3. To know if this is true, some Beautiful objects should be considered. The term is unquestionably applied, in its restricted sense, to painting, statuary, architecture, music; and to many works of Nature. Jewels, plants, animals; earth, sea, sky; the human form, countenance, voice; paintings and musical productions—these are by all admitted to be sometimes *beautiful*, in the highest sense of the term. No common qualities are perceived in the vast variety of objects which are declared to be *beautiful*. They are like in this attribute. What more may be said of them? They all have a similar mental power, and awaken feelings which are not *sensations*; nor simply pleasant mental perceptions. The *feelings* are not constant or universal, but variable and limited, as human *affections*; and have something of their purity and dignity, depending, like them, directly on the state of the mind, and only indirectly on that of the body. When we see a very beautiful flower or landscape, or hear some very beautiful music, we have feelings like those produced by the highest objects of Affection. There is a love, a tenderness, a delight, a sadness, like the feelings caused by persons; though none may be thought of. Inanimate objects often suggest animate. A flower or a tune may suggest persons and events. But *beautiful* objects do not always cause *thoughts*, and their power is never according to such suggestions. The most *beautiful* engross attention, and the excitement of *feeling* precedes the recall of *ideas*. These familiar facts seem to show, that Beauty is the power of pleasing, which objects acquire by association. Associa-

tion is sometimes with single entire objects; but more frequently it is with their elements, qualities, and relations. These have often been combined in previous experience with pleasant affections and their joys; or are suggestive by resemblance and analogy; and so the feelings are reproduced, with or without the remembrance of their primary objects and occasions.

4. Beautiful objects please of themselves, and they have a further power of pleasing from Associations. These reproduce the feelings before excited by similar, or analogous objects. The associations of an *individual*, and those which belong to *single* objects, greatly increase the power of *pleasing*. But only those in which *many* share, and which belong to *common* qualities, actions, and relations, render any object Beautiful. Light, purity, and strength, symmetry, order, and proportion, are pleasant in themselves; and they have before given pleasure in innumerable instances. Resemblance and analogies, fitness and utility, are always regarded with some pleasure; and former feelings come back to increase the present. Enjoyment, intelligence, sensibility, activity, energy, give some pleasure to spectators; so do all the expressions and signs of health, ease and repose, greatness, kindness, and goodness. Examples of these that have peculiar excellence, and are regarded with peculiar attention, become representatives of a class; and so have a special worth and power, according to all the feelings which have been experienced in connection with them. Their general influence is felt, though particular objects are not recalled or thought of.

5. It is certain that Association has the power of reproducing *affections* and other feelings, without any adequate corresponding *thoughts*. That it is the cause of the sentiment awakened by what is Beautiful, appears from many considera-

tions. Where there are no such associations, these feelings are not found; with them they often follow; and both the measure and character of the feelings are according to association. Lines and figures, colours and sounds, give a slight pleasure of themselves from the first; but much more afterwards by association. All human beings know some of the material signs of mental pleasure, some of the analogies of matter and mind. All have pleasant associations with light and strength, symmetry and order, resemblances and adaptations; with the forms and colours and movements connected with health, purity, ease, and enjoyment. These associations always make some objects beautiful; and none are ever felt to be beautiful, however pleasant and useful they may be, which have not such associations. Where there has been much previous pleasant experience, and attention is directed to what is most suggestive, and the mind is fresh and unoccupied with other thoughts and feelings, the Beauty of objects will be most seen and felt; and where there is less of such experience and attention, where the mind is wearied and preoccupied, less will be seen and felt. As the pleasures before experienced are high or low, and as the attention is given to what is high or low in the object present, the Beauty seen and felt will be high or low. Some associations are common to all men, while others are restricted to a class. Some are permanent, while others are transient. And so some Beauty is seen and felt by all, and is permanent; while other is restricted to a few, and passes away. Some things are beautiful in all countries and ages of the world; others are so regarded only in particular places and times.

6. Beautiful objects are always agreeable and suggestive; and to be very beautiful they must be composite and harmonious. Many various parts and properties increase the number and extent of associations; and if these agree in character, the effect of the whole will be greater. Harmony

in painting and music are felt to be necessary to Beauty; and often the simple combination of a few objects is felt to be peculiarly beautiful. Some diversity is favourable to associations of thought and feeling; for *contrast* makes each impression more strong, and gives to the whole a Beauty not found in any part. The Beauty most easily seen, depends on obvious properties and common associations. That is highest and best, which respects the most important properties, and results from the widest and noblest associations. Good Taste, in regard to Nature and Art, is the perception and enjoyment of the *best* things. Attention and consideration are requisite for the discernment of these; and their highest enjoyment depends on the Associations which are formed by mental and moral culture.

7. Works of Art are intended to *represent* some object, or to *express* some sentiment, or to answer some *purpose*. They are agreeable and admirable, when they are not Beautiful. All imitation pleases, all exhibitions of life, all usefulness. The agreeableness of Works of Art, depends partly on the nature of their object, sentiment, purpose; and partly on accuracy of the representation, the completeness of the expression, the excellence of the work. These may be requisites to Beauty, but they do not make it. Works may be admirable for correctness, expressiveness, usefulness; they may be wonderful for the genius, skill, and power displayed, and yet not be beautiful. No representation of offensive objects, no expression of painful feelings, no effectiveness for disagreeable results, can be *beautiful*, however excellent they are. As objects may please at a distance and not near, so may pictures and descriptions. That is omitted which is painful, and that is retained which is pleasant. Pictures and descriptions often please more than *real* objects, because in them the most pleasant things are selected, and made prominent; and what is found separately is combined. Thus Art may

in some things excel Nature, though its highest use is the representation of Nature. The sensibility of genius enables the artist to see what others do not, till their attention is rightly directed.*

8. Most natural objects in their proper place are in some degree Beautiful, and many pre-eminently so. Nothing can surpass the *loveliness* of flowers and plants, the *beauty* of many birds and quadrupeds; of many landscapes and clouds, of many skies at sunrise and sunset; of many human beings,—men, women and children. The garden and field, the hill and stream, the mountain top and the sea shore, all present an endless variety of objects, not only pleasant to the eye, but delightful to the mind and heart, soothing, refreshing and invigorating. They are open to all, are continually renewed, and require only a quiet and observing eye, with the experience of those simple joys which come from the faculties and affections given to all. These when properly used leave impressions, the revival of which is an ever increasing occasion of delight. With advancing years there is less of the transport of youth, but a larger provision for the tranquil enjoyment, which is more precious when shared with others, but is not dependent on society, or circumstances.

9. Beauty, when the term is applied to Language, spoken or written, is more than excellence. In conversation and

* Paintings may have much *excellence* which few can appreciate, but those which are *beautiful* are in some measure felt to be so by all. Music is full of significance to some, and affords the highest delight; while to others it has no meaning, and gives little pleasure. Those who delight in Music have countless associations with old and new combinations of sound; and through these all past emotions and affections are awakened in the measure and manner which gives most varied enjoyment, and produces an intense temporary excitement; while others hear with indifference.

oratory, more frequently in poetry and in some kinds of prose composition, sentences, descriptions, narratives, are said to be Beautiful. They are more than clear, correct, and instructive; they are peculiarly pleasing and impressive, and have an indefinite power similar to beautiful sights and sounds. They excite more than usual attention and please by associations, as well as by peculiar excellence.

Moral Beauty also is more than agreeableness and excellence of action. Conduct may be perfectly *right*, and yet not *beautiful* in any way. It may have an outward grace, a natural beauty; and no special moral excellence, no moral Beauty. But when the action is *pleasant* to contemplate, and has peculiar *moral* excellence, it often becomes typical and representative, drawing to it associations from all that has been known and admired of similar virtue. Then it is in the highest degree approved, admired, and loved.

4. Sublimity.

1. This like Beauty is the result of Association, and is always pleasant, though not in the same degree. Sublimity is always connected with some kind of *greatness*, generally with *elevation*. The starry sky is *sublime*, so are the ocean, a lofty mountain, a vast desert, a dark forest, a violent storm, very large buildings,—all objects of great magnitude or power. Pictures which are grand and gloomy may be *sublime*, sounds that are overwhelming, descriptions of the boundless, irresistible, awful. Sentences are sublime when they express briefly and powerfully what is in some respect agreeable, and beyond complete comprehension. Great energy of will in doing or suffering is sublime; conduct that far surpasses all ordinary courage, fidelity, goodness. Greatness may be associated with fear, and then the *sublime* becomes *terrible*; or it may be regarded with loving trust, and cause the exultation of safety and sympathy. What is said to be Sublime has a greatness of its own, which is first seen and

felt; and this is followed by indefinite similar feelings previously produced by similar objects.

2. Beauty and Sublimity are sometimes combined, but often the qualities are contrary. Beautiful objects are frequently small, feeble, and delicate; but only the large, strong, and steadfast can be Sublime. Clearness, smoothness, rest, and gradual motion, belong to the one class; obscurity, roughness, rapid movement to the other. The sensible qualities do not produce the feelings which belong to the Beautiful and the Sublime; but they have the *associations* on which these sentiments depend. Cheerfulness, gentleness, kindness, moderate grief, every virtue, every occasion for joy, may be Beautiful in fact, and in representation. Extraordinary courage, fortitude, justice, fidelity, may in like manner be Sublime. Corresponding to the pleasure given by Beauty is the pain caused by Ugliness. There is more than the disagreeableness of certain forms and colours: some objects are *disgusting*. They are peculiarly offensive, because of suggestions. Few natural objects are *ugly*, and their repulsiveness serves to deter from what is injurious.*

* Jeffrey in the Review of Alison (*Edin. Rev.*, May, 1811) has given the same view of Beauty and Sublimity. "It is very remarkable, that while almost all the words by which the affections of mind are expressed, seem to have been borrowed originally from the qualities of matter, the epithets by which we learn afterwards to distinguish such material objects as are felt to be sublime or beautiful, are all of them epithets that had been previously appropriated to express some quality or emotion of mind. Colours are said to be grave or gay; motions to be lively, or deliberate, or capricious; forms to be delicate or modest; sounds to be animated or mournful; prospects to be cheerful or melancholy; rocks to be bold, waters to be tranquil, and a thousand other phrases of the same import; all indicating most unequivocally the sources from which our interest in matter is derived, and proving that it is necessary in all cases to confer mind and feeling upon it, before it can be conceived as either sublime or beautiful."

3. The Beautiful, the True, the Good, have been associated by some, as the supreme objects of regard; and inferences have been drawn from one of these to another, as if they were of the same class. But these objects are so different, that such reasoning has only a very slight apparent plausibility. They may all exist in some form and degree wherever there is Thought and Feeling; and there is more of them, as there is more of Intelligence and Sensibility. But of each there are infinite diversities,—as many as there are minds, by which and in which they are known. The lower is not the *same* as the higher; what belongs to one object is not the *same* as that which belongs to another; nor is the knowledge of one person the same as that of another. There is *similarity*, but not *identity*. The Supreme Being contains all others, only as the Cause contains *effects*; differing from them, more than they differ from one another. The comprehensions of Genus and Species belong to Thought. The *abstractions* from all that is *true*, or *good*, or *beautiful*, are among the smallest objects of Thought. Each class may be said to be *one*, being partially represented by some small *idea*; these ideas are of the least possible value or use. Where there is Reality there is plurality and difference; and these must be recognized, when anything important is regarded,—anything worthy of investigation and discussion.

4. TRUTH,—the agreement of *representations* with what is represented,—is the object of Intelligence; it is permanent and unchangeable, in some degree pleasant, in many ways profitable. It is various as the objects to which it refers; and is precious according to their excellence, and its usefulness. Objectively it may be the same to all minds, but subjectively it is different in every one. Truth sometimes stands for Reality; and then it denotes the Infinite and Unchangeable, as well as the finite and changeable.

Good is the object of Feeling, and in its widest sense, it comprehends all that is delightful and desirable, all that belongs to *well-being* and *well-doing*. It is various, as are the capacities of different subjects.

There is a Good simply *natural*, and a Good that is *moral*; and what is good for one, is not always good for another. Good may be low or high, little or much, brief or enduring; and the *greatest good* must include all that is requisite to the complete well-being of which the subject is capable. Good is a general term, not standing for any one thing, but for all that is pleasant and profitable and noble. As the nature and condition of any being varies and changes, so must the Good be different; but where the former are the same, so must the latter be. Moral Good is the highest and best, the most comprehensive and enduring.

BEAUTY is not the same for all persons, times, and places, like Truth; nor is it, like Good, comprehensive of the whole nature of any being. What is beautiful is felt alike by few, and is not always the same to any. It can satisfy but few of the wants and desires of any human beings. The greater Good is always to be preferred to the less, but the more Beautiful is not always the Best, the most desirable. The less beautiful may have more of the real and permanent Good, compared with which the highest known Beauty is not worthy of any regard.

The properties and relations which underlie all that is Beautiful, are the same to all by whom they are known, partially or completely. But as knowledge differs in degree, and they who know are themselves subject to change, human apprehensions of the Beautiful cannot have the universality and unchangeableness which belong to Truth, and to what is morally Right and Good. Beauty may be high or low, little or much, special or general, natural or moral. The necessity, certainty, and universality which

belong to Morals, do not belong to Art. Ethics and Æsthetics are not of the same order; and nothing is more adverse to human welfare than the making Duty a matter of Taste. Beauty is often connected with ease, pleasure, and self-indulgence; and these are often contrary to what is True and Good. Duty and present enjoyment are proverbially opposed, and the noblest and best life is one of self-denial. What is True and Good may become in some degree Beautiful; and all that is Beautiful has something that is True and Good; but it may be the least and lowest of these, or the greatest and best. The objects which are most admired for their Beauty, are not remarkable for the higher mental and moral qualities; and the persons most celebrated for their power of discerning and producing Beauty have not been always eminent for wisdom and goodness.*

* Mental Feelings may be defined, as states of Mind, partly like Sensations, and partly unlike. They are *like*, in that there is with them a special consciousness of what is *subjective*—Self and its states. But they are *unlike*, in that they have not material causes and properties. All Feelings come at first without being chosen; but afterwards they may come because of choice, or in opposition to it. The difference between Feelings of every kind, and Volitions, will appear when both are considered and compared.

PART II.

VOLITIONS.

Division I.
NATURE OF VOLITION.

Division II.
OBJECTS OF CHOICE.
MATERIAL AND MENTAL.

Division III.
MOTIVES OF CHOICE.
FEELINGS, JUDGMENTS, VOLITIONS.

Division IV.
LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
EXPLANATIONS AND ARGUMENTS.

Division V.
EFFECTS OF VOLITION.

DIVISION I.
NATURE OF VOLITIONS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. **T**HE distinction between what is Voluntary, and what is Involuntary, is universally admitted to be of great importance. It affects all judgments respecting the conduct, the condition, the character of men. The WILL deserves special consideration as, in some respects, the highest endowment of human nature. It pre-supposes every kind of Intelligence and Susceptibility. There are low acts of Will, as there are low kinds of Knowledge and Feeling; but the corresponding choice is superior to these. The highest exercises of Will include the highest exercises of Intelligence and the highest states of Feeling; and are therefore above these. Volitions are important for what they are, for what they manifest, and for their consequences. The conduct, character, and condition of men depend on the exercise of Will. Without right Volitions there is no continued exemption from ill, no permanent possession of any good, no sure progress, no attainment of what is highest and best. Very little is *directly* subject to the Will; but *indirectly* very much,—all that most concerns us in the present and the future.

2. The WILL, as a Faculty, is known only by inference, as all mental *faculties* are; but Choice, the exercise of Will,

is directly known. Choosing is like *thinking* and *feeling*, a state of consciousness in which both the *self* and the *state* and some *object*, are directly perceived. All voluntary changes are known. We cannot have them, without knowing in some measure that we have them; and we cannot know them fully, but by attentive consideration. Some exercises of Intelligence, but not all, include what is *material*; and so do some acts of Will. But there are complete Volitions which are entirely *mental*, and do not contain any consciousness of body. All have material antecedents and consequents, but none have material parts or properties. As *thought* and *belief*, *desire* and *affection*, must be experienced to be known, so must Volition; and, like all mental states, its nature is learnt only by internal inspection and reflection. The study of the brain and nerves, of the muscles and limbs, will give some knowledge of the corporeal conditions and accompaniments of Volition; but not the least knowledge of its nature, or even of its existence.*

* The Cerebro-Spinal nervous system is the present constant condition of all voluntary movement, as it is of sensation and all consciousness. The Mind has no direct power over the Body, when the nervous force transmitted from the brain is wanting; and its power is greater or less, as this force is increased or diminished. Many motions which may be produced voluntarily, are also caused by this force, without choice; and others are caused by Electricity and Galvanism. In whatever place and way the Mind acts on the Body, it is evident that Volition does now produce *motion*, determines what part of the body shall move and in what direction, whether the motion shall be rapid or slow, strong or feeble, regular or irregular. The Will has this power over all those parts of the body to which certain nerves go; but not over other parts. It has no direct power over any other bodies. All present Consciousness depends on the state and action of the Brain; and therefore all acts of Will, as all states of Intelligence, require some supply of nervous energy. But there is no evidence that Volitions are in, or from, the Brain, any more than thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and affections. The state of the Brain affects the *capacity* of thinking and choosing, but does not determine what we think and choose. Locality, extension, and figure do not belong to the Will, any more than to the Understanding.

3. The nature of Volition is learnt from Consciousness, but it is not equally evident in all cases. As there are many kinds and degrees of Intelligence and Feeling, so there are diversities of Volition ; and what is to be found in the higher states, does not always appear in the lower. The nature of Volition is more clearly seen, when *one* of two or more objects is chosen, than when only *one* is present to the mind. It is more manifest in *deliberate* choice, the result of consideration, than in sudden choice, the effect of strong impulse. It is more fully perceived, when choice is not between objects of the same kind, but when the objects are very *different*, and different principles of action are concerned ;—passion and prudence, inclination and duty. Lastly the volitions which respect the prior consideration of *motives*, though often little noticed, deserve special consideration ; for they have the same nature as those which respect outward *actions*, and show in some respects most clearly the nature of Volition. The choice of *actions* is generally determined by this *prior* choice. The causes and effects of Choice may be unknown, but the nature and objects of Choice are within the range of Consciousness. This shows the various states of thinking, feeling, and choosing ; and the one Self which thinks, feels, and chooses.*

4. The various questions respecting Volition, which have occasioned so much discussion, are of three different kinds ; and the confusion of these has caused many mistakes. The first enquiries are Psychological,—Natural or Physical ; the second are Metaphysical ; and the third are merely Logical. We have first to consider what is shown in Consciousness of Volition ? What is its Nature as a state of Mind or Self ? Next, what are its Objects, that which is thought of and

* We are often conscious that we *can* choose, before we *do* choose ; and so in some Acts of Will, we are conscious that we *could* choose what we *do* not ; though it is not always so.

chosen, either for itself, or some other object ! Thirdly, what are the Motives of Choice, the reasons and natural causes of Choice ? When these are known, we can understand the arguments, physical and metaphysical, respecting the Origin of all Volitions, natural and moral ; and judge of the proper use of the Axioms, on which the conclusions depend. Logical questions regard Definitions, and accepted propositions ; and differences which are merely *verbal*, have been often taken for *real*. Some notice of the Effects of Volition will conclude the consideration of this part of Moral Science.

CHAPTER II.

NATURE OF VOLITION.

1. INVOLUNTARY changes in mind and body are always experienced before any that are Voluntary. There must be some *thought* of what is chosen, some *belief* that it may be gained; and there is, or has been, some *feeling* respecting it. These are antecedents to the mental *act* which is the *volition*, the exercise of Will. The mental and bodily changes which follow are *effects*, of which Volition may or may not be the *cause*; for there are other *causes*, and the *effects* do not always follow this one. The earliest Volitions cannot be examined, but the later may be; and the certainties of present experience are to be considered, before any conjectures of the forgotten past. When we choose to take a book from the table, we have some knowledge of our bodies and of outward objects, and some desire respecting them. This occasions a mental *act*, by which the movement is produced, through which the object is gained. There would not be the conscious *effort* without some previous thought, belief, and desire; but these are not the mental *act* or *effort*, which is called *choice* or *volition*. They may exist without it; and Volition is something added to them, of another kind. Volitions agree more or less with antecedents and consequents, but they are always different in nature from both.

2. No one ever chooses what is not thought of, and thought of as possible; and there is no choice or volition

which has not its origin in some previous desire or aversion. There can be no Volition without some *object* and *motive*. As we cannot *see*, unless something is to be *seen*; so we cannot *choose*, unless there is some *object* to be chosen, and some *motive* for choosing it. There are states of *intelligence* without any kind of *desire*, but these give no object or occasion for *choice*. The difference between Desire and Volition,—*wishing* and *willing*,—is very great; and is generally recognised in Consciousness. The one precedes, the other follows. There are often several different desires, and then some single choice. We *desire* the conduct of others as well as our own; but we *will* directly only our own. Desire refers chiefly to the *end* to be gained; Choice to the *means* to be used.* Desire is an effect produced, an impression received; Choice is the beginning of action. Desires are feeble or strong; Volitions easy or difficult. Desires are pleasant or painful; Volitions are approved or condemned. They are

* It has been said that *volition* is simply *desire*, directed to some change which is *expected* to follow immediately. But the states of *desire* and *expectation* are different from *volitions*; and the *expectation* is founded on the *volition*. The movement of the hand is expected, because of the effort,—because there is the *willing*, as well as the *wishing*. We may *wish* and expect the rising of the sun a moment before it rises; but there is no act of *will*. The moral differences between *desiring* and *willing*, result from the *difference* between them; and not from the distance and uncertainty of one object, and the nearness and certainty of the other. If in some cases the difference is unnoticed, in other cases it is manifest; and it is real in all.

Volition, in a peculiar degree and way, belongs to Self. The choice is our own. We are responsible, answerable for it, as we are not for any other state. We are commended or censured for what we choose. If the choice is right, we *ourselves* are right, and to be *personally* approved for it; while if the choice is wrong, we *ourselves* are wrong, and to be *personally* condemned for it. We are not responsible for what others choose, unless we contribute or consent to their conduct; and others in the same way are not responsible for what we choose. Every man must bear his own burden of responsibility.

the only objects of moral approbation or condemnation. What is altogether involuntary is no proper object of praise or blame; we praise good when it is chosen, and blame evil when it is chosen. The *choice* of good is itself good, whatever may be before or after; and the *choice* of evil is in like manner unconditionally evil.

3. Volitions are in some measure pleasant, apart from their objects and effects. A portion of the pleasure found in mental and bodily exercise, is the pleasure of choosing. Men become weary in choosing, and often wish to be free from the trouble and difficulty and responsibility of some decisions. But they like to choose who shall decide for them; and in most things like to choose for themselves. This is not always to secure a better portion, or to enjoy the exercise of power; but because *choosing* is itself pleasant. The delight which some find in contradiction and opposition, comes from the clearer consciousness they have of exercising their own will, when it is different from that of others. The pleasure of self-will is natural, and not always wrong. There is some pleasure in choosing for oneself, in *opposition* to another; but a greater pleasure in choosing in *agreement* with another, when there is sympathy, trust, and mutual affection. There is an advantage in choosing for oneself, when we know fully and certainly what is best to be chosen; but there is a greater advantage in choosing what another has chosen, when that other is wiser and better.

The brief and varied exercise of Will is pleasant to all, but the strenuous and continued exercise is not pleasant. To some a little mental effort soon becomes difficult and painful; every kind of *work* is disagreeable to them; but all like the easy occupation of *play*. The exercise of Will required for human welfare, is always more than is agreeable. Doing only what is easy and pleasant, is never very profitable. What is most beneficial demands earnest and persevering

exertion; and the Will requires to be strengthened and disciplined. A noble life is never one of self-indulgence.*

* Purposes are not really Volitions, though often taken as such. They are only *beliefs* respecting them. These *beliefs* may be of nearly the same worth, or they may be of scarcely any value; but they have not the same nature. Belief and Feeling respect the past, the present, and the future; but Volition belongs to the *present*, not at all to the *past*, and to the *future* only as dependent on the present, and ideally included in it. We may *regret* the past, and *believe* that, if we had to choose now, we should not choose as we did; or that in the future we shall choose differently; but these states are not *volitions*. They are states of *feeling* and *judgment* which precede *volitions*; and they may show a real change of *character*, but they may result from a change of *condition*; and are often of no value. The simple *purpose* of doing any thing, or not doing it, is the *belief* that, when the time comes, we shall *choose* to do it, or not to do it. The *belief* may be sincere, but erroneous. With contrary resolutions, the same conduct is repeated again and again. Regrets and Resolutions may help to corresponding Volitions; but they may be taken instead. The proverb "Hell is paved with good intentions," shows the common worthlessness of the Purposes and Resolutions which are mistaken for Volitions. Present feeling alone is no proof of a future Volition; and a present Volition is a pledge of the future, only when the present and future conditions are like. The choice of some present *action* may include the choice of some future *event*; and then both the present and the future are direct objects of choice. But when the present action is only the first of a series, and the conditions are very different,—the first being easy, and the others very difficult; then the one volition does not include the other, and can only be some preparation for it. If there is no *present* object of *volition*, mere *purposes* respecting the *future*, have in no degree the character of *volition*, though mistaken for it. Men say their minds are made up respecting what they *shall choose*, but this is an act of *judgment*, not of Will. When S. Peter said to the Lord, "If I must die with thee, I will not deny thee," he spoke sincerely, but in ignorance of himself. The present choice was no proof that the future would be the same.

DIVISION II.

OBJECTS OF VOLITION.

1. **T**HE OBJECTS of Volition comprehend all that is really chosen. They are therefore innumerable and very diverse; but all may be referred to a few classes which have peculiar interest and importance, both psychological and moral. Objects of Volition are either *material* or *mental*; we choose the motion of our *limbs*, and the direction of our *thoughts*. They are also *directly* subject to the Will, or *indirectly*: they are *means*, or *ends*,—*actions*, or their *results*. Our own speech is the *direct* effect of Will, the hearing of another is the *indirect* effect; but both alike are *objects* chosen,—the one as *means*, the other as an *end*. The *means* used are first in *fact*, but the *end* for which anything is done is first in *thought*. The choice of the former includes in it the choice of the latter; both are *direct objects* of Choice, but the one is *effected* directly, the other indirectly. If the *means* are in any degree desired, they become so far an *end*; and the *end* which is desired for itself, may be also desired for some further result, and so it is a *means* as well as an *end*.

2. Besides these principal divisions it may be observed that Objects are chosen with *deliberation*, or without; and that their results are regarded as *certain*, *probable*, or merely *possible*. These differences affect greatly the moral character of Choice. Consequences entirely unknown cannot be

objects of choice ; but all that are in any degree anticipated, whether desired or not, are so far intended and chosen. Many changes, bodily and mental, which at first are made consciously and are objects of Choice, disappear from consciousness and are no longer chosen. This results from Association, and is common in all habitual actions. Other objects become so connected with those first chosen, that they take their place, and are the only objects thought of and chosen. At first many muscular changes are slowly and separately chosen with every movement of the eyes and tongue, the hands and feet ; but afterwards, through frequent practice, these muscular changes come unconsciously, when some result is chosen. What is not thought of, and in some measure expected, cannot be an object of present choice ; but all that is thought of and expected, is also chosen. It is an Object of Choice.

CHAPTER I.

MATERIAL OBJECTS OF CHOICE.

I. Means or Actions.

1. **T**HERE are many states and actions of the Body which are, like the circulation of the blood, always and entirely *involuntary*; while others, like breathing, are partially subject to choice. Many which were at first *involuntary*, like the closing of the eyes, now come whenever chosen; while others at first *voluntary*, become *involuntary* and unconscious, as in speaking and walking. Some states require only a *single* volition; others a continued *series*, ceasing with the effort. Involuntary bodily changes must precede the voluntary, for nothing is chosen that is not thought of, and nothing is chosen at the beginning of life, but from some feeling of desire or aversion. With all *desire* there is some tendency *towards* the object, and with all *aversion* a tendency *from* it; and the primary causes of these feelings are the first objects of volition. Nervous energy, without any external stimulus, will cause some muscular contraction and bodily movement, and thus remove uneasiness and produce a pleasant sensation. When this experience has been often repeated, it will be thought of and desired, and *desire* leads naturally to some *effort* for its reproduction. The muscular contraction, the bodily movement, and the pleasant sensation, are combined in fact, and form at first one object of thought and desire; and to this some *effort* is directed. The earliest efforts are indefinite

and tentative, but after many trials they become definite. When there was a consciousness of some muscular sensation, as well as some bodily motion, the *effort* would be for both ; and when there was only a consciousness of the latter, bodily motion alone would be the object of volition. But this, by unconscious association, brings the requisite muscular contraction.

2. Pain in like manner causes desire for its removal, and is the stimulus to many efforts. Uneasiness produces a muscular contraction, and pain then sometimes ceases. When this experience is often repeated, the whole bodily change is united in thought, as it is in experience. Desire for relief leads to some mental *effort* ; and the muscular contraction, the bodily movement, the removal of pain, immediately follow. The mental effort is a *volition*, an act of choice, an exercise of Will ; the muscular contraction, the bodily movement, the change of sensation, are the *objects* of choice. The frequent connection of these three will cause their combination, so that the choice of one secures, without consciousness, the presence of the others.*

Pleasure and pain produce some *involuntary* bodily movements ; and lead to similar *voluntary* movements. There

* According to common experience in all habitual actions, the choice of a part of a series will bring the rest. That which is seen and desired, is chiefly regarded ; and so the mental *effort*, which primarily was directed to muscular contraction, is transferred to some bodily movement. Thus the motion of the fingers is chosen, and the requisite change in the muscle of the arm at once comes to cause the motion. The speaking a word is chosen, and the requisite movement in the organ of speech comes without any present choice. Before the parts of a series have been frequently associated, each must be separately chosen, and obtained by special effort ; but after a while, a single choice and effort secures all. The mental effort, of which we are conscious in bodily movements, is accompanied by the release of a nervous force, which has come from the brain ; and this appears to be the *physical cause* of muscular contraction.

are other tendencies to action which are partially subject to control. Laughing, weeping, coughing, sneezing, may be involuntary, or in some degree voluntary.

3. Bodily *motions* are the most common objects of choice, but some *sensations* appear to be partially subject to the Will. Colours become deeper, sounds louder, tastes and scents stronger, when they are earnestly regarded. We choose to *look*, and sights become more clear; to *hearken*, and we hear more distinctly. In the same way pleasant and painful sensations are increased when attention is fixed upon them; and those which were so slight as to be unnoticed, become manifest. In morbid conditions of the nervous system, pains are produced by attending to one part of the body, and removed by attending to other objects. The action of disease is subject to the same influence. The increase of nervous sensibility, may be produced by mental causes, or by the state of the blood, as well as by muscular contraction. As sensations are increased by attention to them, so they are sometimes produced by suggestive objects. Sensations are commonly the occasions of Thoughts, but the reverse is sometimes experienced. The *sensations* produced by the presence of material objects, may be reproduced by remembrance. Words produce ideas, and these recall bodily and mental feelings.

2. Ends or Results.

1. Bodily states, internal and external, which cannot be directly affected by the Will, are indirectly the *effects* of choice. Hunger is removed by eating, thirst by drinking. We obtain the sensations of vision by bringing objects before the eyes, or turning the eyes towards them. Tastes and scents are gained by causing the approach of objects that produce these sensations. Health is chosen by taking proper food and exercise; and sickness by neglecting these, and

choosing what is known to be hurtful. By choosing the movement of a small part of the body, we choose also all the known and expected consequents, in ourselves and in others.

2. In firing a gun the motion of a finger is chosen, and this is effected *directly*; but in choosing this there is the choice of all that is expected to follow,—the motion of the trigger, the explosion of the powder, the discharge of a bullet, the perforation of that to which it is pointed. These results are *directly* chosen, but they are effected *indirectly*. When we choose to look in this direction, or in that, we choose to see whatever is near in the line of vision; but we do not choose what is there, or what impression shall be produced on our senses, unless we previously know what is there. But if this is known, then by choosing to turn our eyes, we choose what we shall see. So it is with all sensations. We choose what shall be heard, by going to this place or that; what shall be smelt or tasted or felt, by bringing objects nearer to our bodies, or moving nearer to them. How they will affect us does not depend on choice, but on their nature and our own. Some knowledge is also independent of Will, requiring no voluntary attention. But most of the knowledge of Sensations, and their objects, requires for clearness and completeness a measure of voluntary Attention.

3. All power over other bodies, whether living or lifeless, is indirect,—through the voluntary motions of our own bodies. By moving our limbs, we move the material objects we can touch; and by moving these, we move others. By signs of various kinds we govern animals and men. We choose the action of natural forces, and so change the course of rivers, remove mountains, obtain the service of wind and water, fire and steam; and all the mighty energies, active and latent, which exist in the material world. The *direct* action of the Will on material objects is very small,—little

more than a change in the position of some portion of our bodies. But the *indirect* action is immeasurable in power, extent, and duration. The largest, and most enduring effects may be produced by the slight and brief pressure of our hands. All the effects which depend on human agency, are thus connected with the Will; and so far as they are known, they are objects of Volition. They are equally chosen whether near or remote, present or future.

4. Unknown results cannot be chosen; but all that are known are chosen, whether *desired* or not. There is a great difference in the choice of what is desired, and what is not desired; and a great difference in the choice of what is anticipated as certain, probable, or merely possible; but all, as foreknown, are intended and chosen; they are *objects* of Volition. No human will can create any force, or change in the smallest degree any natural power or law; but it can alter the combination of things, and thus change latent into active power. We can easily change the position of objects, and thus choose what natural forces shall act, when and where, in what direction and how far. Thus we produce effects, which would not otherwise come, of incalculable extent and importance; and prevent others.*

* No one pretends to know all the material elements and forces of Nature, and all their possible combinations. It is therefore quite possible, that a chemist in our own day should make a new substance, as an engineer makes a new machine. No one can draw a line to separate all the *natural* from the *supernatural*, though it is often easy to determine what is *superhuman*. The *supernatural*, or *superhuman*, has no known adequate natural cause; and therefore the Divine Power is at once recognised; but this is equally present everywhere, though not equally *obvious*, nor with the same *purpose*. Human beings are not the only *voluntary* agents who can change the course of Nature, merely by altering the position of objects, and using forces which have existed from the beginning, with qualities and laws that never change. Miracles are not events without *causes* and *reasons*. They are not violations of natural laws, but proofs of a Divine mission, by superhuman knowledge, power, and goodness.

CHAPTER II.

MENTAL OBJECTS OF CHOICE.

I. Means or Actions.

1. **T**HE power of the Will over *mental* states is similar to that over *corporeal* states. Some changes begin without choice, continue and are repeated with choice; and some begin with choice, but continue and are repeated without it. Little is affected directly, but much indirectly. The choice of thoughts and emotions soon follows that of movements and sensations; the welfare of the mind depends on the former, as that of the body depends on the latter; and in both the involuntary precedes the voluntary. Whatever thought or idea gives pleasure or pain, or awakens desire, secures *involuntary* attention; the result of which is an increase of thought and feeling. When this has been experienced many times it will be remembered and anticipated; and when the consequent is desired, the antecedent is chosen with it. Attention without effort thus leads to attention by effort, and the consequent effects on thought and feeling.

2. Internal volitions often precede External, and the former often determine the latter. Before deciding on a course of conduct, there is some voluntary consideration. The mind turns to one object and from another, chooses what to regard and retain, what to neglect and lose. The direct power of the Will is chiefly in the effort of Attention

directed to thoughts, but some influence is exerted on the feelings by yielding to, or resisting, their tendencies to expression and action. Will is not necessary to all *thinking*, any more than *thinking* is necessary to the *existence* of Mind. Thinking is no more *essential* to the existence of *mind*, than *motion* is to that of *matter*; though both are always *capable* of these states.

2. Ends or Results.

1. The indirect power of the Will extends to all that most affects our own welfare, and in some degree to what affects others also. By voluntary attention *ideas* become more clear and complete, they are gained and preserved; and the course of thought is regulated, according to natural laws. By choosing our thoughts, we choose all that depends on them—belief, emotion, desire, affection. We cannot by Will obtain directly any thought, or belief, or feeling; but these follow antecedents which we can choose,—which are directly subject to the Will. By choosing what thoughts we will consider, we choose also all their known consequences. Belief is involuntary, but not more so than joy and sorrow, gratitude and esteem, and all other mental states and affections.

2. We can never choose in what way any objects shall affect either body or mind, for this depends on their nature and our own; but we can often choose what objects shall act upon us, in what degree, and to what extent. We choose the direction in which we look, but not the objects seen there: the things we touch and taste, but not the feelings they shall produce. So in like manner we choose the objects of thought, but the effects are determined for us. We choose what we shall remember, by choosing what we attend to. We choose the *evidence* we consider, and the *belief* comes without any other choice. We choose the

consideration of certain objects, and have various *emotions* and *affections*, according to their qualities and our susceptibilities. Nothing can be reasonably commanded, that is altogether beyond our will; but that may be properly required, which in any way depends on choice. The government of Feelings is chiefly by the direction of thought, by what we choose to make the object of attention; but it is aided by consenting to, or resisting, the expressions to which the Feelings prompt; as well as by the choice of bodily conditions and circumstances, of mental associations and sympathies, favourable or unfavourable. The power of the Will must be according to natural capacities. No effort can create these when wanting; and more or less of effort is needed, as there is a natural taste or aptitude for any objects. The moral character of volition depends on all that is *chosen*, whether subject to the Will directly or indirectly, whether desired or not. Unknown consequences cannot be desired or chosen; but known consequences are chosen, when not desired. All have to choose in some measure their *way* of life, and so they choose the *end* to which it leads. They choose their *work*, and so choose its *reward*.

3. The power of one human Will over others is of vast extent and importance; but it is all indirect; and chiefly by means of signs made in one body, and received in another. Thoughts and feelings are transmitted by material changes. Verbal statements may so represent objects as to produce the greatest impressions; and the assertion of belief aids its formation in others, as the expression of feeling promotes the excitement of feeling. Whatever effect on the minds of others is anticipated, is also intended and chosen; whatever may be the distance of time or place. Unknown results on other minds of what is said, or written, or done, cannot be objects of choice; but all foreseen results are, whether desired or not. The words and deeds of persons

in distant lands, and former ages, have a present influence on the minds of millions ; and so far as this was foreseen, it was chosen. Immeasurable and inconceivable is the power of the human Will, over the objects of the material world ; and equally so is its power over human minds. But it is all indirect, and all according to the laws by which all things visible and invisible are alike regulated.

4. The objects of choice are all known ; some are chosen because desired ; others because they are conducive to the attainment of what is desired ; and others merely because they are connected with these. But *ends, means, accompaniments* and *consequences*, so far as known, are alike objects of Volition. What is known to be the result of Volition is equally the object of choice, whether it be a *direct* or *indirect* result. So what is *desired*, and what is *not* desired, if known to be the result of Volition, are equally the objects of choice. But while the difference between *direct* and *indirect* results, is of no moral significance, the difference between *desired* and *undesired* results is of much moral importance. To inflict *pain* as a means of good to the sufferer, is true benevolence ; but to do it for one's own advantage, is unjust ; to do it simply for one's own pleasure is inhuman cruelty. The pain that is not desired is *chosen*, as much as the pain that is desired ; and the agent is equally responsible for his action in both cases ; but the moral character depends chiefly on the Motive, though all objects of Volition are to be considered. Bad actions are not made good by the best intentions.

DIVISION III.

MOTIVES OF CHOICE.

THE Motives and the objects of choice are sometimes the same, but generally they are different. Some things are chosen for themselves, but many things are chosen wholly for the sake of other things, as *means* for attaining the *ends* sought; and many because they are necessarily connected with these, and are taken as inevitable accompaniments. That is a Motive of choice, for the sake of which, or because of which, anything is chosen and done. Motives are of various kinds, and may be referred to three classes. There are volitions from Feeling, from Judgment, and from Habit. These Motives are different, and may be coincident or conflicting. Some in speculation have identified all Motives, and have described them as operating in the same manner. But in common life, apart from any theory, their difference is always recognised. All distinguish between the actions that are simply produced by *passion*, and those which result from *principle*; and these are different from those which are without any present feeling or consideration, the voluntary effects of *customary* choice and conduct. These *motives* differ in their nature, and in the mode of their influence; and they occasion contrary estimates of conduct and character. Men are wise or foolish, right or wrong, good or bad, according to the motives by which their lives are directed and governed.

The name Motive is sometimes given to the *external* objects which affect the mind, producing certain feelings, judgments, and habits. But it is only as these are produced within, that any external objects can influence choice. It is therefore more correct to speak of the nearer *internal* antecedent as the Motive of any choice, rather than the remote and external. Choice must be according to some motive, but it may or may not be according to Feeling or Judgment or Habit.

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CHAPTER I.

VOLITIONS FROM FEELING.

1. **F**EELINGS are of various kinds, and some are much superior to others ; but all have a similar influence, as present motives of choice. They are *impulsive*, attracting or repelling, drawing to or driving away. The Appetites of the body, or the simple desires in which they originate, may be considered first. They are the earliest experienced, and some are constant and universal. The desires for any bodily pleasure or its cause, and the aversions to any bodily pain or its cause, prompt to the choice and action whereby certain objects may be gained. The excitement of *feeling* is attended with some increase of *power*, and a *tendency* to action, with which it is easy and pleasant to comply, but which it is often difficult and painful to resist. Desires for food and exercise, light and warmth, produce a corresponding choice ; and the contrary Aversions have their natural expression and influence. When there is only one object of desire or aversion, there can only be one choice. When there are feelings of the same kind which urge in contrary directions, the strongest feeling will prevail. But the strength of feelings is known only by their effects ; and that which is most effective in one way, is not always so in another. The feeling which is strongest as a *motive* is that which overcomes another ; and therefore the strongest *must* prevail, for otherwise it would not be the strongest.

2. It is the same with *mental* as with *bodily* desires and aversions. The desire for any kind of knowledge, for any mental exercise and effectiveness, increases the *ability* for them, and produces an *inclination* to the efforts requisite for their attainment. When curiosity is awakened, voluntary attention is easy and pleasant; when an interest is felt in any work, vigorous exertion and persevering industry are readily and cheerfully chosen. And so with all the secondary desires, when the *means* are, in fact or in thought, closely connected with the desired *ends*, for the sake of which they were primarily chosen.* Desires for wealth and distinction, for influence and honour, prompt to the choice of all the requisite exertions and sacrifices. Disagreeable things are readily chosen, and difficult things are readily done, when there is a strong desire for any object. When feeling alone is the motive to action, the facility and steadiness of choice are according to the measure of *feeling* with which any object is regarded.

3. The Affections, which regard others, have the same influence on Volition, as the feelings which regard self. It is easy and pleasant to choose according to the prompting of gratitude or compassion. The service required by those who are loved and trusted is cheerfully rendered; and often, the sight of those who are in danger and distress produces, without hesitation, a willingness to make every possible exertion to afford relief. Moved simply by the feeling of pity, men risk their own lives, that they may save others. Resentment and envy, in like manner, facilitate all adverse choice and action. It is easy and pleasant for a time, to say or do anything that may be painful or hurtful to those, against whom there is some adverse feeling. Passion

* Desire for *pleasure* and aversion to *pain* are common motives, but these are not the only desires and aversions. Other objects cause these feelings.

prompts sometimes to what is most injurious to oneself and others ; and produces conduct which when considered causes the bitterest regret and remorse. The worst actions are not involuntary, but in them there is commonly a yielding to feelings which should be resisted and restrained.*

4. Under the influence of all Feelings,—desires and aversions, hopes and fears,—we are carried on with little exertion, as those who are sailing with the wind, or rowing with the stream. The natural effect of all Feeling is to keep some object before the mind ; thus the feeling is increased, and the inclination to choose accordingly. But the *choice* is not inevitable, or in any way necessary. It is not like a movement caused by outward force. Feeling does not often produce action without choice, but it often produces choice different from what was purposed. What is according to present feeling is easy and pleasant, and what is contrary is difficult and painful ; and therefore the present choice is sometimes contrary to former volitions, and very often to previous resolutions.

It is easy to choose according to feeling, and the choice is easier as the feeling is stronger. If the strongest feeling always determined choice, then no choice would be difficult. The best choice is often difficult, seldom the easiest ; because of some adverse feeling. It is seldom possible by any exercise of imagination to give to the distant and unseen,

* It has been supposed by some, that Pain is the only *motive* of all actions, and that all Desires and Affections move to exertion by the uneasiness they excite. But neither men or animals are always influenced by pain ; in none is it the only motive, or the most common ; and in many it is not the strongest. Men and animals are moved by the attraction of *pleasure*, as much as by the repulsion of *pain* ; and more by the former. Desires and Affections are not painful, unless inoperative, ineffective, or excessive. The *stimulus* of pain is sometimes needed, but not by all ; and the greatest pains may be disregarded, under the influence of higher motives.

the power of the seen and present, and this is never necessary.

5. The actual *strength* of any desires or affections can be known only from their *effects*; some of which are involuntary, and others voluntary. In these there is a great difference, not only in different persons, but in the same person at different times. Some have more general sensibility than others; all their feelings are stronger, or it may be those of some special kind. But the persons who have stronger feelings are not always more governed by their feelings than others. Feelings are of various kinds, and their comparative strength, apart from their influence on choice, does not show the influence they have upon choice. The strength of desires for animal gratification, for intellectual improvement, for personal advantage, for the welfare and the affection of others, can be compared only by their actual influence on volition. It is not possible to know that sensual desires are stronger than mental, selfish desires stronger than social,—or the reverse,—except as desires of one kind have a greater influence on conduct than those of another kind, the one prevailing over the other when they are in opposition. As the *measure* of any kind of material force can never be known from the antecedent alone, so it is with the influence of feelings on Choice. Nothing is seen in any kind of Desire or Affection, to account for its influence being more or less than that of another kind of feeling. If apart from their influence on Choice, feelings of the same kind are known to be one stronger than another, it is not so with feelings of a different order. When choice is determined only by Feeling, it may be according to the strongest, but the strongest cannot be known until it prevails; and Feelings are not the only antecedents of volition.

6. When persons are influenced only by Feeling, their

choice must be according to this principle. They move as inanimate bodies do, in the direction to which the greatest force tends, and where there is least resistance. This appears to be always the condition of beings who have only an animal nature; and often of children in whom human nature is but partially developed; and of those who leave themselves to be governed by the impulses of appetite and passion, without any consideration and self-control. Some feelings are pleasant and others painful, some generally beneficial others generally injurious, some violent and others gentle, some transient and others enduring; but the influence of all on volition appears to be similar. They produce some internal and external movement, and they prompt and facilitate Choice. They are always limited to one part of human nature, they respect only some of the objects connected with human welfare. Feelings are much increased by consideration, proximity, and sympathy, and are transferred from *ends* to *means* by frequent connection. They are therefore seldom proper rules for action. Those which are highest and best may sometimes urge to actions permanently and extensively injurious, both to the agent and to others. The statements of some philosophers, that men always act from the impulse of Feeling, and must do so, are contrary to the common judgments and the universal experience of mankind.

CHAPTER II.

VOLITIONS FROM JUDGMENT.

JUDGMENTS of every kind, as Motives of Choice, require the *prior* experience of Feelings, but not their *present* existence. Desires and Affections are the primary principles of Volition, and Judgment has respect to these, not as now felt, but as remembered or anticipated. It refers both to *ends* and *means*. Judgment regards the comparative *value* of what is sought, with the comparative *probability* of gaining it; and also the comparative *facility* of any means to be used, with the comparative *probability* of their success. Ends are desired, and Means are chosen for their sake, though they may be regarded with indifference or aversion. Means may become objects of desire through Association, and so be chosen from the impulse of Feeling; but commonly Desire is only for the *end*. Volition is easy and pleasant when the *end* is desired, and the *means* are not difficult and painful; but the *aversion* to the means may be greater than the *desire* for the end. Then Volition, if determined by Feelings, will be according to their comparative urgency.

I. Choice of Ends.

1. Judgment, in estimating the comparative worth of the objects of pursuit, considers primarily what they are. Present feelings depend much on proximity, on partial consideration, on the exercise of imagination and sympathy;

and therefore cannot show the real and permanent value of objects. Judgment regards the desire and delight, the pain and regret, which are sure to be felt, when the distant becomes near, the future present, the invisible visible; when what is thought of faintly and partially, shall be perceived clearly and fully. These are not present feelings, but they are known and can be measured; and according to their intensity and extent, *known* when not *felt*, one object should be preferred to another. If there were no remembrances and anticipations; no capacity for comparing the momentary present, with the long continuing future; that which respects a part of our nature, with that which concerns the whole; no power of reflection and self-control; then choice would necessarily be according to present feelings. Volitions and actions would all be according to appetite, passion, inclination. Thus it appears to be with animals and infants; but not with human beings who have any forethought and understanding. The most thoughtless and degraded are seldom entirely indifferent to their own welfare, and that of others. Only under the strong excitement of passion, or the stupefaction of intemperance, are human Volitions determined by the impulses of Feeling, wholly regardless of the dictates of Judgment. Men easily persuade themselves that what they are inclined to is not wrong, and that they may yield to the impulses of the present, without any great suffering or loss. They shun the consideration of which they know they are capable, fearing that it would mar enjoyment, and make it impossible for them to do what they wish to do. Feelings may become irresistible, but generally they are not; and there is the consciousness of a power to resist, which can be exercised, whether it is or not.

2. The promptings of present desires and aversions may be met, and overcome, by the excitement of contrary feelings. One passion may be roused to resist another passion, one

desire to counteract another desire, one fear to overcome another fear, one affection to drive away another affection, or to repress selfishness. These are important aids to self-government. Volition thus obtains strength and steadfastness ; but it is not dependent on such assistance for its existence or efficiency. A moment's consideration alone often suffices to secure the determination of the Will, in opposition to the strongest feelings. They who are not the slaves of appetite and passion find, that the simple thought of interest or reputation, of family or country, of duty or religion, show what is reasonable and right ; and determine choice, before there is any excitement of feeling. An involuntary change of feeling, or a change obtained by consideration, may produce another choice ; but without either, simply under the direction of Judgment, there may be choice contrary to all present Feeling. The human Will has this power, and it is often exercised.

3. Judgment respecting the objects of Choice regards not only the worth of the object, but also the probability of obtaining it. What is judged to be most desirable is not preferred, if there is little hope of gaining it. If success in the pursuit of less good, and failure in the pursuit of a greater, are highly probable, then whatever may be the measure of desire, the former is generally preferred. But there are objects so desirable, that a slight probability of success is sufficient to render choice reasonable and right.

A careful estimate of the *value* of objects, and the *probability* of success, may not be common ; but some consideration is almost universal. Men form some judgment for themselves, not disregarding the judgment of others. They know that the future will soon be as the present, and other objects as those now seen and felt, according to the sure lessons of experience.

2. The Choice of Means.

1. Means, as objects of choice, differ in two respects,—their use is agreeable, or disagreeable, and their success is more or less certain. If a pursuit is itself easy and pleasant, it will be preferred when there is little probability of gaining anything by it; but if it is difficult and painful, it will not be chosen unless likely to secure that which is desired. Means are not chosen because they are liked or disliked, but because some other object is desired, and they are not chosen simply from desire for this object, but from some *judgment* respecting the connection of the use of the *means* with the attainment of the *end*. However much any object may be desired, no sane person would use any means for obtaining it, if they were known to be entirely and certainly useless. If there is very little likelihood of success, there is very little inducement to their use; and this becomes stronger, as the probability of success increases, even if less desire should be felt. Means will be chosen when there is a firm expectation of success, which will not be chosen when there is little hope, however strong the desire.

2. The proper *use* of the right *means* for attaining the best ends is not always easy, and therefore is neglected by many. A measure of effort is frequently required, which is not easy and pleasant, but difficult and often painful. Men cannot become rich and learned, able and virtuous, without strenuous and persevering exertion, the frequent denial of strong inclinations. Poverty and ignorance, incapacity and vice,—intemperance, imprudence, cowardice and selfishness,—are the consequences of choosing according to the impulse of Feeling, and disregarding the dictates of Judgment. Wealth and wisdom, health and strength, virtue and honour, are the result of consideration,—of seeking to know what it is best to choose, and striving for it in the right way, with diligence

and perseverance. Nothing is more false and fatal to progress and prosperity than the doctrine, that men *must* choose according to impulses and inclinations ; and that Reason and Conscience have no resisting and controlling power.

3. When Ends are different, but of the same kind, the *greater* will be preferred to the *less*, if equally sure ; and the *more* sure to the *less* sure, if the ends are of the same value. So in the choice of Means, the *easiest* will be preferred if equally *sure* ; and the *surest*, if equally easy.

Actions are judged according to their *motives*, or according to their *results*,—principles or consequences. The higher *principles* are preferred to the lower, because of their wider and longer operation. The larger *consequences* are preferred to the smaller, and the surer to the less sure, also because of their intrinsic superiority. The influence of Judgment on Choice is according to the consideration given to the nature, magnitude, and certainty of the objects ; but this influence may be disregarded and resisted, or accepted and obeyed.

CHAPTER III.

VOLITIONS FROM PREVIOUS VOLITIONS.

1. **M**ANY things are habitually chosen, without any present excitement of feeling, or any present consideration of reasons. As thoughts, desires, and affections are often reproduced by association, so are volitions. A series of bodily motions or mental changes may become involuntary; but there is often a rapid succession of *volitions*, every single action being chosen at the proper time and place. Experience shows both of these sequences in all habitual actions. In walking or talking, in all kinds of play and work, many actions are consciously chosen, without any other motive than a preceding choice. This may be remembered, and become a motive to choice by the *feeling* it causes, or the *reason* it presents; and thus former volitions continue to influence. But often new volitions follow, without any such thought of the past. Nothing is more common than the repetition of volitions, as they have previously come. Actions would be slow and few, and practice would not help to perfection, if for every volition it was necessary to renew excitement and consideration. In all voluntary actions choice may be suspended, if there is occasion for reconsideration; but if none appears, the volition naturally follows. We always choose more readily in the usual way, and sometimes without any other cause than custom. Hence the importance of the first step in a good or evil course.

Previous resolutions to act rightly do not avail much, but the first right choice and action are of unspeakable value.

2. As some persons are more influenced by *feeling* than others, and some are more *considerate* than others in what they choose; so some are more *persistent* than others in what they have once chosen. There are those who are obstinate, and those who are fickle-minded; those who are averse to any change, and those who are ready for any; those who are slow of thought and attached to what is old, and those who are quick and attracted to what is new. There are occasions which require a *change* of feeling, judgment, and choice; when both external and internal conditions are different from what they were, or are supposed to be. Then perseverance is pernicious. Every *volition* tends to produce similar *volitions*, according to its energy and proximity, and the similarity of internal and external conditions. The first choice is the most difficult, and every repetition is more easy. With subsequent exercises of Choice, there is generally less of feeling and thought, and more readiness and steadfastness. There should be a willingness to change, when there is a reason for change. But when there is no reason for change, what has been deliberately chosen as true and wise and right and good, should be kept and maintained. Steadfastness is a good only in that which is good. Obstinacy is unwillingness to change, when there is a reason for change. Fickleness is a willingness to change, when there is no reason for change.

3. As former volitions affect present choice, so the choice of others will affect our own. The resolutions of others may be occasions for ours, by the *feelings* they excite, or the *reasons* they present; but apart from this they have some influence. We *believe* more firmly when we *believe* with others, and *feel* more strongly when we *feel* with others;

and so we *choose* more readily and steadfastly when we *choose* with others. The expressed *will* of one person is often a direct cause of the *will* of another; if not alone, certainly by increasing the influence of other motives. Commands enforce obedience, entreaties induce compliance. The strong *will* of one often overcomes the feeble *will* of another. This is most manifest in children, in sick and deranged persons. They are controlled by the energetic will of others, though they may not be convinced or persuaded.

4. The contrary effect sometimes appears, and the expressed will of others may awaken opposition. Prohibitions are said to produce disobedience, but this is not always their tendency. They naturally lead to the supposition, that there is something *pleasant* in what is prohibited, or there would be no occasion for the prohibition. They also give to the exercise of will the pleasant sense of *freedom* and *energy*, which are felt when another *will* is opposed. But wise prohibitions mark what is *hurtful*, and to be avoided. The pleasure of obedience to rightful authority, is as great as that of resisting usurpation and wrong. The consciousness of will is clearest in the exercise of self-denial; and the highest pleasures belong to the agreement of one's own *will*, with the *will* of those who are loved, trusted, and honoured. There is the joy of the greatest activity and effectiveness, when the separate wills of many are in free and loving obedience to a higher will.

We know that we need not choose from the impulse of Feeling, nor from the dictate of Judgment; and it is equally clear and certain that the continuance or repetition of volition is not necessary; there is often a change of will.

5. Feelings may be compared with Feelings in respect to their intensity and energy, and one may be said to be stronger than another; but Feelings of different kinds, as

appetite and affection, have no common measure. Feelings and Judgments cannot be thus compared. Judgments may be compared with Judgments, in respect to the relative worth of similar objects, and the relative probabilities of success. But a Judgment respecting personal advantage cannot be compared with one respecting social affection, nor with one respecting duty and honour. Feelings are *subjective* and variable, Judgments are *objective* and abiding.

It may be natural to yield to Passion, but it is better to be guided by Prudence. It may be natural to be moved by selfish desires, but it is better to follow social affections. It may be natural to regard only pleasures and interests, but it is better to consider duties also. Men can and do choose and act in all these ways. Nothing is more contrary to truth than the statements: "That the Will always is, as the greatest apparent good," and that "the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding."—EDWARDS, I. ii. 2.

6. The Motives of choice are the *natural causes* of volitions, and are commonly referred to as such. They are, as all other *natural causes*, observed antecedents, agreeing in some way with the consequents, and unless counteracted always followed by them. They differ much from the *metaphysical causes*, often confounded with them. The latter are never observed, being known only by *inference*; they are believed to be connected with their effects by some kind of *necessity*, exactly agreeing with them, and accounting for them. This *efficiency* is generally in some measure attributed to *natural causes*, by others it is referred to the Divine will, and by others it is entirely rejected. Feelings, Judgments, and previous Volitions, are said to be causes of the choice and action which follow; but it is not generally meant that they are alone *sufficient*, or that they are necessarily connected with their consequents. Nothing is more certain than the diversity of Motives which influence human conduct.

None always choose from Feeling, or from Judgment, or according to a prior Volition; and all are more or less influenced by each of those classes of Motives.

7. The present influence of Motives is increased and diminished in various ways. As Attention is given to one class of motives or another, their nature is seen and their power felt. As one kind of Choice is repeated or another, the motives will be more fully recalled; and the choice comes with more readiness, completeness, and steadfastness. Those who yield to their inclinations and passions find that these become stronger by indulgence, though they afford less pleasure; and that there is less willingness and power to resist and govern them. Those who obey Reason and Conscience, find that obedience becomes more easy and pleasant; and they have more willingness and power to do what is right and good. Habit changes the nature of men, so that of some it is said to be impossible that they should be good, as it is impossible for others to be wicked. Generally men choose in any way more easily, if those with them have the same or a similar choice. The power of Sympathy for good and for evil is incalculable. The worst become so, by companionship with the bad, and the best become so, by fellowship with the good. Some stimulus is afforded by opposition; but more help is given by sympathy. We should think of those who are against us, but much more of those who are with us, in the practice and pursuit of what is good.

8. All the various kinds of Motives are equally natural, and needful for human welfare. Without Feelings, present or past, there could be no Volitions. All are requisite on some occasions; some are in themselves pleasant, and others are useful. None are needless, and no one can take the place of others. It is easy to *choose* according to the

mpulse of Feeling, and pleasant for a time when any *desire* is gratified. Judgment is also natural and needful; and some exercise, respecting both *ends* and *means*, is universal after early childhood. It is often easy and pleasant to choose according to what is seen to be best; but it is not so always. When the *means* to be used require effort and suffering, the *choice* is often difficult and painful, whatever *desire* there may be for the end. But men are capable of *choosing* thus, and all do so in some things; and they *must* do so, if they would secure and promote their own welfare and that of others. Finally, the influence of previous Volitions is also natural and needful; for little could be done, if fresh consideration and excitement were necessary to each single choice. There could be no improvement by practice, no increased facility of action, no progress towards perfection.*

* Many of the actions of animals appear to be *voluntary*, as the similar actions of men; but from their inferior intelligence, with their incapacity for reflection and self-control, their power of Volition is limited and low. They choose only according to present impulse, and must act according to their constitution and circumstances. They are therefore subjects of a *natural*, but not of a *moral* government. Many of their actions are regarded as *voluntary*, because they appear to have *mental* antecedents. If they were produced entirely by *material* causes, the actions of animals would be no more *voluntary* than the movements of plants. In both some motions are produced by *internal* causes; and no action is *voluntary*, simply because it has an *internal* cause. There must be a reason for the different judgments formed respecting the actions of men, and the similar actions of animals; for moral qualities are attributed to the former, and never to the latter. This reason is found in the power of reflection and self-control which men possess, the greater power of the human Will.

DIVISION IV.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

CHAPTER I.

EXPLANATIONS.

THE question respecting the Liberty or the Necessity of the Will, is one of much interest and importance. It appears among the earliest philosophical discussions, and is still the subject of controversy; common sense and facts being said to be on the one side, Reason and syllogisms on the other. The ambiguity of the *terms* has much increased the difficulty of appreciating arguments, and of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. Their meaning is therefore the first thing to be determined.

I.

1. LIBERTY is primarily and generally used of Agents. Persons are said to have *liberty*, or to be *free*, when not subject to any peculiar restraint in choosing and acting. They who are *free* can stay or not as they choose, go to this place or that, do one thing or another, work or rest as they please. They are not *free* from all restraints, for some both natural and social are universal; but they are free from those that are not common to men. Persons are *not free* whose *action* is *restrained* by walls or chains, nor are they free whose *choice* is restrained by special prohibitions and penalties.

Sometimes persons are said to be *not free*, when prevented from choosing and acting, as they usually do, by sickness or any such natural restraint. But generally the restraint referred to is from the action of others, and also for the advantage of others ; though it may be otherwise. It is for their own benefit, that children and insane persons are deprived of some portion of their freedom.

2. It is plainly impossible that liberty should belong to the Will, in the same sense in which it belongs to the Person ; unless the two are identified. But the inquiries respecting the *freedom* of the Will, and that of the Person, are entirely different. When the latter is decided, the former is still to be discussed ; when the one is affirmed, the other may be denied. There is therefore a change in the meaning of the *term* ; and the *freedom* of the Will is something different from the freedom of the Person commonly spoken of. This latter Freedom is opposed to one kind of Necessity, but there are other kinds ; and it is quite natural that the former term should be extended to correspond with the latter. The freedom of the Will is not the absence of such restraint as would make the action *necessary* in one sense, but the absence of all that would make it *necessary* in another sense. Judgment is said to be *free*, when there is nothing to prevent its proper exercise ; and the Heart to be *free*, when there is nothing to hinder the natural response of affection. So the Will may be said to be *free*, when there is nothing in what is external, or in what has been within, to make the present choice of motives and actions *necessary*, and any other choice *impossible*. With one sense of the term, the Liberty of *acting* according to *choice* is the only possibility ; but not so with the other.*

* Civil Liberty is different from Personal. According to Paley it is, "the not being restrained by any Law, but what contributes in a greater degree to the public welfare."

II.

NECESSITY is a term applied to various subjects, and used in different senses. That is said to be *necessary* which *must* be, either because there is no available power sufficient to prevent it; or because it is such that no power can affect it. Necessity is of several kinds,—Physical, or Moral, or Mathematical, or Metaphysical, or Logical.

1. Natural events are sometimes said to be *necessary*, when *we* cannot prevent them, though *others* could. Thus the fall of a house, the failure of a bank, are often said to be *necessary*, because there are no available means of prevention. A reference may be made to *all* human power, as when the decay of plants and animals is said to be *necessary*, the ebb and flow of the tide, the change of the seasons. These are examples of Physical necessity, which may be in opposition to the Will, or apart from any exercise of Will.

2. Actions are said to be morally *necessary*, when not to be prevented by any *ordinary* considerations. When it is said that a man *must* pay his debts, keep his promises, attend to his business, provide for his family, assist his friends,—nothing more is meant than that this conduct is to be expected, and cannot be prevented by any common considerations. This *necessity* may respect the influence of *duty*, or any other motive admitted to be generally paramount. It is not supposed that what is *morally* necessary cannot be neglected by the agent, or prevented by others. Less of certainty is usually understood, when it is said that conduct is Morally necessary, than when it is said to be physically necessary. But the *moral necessity* asserted by some of all *volition*, has the highest certainty; and differs from the *highest physical* necessity only, in that it respects the con-

nection of *volitions* with *motives*. Moral necessity belongs to the Will, and cannot be without or in opposition.

3. Mathematical truths are said to be *necessary*, because the contrary appear to be impossible and absurd. Equals added to equals *must* produce equals; the sums *must* be the same, in whatever *order* numbers are taken; two straight lines cannot inclose a space. In such cases the certainty is absolute, and the *necessity* has nothing to do with the measure of power.

4. It is the same with Metaphysical necessity. There *must* be Space and Duration everywhere; and there *must* be an adequate Cause for all that comes into being. This *necessity* is entirely different from physical or moral necessity, and is like that of mathematics. A similar *necessity* belongs to some Ethical propositions, and to some other *abstract* truths.

5. Logical *necessity* respects only the *form* of propositions, and may be connected with every other kind of necessity, but is quite different. What in fact is only *physically* or *morally* necessary, as well as what is necessary in mathematics and metaphysics, may become in thought *logically* necessary. A universal necessity belongs to *forms* of thought or belief. Thus it is *necessary* that the particulars should be true, if the universal is; that one proposition should be true, if another is false. So the motion of a ball is *necessary*, if the bat has the *force* attributed to it; fire *must* burn, powder *must* explode, plants *must* grow, if they have a supposed nature. A man *must* be truthful, honest, and kind, if he is really good. This conditional necessity may belong alike to all things. It is simply Logical. Given certain antecedents in thought, and the consequents must follow, according to the necessary laws of Thought. But

this is no evidence that any facts, events, or actions, have *causes* with which they are necessarily connected.*

These various kinds of Necessity are generally admitted to be real and different; but by some all Necessity is said to be merely *invariable connection*. Many objections to the *necessity* of all human volitions, do not apply when only *invariable sequence* is maintained, and *causes* are declared to be merely *constant* antecedents. If nothing is known to be *necessary*, volitions are not necessary. But those who deny all Necessity, and those who assert the *necessity* of all human volitions, agree in assuming, that *moral actions* and *natural events* are of the same nature; and have a similar origin.

It should be kept in mind that, while Logical Axioms are universal,—may be gained from, and applied to, all objects of Thought,—it is not so with Physical Axioms or Metaphysical. These are gained from the consideration of some objects, and can be applied only to those known to be similar.

All agree that *natural events* are determined by their antecedents, with which they exactly agree. With the same *antecedents* there *must* be, or there *certainly* will be, the same *consequents*. The question for consideration is this, Are *human volitions* always in like manner determined by their antecedents?—these being all that *precedes*, both the external and the internal. Do all *human volitions* agree with the

* It is Logically *necessary* that every *motive* tends to more, or it would not be a *motive*; that every *effect* has a *cause*, for otherwise it would not be an *effect*; that the *strongest* motive prevails, for otherwise it would not be the *strongest*; that a man either choose or not choose, go or stay; for there is no other alternative. If he do not the one, he *must* do the other; but it does not follow that the choosing is necessary, or the going, or the staying. The *conditional* necessity of a *proposition*—the connection of thoughts and terms—is one thing; the *causal* necessity of a *fact* is another. What is *known* to be, *must* be, whether past, present or future; otherwise it could not be known, for *knowledge* implies reality.

motives present, and the *prior* mental condition? And is this necessary? The *motion* of a *ball* must be according to its weight, and according to the amount and direction of forces acting upon it. Is it the same with the action of human minds? Are *moral actions* always *like natural events*, determined by antecedents, so that, whatever a man chooses, his choice is *necessary*? Or if there be no *necessity*, is there *invariable sequence*? And how is this known? The arguments for Invariable Sequence are all *physical*; those for Necessity are partly *physical*, but chiefly metaphysical. The questions to be considered are, Is the *physical* axiom,—all events have *natural* causes,—or the *metaphysical*,—all events have *adequate* causes,—applicable to *moral* volitions?

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERTY.

I. Consciousness.

THE first evidence of the Freedom of the Will is given by consciousness.

1. When one object is preferred to another, one course of action to another, we often know that we could *choose* differently, as well as *act* differently. As we know that there is a *power* of choosing, so we know that it may be *exercised* in one way, or in another. We can yield to the promptings of appetite and passion, or we can resist them. We are often conscious of conflicting desires or tendencies, and we do not look on these as passive spectators who wait to see which is the stronger; we cause one to prevail by *consenting* to its influence, while we *resist* the other. Something is added to the *tendency*, by which it is made effective. The action of the Will may be easy, so slight as to be scarcely perceptible; or it may be difficult, so hard as to require painful effort. But it is present in all *voluntary* action; and without it the desire is ineffective, or any consequent action is *involuntary*, automatic.

In choosing what is right, every one knows that he could choose otherwise; and so in choosing what is wrong. If ever the constraining influence of appetite or passion is felt to be *irresistible*, it was not always so. Generally there is a present knowledge of power to resist motives. They do not prevail without permission. The present act of the Will is

not made necessary by any external objects, nor by any preceding states; but it has its origin in the present Self. The present Self is the cause of the Volition; yielding and consenting to one motive, resisting and overcoming another.*

2. When we choose one thing rather than another, we know that we could make a different choice. When we have any *perception*, we never suppose that, the faculty and object being the same, the *perception* could be different. When we have any *feeling*, we never suppose that, the sensibility and its object being the same, the *feeling* could be different. But when we have a *volition*, we are often sure that, with the same capacity and the same motives, the *choice* might have been different. Without any increase of *power*, there might have been a different action; and without any change of *motives*, a different choice. Men blame themselves for not using the *power* they have, and for not yielding to, and for resisting, *motives* sufficiently known to require and produce a better choice.†

* Mr. Mill rejected all Necessity, thinking it contrary to Reason; but he denied the *necessity* attributed to human volitions, as evidently contrary to Consciousness. Of the "mysterious *constraint* exercised by the antecedent over the consequent," he says: "Now this it is which, considered as applying to the human will, conflicts with our consciousness, and revolts our feelings. We are certain that, in the case of our volitions, there is not this mysterious constraint."—*Logic*, vol. ii. p. 481.

"Those who think that *causes* draw their *effects* after them by a mystical tie, are right in believing that the relation between *volitions* and their *antecedents* is of another nature. The doctrine is not true of human actions."—*Ibid.* p. 482.

† Strictly speaking, we are not *conscious* of any *power*; but we have a *conviction*, often as sure as any *intuition*, that we are *able* to do again what we have done. Now the *belief*, that we *can* choose before we *do* choose, is not more certain, than the *belief* that we *could* have chosen as we *did* not.

3. Consciousness always shows that there is, and must be, some motive to every choice; but not that there is anything, in the present or the past, to make *necessary* the prevalence of one motive against another. Nor does it show that the same motives have always the same influence. It is easy to increase the power of motives, by giving more attention to some than to others; and this is often done, though not always. Some general agreement between *motives* and *volitions*, both in ourselves and others, is readily discerned; and expectations are according to experience. All choose most frequently as they have been wont to choose. Those who are accustomed to yield to inclinations and feelings, will do so again; and those who are accustomed to regard considerations of prudence and duty, will continue to do so. But exact constancy is never observed. Such is the complexity of human nature, the incompleteness of our knowledge of ourselves, the combination of conscious and unconscious influences, that it is utterly impossible to discover in ourselves, or in others, any exact and constant correspondence between motives and volitions. This correspondence is known at the two extremes of Volition. Animals who choose according to impulse, choose according to their nature and circumstances; and their volitions are determined by antecedents. The Supreme Intelligence, whose actions are always according to perfect wisdom and goodness, always chooses what is best. But between these two extremes, there are in human conduct countless irregularities; some approaching invariable connection in one way, and some in another. Constancy in goodness is not a *necessary* effect of the *past*, but a *free* preference; there being the same *freedom* in past, present, and future. The constancy of Nature and the inconstancy of Man have become proverbial.

This is not mentioned as proof, that there is not much more of regularity in human conduct than appears. The

perfect regularity of Nature cannot be always verified, scarcely ever in what respects *living* bodies ; but from many *natural events*, in which antecedents and consequents exactly agree, it is justly inferred that it is always so with *natural events*. But there is no similar experience of *human actions*, to justify a similar inference respecting them. There cannot possibly be the same evidence for the constant agreement of consequents with their antecedents, in that which is voluntary and moral, that there is in what is involuntary and merely natural. Some agreement between *motives* and *outward* actions is generally to be observed ; but the *antecedents* to the *inward* exercises of Attention are little noticed, and no such agreement with *consequents* is observed in them. These prior volitions have the greatest *moral* importance, for they greatly influence those which follow.*

2. Reason.

Reason shows that there is a great difference between *voluntary* actions, and *natural* events.

1. They do not give rise to the same inferences, either spontaneously, or on reflection. In some cases there is no apparent difference, but in others it is manifest. Involuntary changes in matter or in mind produce in most persons the conviction, that there *must* be a prior adequate cause of the change. But no such conviction arises on the consideration of voluntary actions. Volition is an act of the Will or Self ; and has its sufficient

* It has been said that men suppose their *volitions* to be without *causes*, because they do not remember the feelings, considerations and tendencies by which *choice* is determined ; or because the regularity is hid by the complexity of conditions. But there is not always this forgetfulness of motives, or obscurity of conditions. The *antecedents* of volition are as clearly and fully perceived and remembered, as those of most natural events ; but they are not considered to be *necessary* causes. And the complexity of mental conditions is not always greater than that of material phenomena.

cause in the present Self. Voluntary actions are not uncaused events, but the Agent is the cause; not acting without motives, but giving to them the needful efficacy. We see that acts of Will are our own, more fully than states of Thought or Feeling. We are merely the *subjects* of other mental states, but of Actions we are the *causes* as well as the *subjects*.* Nothing is ours so completely as a *deliberate choice*. This shows what we are *now*; it may be the same that we were, or with another present direction and determination. A different choice shows and makes a difference in the agent; but is no proof of a preceding difference, of which it is a necessary consequence.

2. Volitions respecting *conduct* are generally according to preceding views and feelings, and are produced by them. But Volitions respecting *consideration* are the *causes* of what is seen and felt, not the *effects*; and these prior acts of Will are of the greater importance, the others naturally following. We first choose whether we will act without consideration, or with it; and then choose, what shall be considered, in what way and how long. The antecedents to these volitions are little noticed; and there has been no exact extensive observation of the agreement of these antecedents and consequents. Certainly there is no conviction in men's minds, that they could not have attended to some things more than they did; and to others less. When the mind simply turns towards one object rather than another, looks to one more than another, regards one more than

* No state of *feeling* is fully our own, till it is *chosen*. Involuntary emotions and affections are transient, and no sign of character. The different estimate formed of the *instincts* of animals and the *affections* of human beings, results from the *involuntary* nature of the former, and the *voluntary* nature of the latter. Desire that is not chosen is no sign of present character. Love that is not chosen is a transient feeling of little value.

another, Consciousness does not show that these acts have always corresponding antecedents ; and certainly Reason does not declare that it *must* be so.

3. A plant cannot grow, a stone cannot move, without a sufficient cause ; but a sufficient cause is not requisite for wrong choice and action. No conduct could be *unreasonable*, if there were an *adequate cause*, and a *sufficient reason*, for every volition. All *changes* are in some respects alike, but it does not follow that all are produced by adequate antecedent causes. All solid substances are in some things alike, but all do not sink. Natural events and moral actions are in some things alike ; but the convictions of causation which come with the former, do not come with the latter. The Eye gives its testimony, that objects are not to be *seen*, if they are not seen when looked for in the place where they would be seen, if really there. Reason, in the same way, gives its testimony, that propositions are not to be *believed*, if no conviction follows the full consideration of all evidence. Reason is often said to show the *necessity* of volitions ; but this is true only of Syllogistic reasoning, in which what is to be proved is taken for granted. It is assumed that there is no great difference between *natural* events, and *moral* actions ; and that what is true of the *former*, is equally true of the latter.

3. Conscience.

Conscience declares that present *volitions* are not the *necessary* consequences of motives, or of any previous states.

1. No *actions* are praised or blamed, which are entirely *involuntary* ; and no *states* of feeling and affection are objects of *moral* commendation or censure, but as they are *chosen*, and according to the power of self-control. If *volitions*, equally with *desires*, are the necessary consequents of internal or

external antecedents, there is no moral difference between what is *voluntary* and what is *involuntary*. Freedom of Will is the condition of Moral action. Unless freely chosen, the most beneficent actions are not praiseworthy; nor are the most injurious actions to be condemned. So far as *habit* takes the place of *choice*, it lowers the moral quality of the *action*, though it may be so much stronger evidence of the *character* of the agent.* All moral judgments are at once subverted, if we consider the volitions and actions of men as the *necessary* consequences of preceding conditions, making it impossible that they should choose and act otherwise than they do. The only praise then to be given to any, is that given to pleasing flowers and useful machines. The only censure, that of being disagreeable and useless. But the consciences of all men protest against this conclusion. It is often said that Reason and Conscience are here contradictory, one asserting the *necessity*, and the other the *freedom* of the Will. But there is no such opposition. Reason declares the necessity of *natural* events, but not the necessity of *moral* actions. Conscience accepts the dictates of Reason, and commands or forbids, commends or condemns, on the ground that there is no *necessity* in human action,—that the Will is free to obey or disobey. They who claim for themselves exemption from censure and punishment on

* Affections are pleasant and beautiful, when they are entirely *involuntary*, but they have moral worth only as they are *voluntary*. Volitions in like manner would be pleasant and beautiful, though supposed to be *necessary*, as Feelings are. But on this supposition, the difference between the *voluntary* and the *involuntary* appears to be only in name.

The strength of *tendencies* to right and wrong actions shows the moral character of the Agent, which is better or worse, according to the strength of the tendencies. But the judgment of single *actions* is not the same. Actions may be more right *morally*, because of the tendencies which have to be overcome; and they may have less of *moral* character, because they are natural or habitual.

the ground of necessity, condemn as *unjust* the conduct of those who condemn them; and thus affirm the reality of moral distinctions in the endeavour to overthrow them.*

2. The testimony of Conscience is plainly and directly contrary to the necessity of all human Volitions. Those who have doubted the evidence of Consciousness to everything else, have declared the reality of the difference between *Moral* right and wrong to be unquestionable; and hence have inferred the Freedom of the Will, as indispensable to Moral responsibility. It would be as easy, or more easy, to believe that light and darkness, pleasure and pain, are the same; as to believe that there is no real difference between what is *morally* right, and what is *morally* wrong; between the best actions of good men, and the worst actions of bad men; that none are to be praised, and none are to be blamed. There is nothing that may not be *verbally* admitted or denied, when *words* only are regarded; but when real objects are regarded in human character and conduct, the difference is too manifest to admit of denial or doubt.

4. Religion.

1. The Freedom of the Will is requisite to all *moral* government.

If the present volitions of men are all *necessary*, according to the internal and external antecedents; so it must be with all previous volitions. If what is chosen in old age must be always according to what was chosen in manhood, what is then chosen must be according to what was chosen

* As there may be the same *choice*, and not the same *motives*, so there may be the same *motives*, and not the same *choice*.

Statistics show more *regularity* in what respects *many*, than in what belongs to *one*. But the apparent regularity is not real, one *irregularity* being balanced by another. Perfect *regularity* would be no proof of any *causal* necessity.

in youth, and all that is then chosen must be according to what was chosen in infancy; and all this must be according to a nature and condition not chosen by the *subject*; and therefore must be chosen by the Author of his being, if chosen at all. This conclusion is inevitable, and it is absolutely certain. There is only one real Agent, if there be this one, in all descriptions of human conduct. Men are moved as puppets by the show-man, who pulls the strings which cause all that is done. God is equally the Author of all evil and all good, of all wrong and all right. All the precepts and prohibitions of Conscience, as well as all the precepts and prohibitions of Scripture, are delusive. Nothing is really commended or forbidden, but all are alike according to the will of God, or the blind forces of Fate.

2. If men are not *really* free, it cannot be for their good that they should *fancy* themselves to be free. No wise government of men, domestic or political, requires the habitual belief of what is not true: and much less can this be requisite for the Divine government. The sphere of choice may be small, but there must be something that depends only on the human Self, or there could be no *opposition* to the Divine Will. There could be no *moral* obedience or disobedience, if the Will were not free. Invariableness of *volitions* according to *antecedents*, is quite consistent with free moral agency; but their Necessity is not. As human beings approach to perfection, there is more of regularity, and more of freedom. It becomes *impossible* for them to do wrong, in one sense of the term, while it is always *possible* in another sense. The *impossibility* which accompanies *necessity*, belongs to the lower objects and a lower government: and could be given to men only with the loss of their higher moral nature; and their subjection to a *natural*, and not a *moral* government. Human laws are *reasonable*, as well as the Divine, because human

volitions are free : and men are not governed as the brutes. Only by the worst governments is appeal made simply to human fears ; and only by the lowest of mankind is obedience to Law simply the result of a dread of Punishment. The highest Government is not that, in which every thing is really done by one Agent ; but that in which many agencies, conscious and unconscious, concurrent and contrary, are employed ; and in which all these in their several ways work together for the best results, the greatest and most enduring.

The Bible recognises in the clearest and strongest possible way the freedom of Man. It asserts the universality and perfection of the Divine Government, but never speaks of God as the author of Evil. He is the cause of discipline and punishment ; but not of Sin.

“I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing : therefore choose life.” (Deut. xxx. 19 ; Jer. xxi. 8.)

“I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord : wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye.” (Ezekiel xviii. 32.)

“Ye will not come to me, that ye may have life.” (John vi. 40.)

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY.

CONSCIOUSNESS, Reason, Conscience, and Religion, give the same testimony to the Freedom of the Will. Objections also are drawn from four sources, Physical axioms and Metaphysical, Practical conclusions and Theological considerations. They who maintain only the *invariable* connection of antecedents and consequents assert, that it is as *contrary* to Experience that there should not be this constancy in Moral action, as that it should not be in Natural events. They who hold to the *necessity* of all volitions assert, that it is as contrary to Reason to suppose that Moral actions are not *necessary*, as it is to suppose that Natural events could be other than they are.

1. Physical.

1. They who deny Necessity, and maintain only Invariable Sequence, admit that this is not to be discerned in Moral actions, or in human Volitions generally. Only because it is ascertained of *natural events*, it is believed to be true of all changes.* But in regard to *natural events*,

* Mill, Spencer, and Bain, with others, admit that Invariable Sequence does not appear in Volitions; and they account for this by the *complexity* of the cases. This is quite sufficient to account for much seeming *irregularity*, but can be no proof of constant *regularity*. Mr. Spencer supposed that the "unknown independent something called the Will," is merely *inferred* from the apparent lawlessness of Volitions. He says that unconscious *cerebration*, if it could be seen,

the Axiom is not extended to different classes of objects, till it has been found to be applicable to them. It is not applied to *fluids*, till it has been ascertained to be true of them, as well as of *solids*; nor to *living* bodies, till it has been found to be true of them, as well as of *lifeless* substances. For the same reason, it should not be extended, from Natural events to Moral actions, unless it can be shown to be as applicable to the latter as to the former. If there were no great apparent difference in the two classes, what was *ascertained* of the one class, might be *accepted* as equally true of the other; but not so when the apparent difference is very great. Because in all *natural* sequences which are *involuntary* there is a *constant* connection of antecedents and consequences, it cannot be inferred that it is the same with the *moral* sequences which are *voluntary*,—that Volitions are always and entirely as their antecedents, external and internal.

2. The exact and constant agreement of antecedents and consequents in Nature, is known only by observation and experiment; and the cases fully known are comparatively few. Still their number and character are quite sufficient to justify the universal conclusion, when confined to objects that have no *voluntary* power. But when the inference is extended to all Volitions,—to those which are accompanied by reflection, deliberation, and a capacity of self-control,—it is very different. Physical Axioms are merely generalizations from Experience, and assume that the observed cases

would be found to agree perfectly with all voluntary actions. This is pure conjecture, which has never been verified. He also states that the permanent Self, of which we are *conscious*, is nothing more than a succession of transient states. This is contrary to the clearest intuitions of the I and me, and the strongest convictions of Thou and thee. If these are delusions nothing is known.—*Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. sec. 219.

and the unobserved are perfectly like. They are not primary proofs, and admit of verification in all cases when their application may be questioned on account of apparent differences. It is not only by the Axiom, that equals added to equals produce equal sums, that this is known to be true of fractions as well as of whole numbers; but in single cases of each kind this is known independently. So it is not by the Axiom, that all bodies gravitate, that this is known of gases as well as of stones; it appears in both. So it is not by the Axiom, that all Natural changes agree with their antecedents, that this is proved of *voluntary* changes as well as of *involuntary*. If the Axiom is applicable to objects so dissimilar, it will be evident in all. Physical Axioms may give rise to Logical Axioms, but neither the necessity, nor the certainty, which belong to the latter, can be attributed to the former. Conceptions and definitions of *natural causes* require the *implied effects*; but this is merely a *logical* connection. If a ball moves with a given *force*, it will and must produce a corresponding impression. If a plant has a given *nature*, it will and must grow and bear fruit. But the necessary connection of the terms of a proposition, cannot show the necessary, or certain connection of objects in a physical sequence. Some *general* agreement between antecedents and consequents is as evident in moral actions, as in natural events. But the *exact* invariable connections often found in the latter, are never found in the former.

3. In the Material Philosophy of the day, there is much reasoning that is based on assumptions which are without proof, and are contrary to the common sense of mankind. It is assumed that Matter is the foundation of all things; and that Man is only an advanced animal. But Mind is as evident as Matter, and is far more interesting and important. *The common judgments and affections of men, testify to the*

difference universally acknowledged between *men* and *brutes*.* If there is anything peculiar to Man, it is to be found in his Moral Nature. Human Volitions have a moral good or evil, surpassing all other good or evil. If they have this peculiar nature and character, it cannot be reasonable to extend to them either physical or metaphysical axioms.

2. Metaphysical.

1. Every Effect must have a Cause, is the axiom on which depends all the reasoning for the Necessity of moral actions, and we must first ask what is meant by the terms. If Effect is defined as that which necessarily follows some antecedent—and Cause as that which necessarily precedes some consequent—then the proposition is merely a truism; as every wife must have a husband. If Cause is defined as a constant natural antecedent, known by experience to have certain consequents, unless counteracted; then the proposition is important; but it belongs only to observed natural antecedents and consequents; and has not the character of a truth necessary and universal. If Cause is defined as the antecedent, which *must* be believed to precede and produce every event,—which is adequate to it and accounts for it,—then it is not self-evident that *moral actions* require such *causes*, as well as *natural events*. In the loose sense commonly given to the terms *cause* and *effect*, Volitions are *effects* and have their *causes*; but whether or not they are *effects*, in the strict metaphysical sense,—changes requiring an adequate antecedent cause,—is the object of inquiry. The axiom may be perfectly true and altogether reasonable in regard to *natural events*; and quite the contrary when applied to *moral actions*.

* If men and animals had the same nature, men might eat one another with the same propriety that they eat beasts, birds, and fishes. None of these are less acceptable as food, because full-grown and highly organised.

2. That nothing comes into being without an adequate efficient cause, is a metaphysical axiom. But if Reason gives this belief with the beginning of all natural objects and changes, it does not give it with Volitions. It sees and shows that some volitions are *unreasonable*; but all would be *reasonable*, if there were an adequate efficient cause for all. Reason regards all that appears in Consciousness, and because it discerns no necessary connection between Volitions and antecedents, therefore Conscience declares the *moral* nature of actions and agents. All *moral* judgment ceases, if it is known of any object, that it could not possibly be other than it is;—that something prior to present choice made it inevitable, and anything else impossible.

3. It is said that Volitions are *effects*, just as natural events are; and that every *effect* must have a *cause*. But the question is, Are volitions *effects* in the sense supposed? As every *action* implies an *agent*, so it is said every *change* implies a *cause*; but the cases are different. An *action* is an *abstraction*, which is always perceived with some *subject*; and is always thought of in connection with it. If there be an *action*, there must be an agent. A *change* in like manner requires a *subject* that is changed; and both co-exist. If there be a *change*, there must be *something* that is changed. But all *changes* do not require antecedent *causes*, adequate to their production. That there are such causes for *natural events*, is a metaphysical conviction; but that it is the same with *moral actions* is an assumption. The conviction does not arise from the consideration of any *moral actions*, but simply from the unwarrantable extension to them of the conviction which belongs only to natural events. Every *volition* implies a Will, and every *faculty* implies a Self. The Will or the Self—the personal I—causes the volition, not by an intermediate volition, but by present active power.

4. It is self-evident, that there cannot be a *volition* without a *motive* ; and that a *self-determination*, without any motive, is impossible. It is also certain that when there is only one *motive*, there can be only one *volition* ; and that every *volition* is according to some *motive*. But when there are contrary motives of different kinds, there is nothing in the antecedents to determine necessarily what shall be chosen. The prevalence of higher motives is not *necessary*, nor is that of the lower. There is no common measure that can be applied to all motives, so that one must be *stronger* than another, as one magnitude is *larger* than another. No one ever blames himself for any choice or action, unless with the conviction that the choice was not *necessary*, but came from a Will not bound by antecedents. Motives solicit choice, they invite and urge, but they do not compel. They can do nothing without the consent of the Will. When there is a wrong choice, the supposition of a right choice being made, never appears absurd and impossible, but the contrary. Only when with one *actual* choice, another is believed to be *possible*, can there be anything praiseworthy or blame-worthy, in ourselves or others.

3. Practical.

1. It is said by some that without *necessity*, by others that without *invariableness*, the actions of men could not be anticipated and influenced. But all human expectations are founded on an imperfect knowledge of *antecedents* ; and therefore the knowledge of *consequents* must be in some measure uncertain. The same medicines, with the same conditions, will always have the same *effect* ; but the conditions are seldom known to be exactly the same, the bodily state of patients differing much. If the same motives, with the same conditions, always had the same influence, our knowledge of their actual influence would still be uncertain ; for it is not known that the mental states of the

same person, still less those of different persons, are exactly like. Common expectations have nothing to do with *meta-physical* causation, or with *invariable sequence*; being based on our common experience of *natural causes*; and being more or less uncertain, as our knowledge is imperfect. In respect to human conduct, whatever may be necessary or invariable, our knowledge being incomplete, our expectations cannot be absolutely certain; but they are sufficiently sure for the wants and welfare of mankind. If there were *no* regularity, there could be no expectations of human conduct. But the *perfect* regularity of *necessity*, or of *invariable sequence*, is not needed, and is not found.

2. Experience shows a general connection between Motives and Volitions, and this is all we need. That there is an *action* of the Will, which is not determined by motives, does not cause more uncertainty, than the *motives* and *conditions* which cannot be known. Knowledge is not less useful, because it is not absolutely certain; and very little indeed is thus known. The speculative differences in regard to *necessity*, and *invariableness*, have not the slightest influence on human expectations and actions. All variations in the choice and conduct of men, whether referred to the present action of the Will, or to previous conditions internal and external, are confined within certain limits. These are to be learnt by experience, and so human actions may be partially foreseen and secured. More than this is never possible, nor is more desirable. Men are very seldom influenced by general abstract considerations; either by the belief of *invariable sequence*, or by that of *universal necessity*. They choose and act, according to the lessons of experience. When any objects are *always* found to be connected, the one is a *sure* sign of the other. When they are only *sometimes* connected, the belief is only *probable*, according to the proportion of one kind of experience to another.

4. Theological.

1. Necessity is inferred by some from the foreknowledge and government of all things by the Supreme. It is strange that they especially should thus *reason*, who insist much on the incompetency of Reason. The *certainty* of facts, past and present, does not show any thing of their *causes*, and cannot prove that they were *necessarily* produced; nor can it prove any *necessary* causation in the future. An incomplete knowledge of the past, gives a probable knowledge of the future, sometimes without any knowledge of *causes*; and so a perfect knowledge of the past, may be connected with a perfect knowledge of the future. Or the Divine knowledge of the past, and of the future, may be quite different from human remembrances and anticipations.

2. As the knowledge of men increases, so does their power. The highest human government leaves the most freedom to its subjects. He who knows all things, and has at His disposal all the resources of the Universe, can accomplish His purposes in many ways that we know not. The government of Force is not the only one, that can secure the fulfilment of the purposes of Wisdom and Goodness. Men are not always moved as machines, nor as animals. Moral government is higher and better, than Natural government. Human beings are to be brought into perfect accordance with the Divine Will, by the Truth which enlightens, and by the Love which subdues and exalts. Thus they receive the Freedom of the sons of God.

3. It would be far more reasonable to suppose, that some things were beyond the foreknowledge of God, than to believe that all actions, evil and good, are equally caused by Him. The Almighty can do all that Power can effect, but some things are beyond the range of any power; and so the

Omniscient knows all that can possibly be known, but some things may be beyond the range of any knowledge. Any supposition is more reasonable, than that God is the cause of *evil*,—that He produces the *sin* He prohibits.

4. In the arguments which are said to demonstrate the *necessity* of moral actions, there is the fallacy called *petitio principii*. That is assumed in the outset, which the conclusion professes to establish. On account of many manifest differences between *moral actions* and *natural changes*, the question is raised, Are they of the same kind or class, so that we may reason on both in the same way? Or do the obvious differences show that there are other differences, which will account for these? When physical and metaphysical *axioms* are applied to Volitions, it is taken for granted, that all *natural changes* and all *human volitions* are of the same class, and have a similar origin, being produced by antecedents. Axioms cannot properly be applied to any class of objects, from which they might not have been obtained. To prove that there is no difference between natural events and moral actions, it is first taken for granted that there is no difference; and then the conclusion certainly follows.*

* Jonathan Edwards' work on *Freedom of the Will*, is deservedly celebrated for its great ability and acuteness; and little has since been added to his defence of philosophical Necessity. His reasoning is generally admitted to be right, when his conclusions are rejected. Inferences are drawn with perfect correctness, from premises which are not self-evident, and have never been proved. The Logic is quite certain when the Psychology is very doubtful. He defines Will to be the power of *choosing*, and in this all agree. But he regards *choosing* and *desiring* as the same mental state or act; and this is generally denied. Voluntary and involuntary Desires have not the same *moral* character, which they would have, if Volition and Desire were the same. Involuntary desires are as *necessary* as other natural events; but that *voluntary* desires have the same *necessity*, is the proposition to be

proved. If *volitions* are merely *desires*, it is so; but not if they are something more, of another nature.

He asserts, as self-evident, that human Choice is, and must be, according to the greatest apparent Good. It will be admitted that this is the only Choice proper for a reasonable being; but the question is—What is natural and common? not—What is reasonable and right? That men often “see and approve the better, but follow the worse,” is a proverb which correctly describes the experience of mankind. Men may sometimes persuade themselves that evil is good, that the worse is the better, before fully choosing it; but not always. If what they choose is always the greatest apparent *good*, this must appear to be the *right* choice; but they *know* it to be *wrong*, and *choose* it notwithstanding. Men need not, and do not always, *choose* what they most *desire*, nor do they always *desire* what they know to be the *greatest good*. He asserts that the *strongest* desire *must* prevail, distinguishing the antecedent inherent strength of the *motive*, from its consequent actual influence. In this it is assumed, that there is a common measure for motives, apart from their effects in choice. Is it so? We can compare the strength of one motive, with that of another of the same kind; but when the motives are entirely different in nature, no such comparison can be made. We compare *lines* with *lines*, and *numbers* with *numbers*; but we cannot compare *lines* and *numbers*. A line cannot be said to be greater or less than 12. We must take some linear unit, before we can measure the line. If this is greater than $\frac{1}{12}$, the line would be less than 12 such units, if it be less, the line will be greater. But this is no comparison of *lines* and *numbers*. We can compare *feelings* with *feelings*, and *judgments* with *judgments*; but we cannot compare *feelings* and *judgments*; and their respective influences on Choice. It cannot be said that one is *stronger* and the other *weaker*, except as we refer to the effects they actually produce. Then every motive is the *strongest* which does prevail, and none can be the *strongest* which does not. How can appetite be compared with prudence, selfishness with benevolence, present inclinations with the convictions of Duty? They are incommensurable quantities.

Desire and Choice are not the same. Pleasure and Pain are not the only Motives. Men do not always choose what they think to be best. Volitions are not like involuntary movements, the *effects* of pre-existing *causes*; nor are all Motives commensurable,—similar in nature and in their mode of operation. The Necessity which belongs to all Nature does not include the Will of Man.

DIVISION V.

EFFECTS OF VOLITION.

1. **T**HE EFFECTS of Volition differ from the Objects in that the former are the *actual* results, the latter those *intended*. All things chosen are *objects* of Volition, and only these; but many things *intended* do not come, and many things follow which are not and cannot be expected. Some of these, but not all, are styled Effects. As natural *causes* are those antecedents, which unless counteracted have always certain corresponding consequents; so natural *effects* are those consequents which always come unless prevented, and which agree with their antecedents. All the *good* results of *good* actions, whether intended or not, are said to be their *effects*; but not the *bad* results. And so all the *bad* consequences of *bad* actions are their *effects*, but not the *good* consequences. The distinction is not always made, but it should be; if there is any difference between what is properly called the Cause, and what is merely the *occasion* of any action or event. The just demand made by one person may *occasion* the unjust action of another; but the right deed of the one is not the *cause* of the wrong deed of the other. The opening of the shutters is the *cause* of the sunshine in the room, but only the *occasion* of the work done by its light.

2. The Effects of Volitions are both *mental* and *material*, *immediate* and *mediate*: and they are all *natural* conse-

quences. There is no *necessary* connection between any state of mind and its natural consequences, however *certain* they may be. Volition is simply a mental act, it belongs to the present Self, and consists of the act or effort of which we are conscious, when anything is chosen on account of some preceding feeling, or thought, or action. Thus when *attention* is voluntary, we choose to regard some object. Often the exertion is so slight as to be scarcely perceptible; but in other cases there is a manifest effort. The volition may be easy and pleasant, as it commonly is at first; or difficult and painful, as it commonly is when long continued. The *exercise* of attention is simply the act of the Will, or the Self; but its *effects* are only *mediately* produced. The continuance and course of thought are the *consequences* of attention, which are chosen by the choice of the *means* for their attainment. The consequences expected usually follow; but they may be prevented, either by the excitement of adverse feeling, or by the absence of the nervous force requisite for the effects. The failure of this lessens the efficiency of attention, and makes at last its exercise impossible. With the loss of Consciousness all Volitions must cease.

3. Other mental states are produced *mediately*. We cannot by direct volition obtain any thought or belief, any desire or affection. But we can choose the considerations which will produce them. The thoughts desired are obtained by attending to some that we have; the proper belief comes from the full consideration of evidence; the proper feelings, from the due regard given to their objects. We can choose what we will consider and what we will not: and we can also choose the bodily expressions, the mental associations, the social sympathies, by which the effects of simple thought are promoted or hindered. Thus in various ways, to a greater or less degree, all mental states are dependent on

Volitions. As they have been produced, so they are preserved or changed. Some beliefs require no conduct, and meet with no opposition; and these when once established always remain. But others require *action*, and meet with *opposition*; and these cannot be preserved unless properly maintained. Men change to the worse without choice, but not to the better. Volition has no power over the minds of others except through the use of means, and according to natural laws. But thus the Will of one has an influence over many, the extent and importance of which are immeasurable.

4. It is the same with *material* changes; very little can be done *directly*, and very much *indirectly*. We are conscious of some act or effort in the living muscles, which begins and ends as we will. The muscular contraction is the consequent expected, but not always following. When by paralysis the nerves have lost the vital force received from the *brain*, there is no more power over the limbs than over distant stones. In all bodily movement there is some expenditure of nervous force, and similar muscular contractions may be produced by electricity. These *forces* are not identical, for their qualities and laws are very different; but the similarity of their *effects* favours the conclusion, that a discharge of *nervous* force is intermediate, between the *volition* and the *muscular contraction*, and is the only direct *effect* of volition. The force which moves an engine is not the small manual power applied to it, but the mighty power of steam or electricity, which the hand releases and directs; and so it may be in all bodily movements. We are conscious of the mental effort, and this is naturally associated either with the muscular sensation which is sometimes felt, or with the bodily motion which alone is seen. The motions of the fingers and the feet are certainly produced through the *senseless* tendons, which connect the muscles with the

extremities of the limbs; but the final motions often seem to be produced directly. That the Will is the *force* which produces bodily movement cannot be known; but we know that the Will guides and governs the *force* whatever its nature may be; causes it to come, to continue, to cease; determines its measure and direction; and so chooses the corporeal effects.

5. All the motions of external bodies, whether near or distant, are produced through changes in the action and position of our own bodies. When other bodies are simply pushed, the *effect* is according to the muscular motion, in magnitude and direction. But the change thus made often gives a new direction to natural powers immeasurably greater; and is also the occasion of the development of latent forces, of still greater energy. The motion of a finger, in applying a match to explosives, is sufficient to overthrow large houses, and to rend the hardest rocks. All the *effects* of human Volition on the world around us are produced in the same way,—by directing and developing natural forces, and using them as means for the ends we desire. As our knowledge of the powers and laws of Nature increases, so the authority of Man is enlarged, and the *effects* of his Will are extended.

6. One of the most certain and important of the Effects of Volition, is the stronger tendency to similar acts of Will. This is an interior result, not dependent on any outward conditions, nor on any wish or expectation. The act of choosing anything increases the feeling that is obeyed, and decreases that which is resisted; it fixes more firmly the considerations which have been regarded, and banishes those which have been disregarded; it has an inherent tendency to repeat itself, so that with less of feeling and of thought to induce any action, there is more inclination to do again

what has been once done. The first step in a right course, or in a wrong course, is always the most difficult. By many repeated actions the tendency grows stronger and stronger, and may become almost irresistible. In vicious practices men make and fasten the fetters by which they are bound; while virtuous habits make the practice of virtue easy and pleasant, and give the consciousness of perfect freedom. All active principles are preserved and strengthened by *action*; they are diminished and destroyed by inaction.

7. The Effects of Choice are according to the nature of the object, whether expected or not. They may sometimes be prevented, and sometimes are beyond reach. Actions must in some cases be maintained and repeated to secure their efficacy, but in other cases a single choice will have life-long effects for good or for evil. A seed is put into the ground and left there; but influences from below and above, without any human effort, cause it to grow and bring forth fruit, it may be a hundredfold. A fire is lighted, it may be at once extinguished; but if allowed to spread a little, it passes beyond control, and ceases not till all is consumed to which it can approach. The natural effects of Volition are like those of natural causes, which require no human co-operation, and can be counteracted only by other natural causes. These may sometimes be known and used, but often they are unavailable; and so the natural ill consequences of wrong are irremediable.

8. The Effects of Volition, whether *Mental* or *Material*, sometimes continue as long as the Mind and Body, ceasing only when these cease. Corporeal, Intellectual, and Moral effects are often combined, with or without choice. Owing to the union of Soul and Body, changes in one are often accompanied by corresponding changes in the other; but it

is not so always. Generally what is material is changed by what is material, what is intellectual by what is intellectual, what is moral by what is moral. Physical diseases require physical remedies, and moral diseases moral remedies. All the Effects of Volition must depend on the continuance of existence, and therefore none are absolutely *necessary*; but many are *inevitable*. There are mental and moral sequences as invariable as any to be found in Nature. Natural consequences are often permanent till counteracted, and so are Moral consequences. Of both there are more than are anticipated and chosen.

9. The *dignity* of the Will, as one of the faculties of the Mind, or one of the states in which the Self exists and is known, appears partially in the measure of Intelligence which may be connected with it. Some volitions respect objects few and small, but others comprehend all, within and without, that can be known and chosen. The *importance* of the Will is chiefly shown in its Effects. All the states of body and mind that can be chosen, directly or indirectly, are more or less subject to the Will. Not only corporeal and mental movements, but health and sickness, happiness and misery, prosperity and adversity, honour and dishonour, life and death, are according to our choice. We choose the welfare of others, as well as our own. The effects of human Will, on the material and mental world, are innumerable and immeasurable. A single Volition may cause great changes on the surface of the globe, which will endure for ages; or alter the destiny of nations, and affect for good or ill the condition and conduct of many millions of mankind.

10. As a *ship*, however admirably constructed and furnished, is of little use, unless there is a *helm*; and as this is useless, unless it is rightly turned by the steersman; so is

is with human nature. Human faculties and tendencies, left to themselves, secure little good, and soon come to ruin. They always require direction and control. The higher Intelligence of Man enables him to discern how his faculties may be best employed; and by the wider range of his Will he is able to govern them. He is thus capable of self-improvement. He chooses which of his powers shall be exercised, what desires shall be indulged, and what resisted. He can obtain helps, and lessen hindrances; secure the attainment of good, and the avoidance of ill. The power of Self-control gives to men a larger measure of Natural good, than they would otherwise have; and it makes possible the higher good which is Moral, and belongs to the right exercise of the Will. But with the greater possibilities of Good, there are greater possibilities of Ill. They who can choose what is good, must be able to choose what is not good.*

* It has been supposed by many, that the idea of Power comes from the consciousness of human effort; but to this there are several objections. Power is measured by the *effects* produced; and these are often greatest, when there is least consciousness of *effort*. The many *agreements* of Volitions with consequent changes, mental and material, produce a conviction that they are *causes*, and have some *power*,—something to *account* for their consequents. Causes are to some extent *reasons* for what comes to pass; but they are not like human efforts in any other respect. As we should think of the Divine Intelligence, according to the highest forms of human intelligence; so we should think of the Divine Will, according to the highest form of human volition, in which there is the most complete efficiency and the smallest effort; all effects being foreseen, and seeming to come simply because they are chosen.

PART III.

MORAL PERCEPTIONS AND SENTIMENTS.

Division I.

INTRODUCTORY.

NATURAL GOOD AND RIGHT. HUMAN CHARACTER.

Division II.

MORAL RIGHT AND GOOD.

GENERAL NATURE. VIRTUES AND VICES.

Division III.

CONSCIENCE.

NATURE, ATTRIBUTES, DIVERSITY, AUTHORITY.

Division IV.

MORAL JUDGMENTS.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY.

Division V.

SUPPLEMENTARY.

MORAL DISCIPLINE AND THEORIES.

DIVISION I.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. **T**HROUGHOUT Nature we find that lower and simpler objects precede the higher and more complex. Something of the former is retained, and something more is added to make the latter. These successive objects are different, and should be distinguished; they are combined, but should not be confounded.* Thus Intuitions precede Thoughts, and Thoughts precede Beliefs; simple Emotions and Desires precede Affections. If there were not a *liking* without *loving*, there could not be the *loving* which includes *liking*, and is much more. If there were no bodily *pain*, there would be no human *compassion*, and if there were no *material* interests, there would be no *moral* injustice. It is written, "That is not first which is *spiritual*, but that which

* The progress of things from the *simple* to the *complex* is represented by the theory of Evolution, according to which there is everywhere, by *disintegration* and *integration*, an advance from what is *indefinite, unstable, and homogeneous*, to what is *definite, stable, and heterogeneous*. This may be the way in which progress is made in Nature; but it is merely a generalization, and accounts for nothing. If there is a *reason* for inferring any pre-existing Power, there is the same reason for believing it to be *adequate* to the *effects* produced. The sequence of their production cannot show, that the signs of *intelligence* show no *intelligence*, that the *simplest* things are the real *causes* of the most *complex*; that the *unconscious* are the causes of the *conscious*, material atoms the authors of all human happiness, wisdom, and goodness.

is *natural*; and afterwards that which is spiritual." So we may say, That is not first which is *moral*, but that which is *natural*. Nothing of a *moral* nature appears in infancy and early childhood; but that which is *moral* is founded on that which is simply *natural*. So it is in all subsequent experience. What is *natural* precedes what is *moral*; the former exists without the latter, but the latter is never found without the former. The *moral* can never be learnt from the *natural*. The *moral* contains the *natural*, but the *natural* does not contain the *moral*.

2. *Moral* qualities belong only to some objects, but all are said to be *good* and *right*, according to their nature. Good is a general term applied to whatever is in any way pleasant and desirable.* Every thing is said to be *good* to any being, if it is *agreeable* and *beneficial*. All *living* beings are subject to increase and decrease, and all *animal* beings have some capacity of enjoyment. They have various susceptibilities, and provision is made for the supply of their wants, and the satisfaction of their desires. That which is *good* for one kind, is not so for another; and that which is the *best* of which some are capable, is not the *best* for others. Men are conscious of various states, bodily and mental, beginning with the lower, and advancing to the higher. Moral apprehensions follow those which are merely Natural, and require the higher endowments of human beings.

3. There must be the *measure* of intelligence, sensibility, and power of self-control, which men have, and animals have not; or there can be no knowledge of what is *morally* good

* That is said to be *desirable* which is a *cause* of any kind of *pleasure*, whether so regarded or not. That is *desired* which is felt to be *pleasant*, or is connected with some *pleasure*, in thought or experience. That which is most *desirable*, is not generally most *desired*.

or evil. All mental states must be learnt from consciousness, and are experienced only under certain conditions. From the transient *states* of which we are conscious, corresponding *capacities* are inferred. It is the same with all that is Moral. Moral states are known only when the proper *objects* are present to the Mind; and the states must be known, before anything can be known of the Moral Faculty. As that which is *natural* precedes that which is *moral*, we must first consider what is *naturally* Good and Right, that we may understand what is so *morally*. As the nature of *compound* substances is never learnt by the study of *atoms*, so the nature of *composite* mental states is never fully known by an examination of their *elements*; nor that of *consequents*, by any study of *antecedents*.*

* The *atmosphere* consists of *oxygen* and *nitrogen*, *water* consists of *oxygen* and *hydrogen*, and *diamonds* are composed of *carbon*; but the properties of the former are not to be found in the latter.

CHAPTER I.

NATURAL GOOD AND RIGHT.

I. Natural Good.

1. **N**ATURAL GOOD comprehends all that affects body and mind agreeably and beneficially. Pleasant sights and sounds, tastes and scents, are *good* ; food and warmth, exercise and rest, are *good*. Knowledge and mental activity are *good*, and so are social intercourse and affection. Human nature has many wants and desires, and there are objects adapted to them. Both internal *capacities*, and external *objects*, are requisite to all human welfare. It is as much a natural principle to look to the future, as it is to look to the present ; to regard others, as to regard oneself. The well-being of every one requires the exercise of the prospective, and of the social principles. It is impossible for any one to seek his own *good*, if careless of the future ; and it is equally impossible for any one to seek his own good, if entirely regardless of the good of others. Seeking one's own good, and seeking the good of others, have often been described as opposite principles. They differ greatly in *intention* ; but such is the constitution of human nature, that the *good* of any one is impossible, apart from that of others. Nothing is merely for itself. The eye and the hand are not for themselves, but for the body to which they belong ; so no persons exist for themselves, but for the family and society of which they are members. None are self-sufficient, but all require, for preservation and progress, constant giving and receiving. And so it is through-

out Nature. Nothing exists for itself alone, but every thing for the whole to which it belongs. All objects are useful to others, consciously or unconsciously; and the worth and welfare of every person depends on the habitual recognition of relations to others, and on corresponding conduct. That which is really *good* for any must be according to their *whole* nature, and their various *relations* to others. As men gain little *good* for themselves, if they regard only bodily sensations and present enjoyments; so they obtain little *good* for themselves, if they think only of themselves. They who seek chiefly what respects themselves alone, and they who seek chiefly what respects others also, are both following natural principles, and affecting themselves, wisely or unwisely, for good or for ill. Such is the condition of all human beings, that little good can be gained by any except in society, and by the exercise of social affections, given and received.

2. What is *naturally good* is so, before it is known and chosen; and it is *good*, whether known or unknown, with choice or without. All things have their qualities and effects, apart from our knowledge of their existence. What they are, and what we are, can be learnt only by experience; and much cannot be known, unless the experience of others is added to our own, and used for its enlargement. Every thing that pleases is *good*, so far as it is *pleasant* or *useful*; but nothing can be considered *good*, if it causes the loss of a greater *good*, or the endurance of a greater *ill*. When only one *good* is known, it must be chosen; but when several are known, the greater may be preferred to the less, the nearer to the remote, the easier to the difficult.

3. Many things are Good, but not equally so, nor in the same way. Some are transient, others endure; and the more lasting are internal and invisible. Outward possessions are

good, some more and some less; but health of body and mind is a greater good than any; for health gives incalculable benefits, while without it none can be enjoyed. Actions are *good* in different degrees, but the powers and dispositions from which they proceed are of much more value, being of long duration and indefinitely productive. Agents are said to be *good* naturally, as they have that which is pleasant and beneficial to themselves and others. Pleasures and pains are the primary causes of preference, and are of various kinds. They differ in *extent*, as they are brief or lasting; in *degree*, as they are faint or strong; and in *dignity*, as they are low or noble. Some have denied the last distinction, saying that *pleasures* differ only in *duration* and *intensity*, but this is not the general judgment. The pleasures of *sight* are superior to those of *taste*; those of the *intellect*, to those of the *senses*; and those of the *affections*, to those which only respect self. The higher pleasures are not always more *extensive*, or more *intense*; but they share the superiority which belongs to the higher faculties, and partake of the *excellence* and *permanence* of their objects. They belong to a class which is in every respect of the greatest value, being capable of indefinite continuance, increase, and communication.

4. Natural Good consists of objects which please, and are desired for their own sake; and also of others, which are valued and chosen only for the sake of that to which they lead. The former are chosen as *ends*, and the latter as *means*. If some things were not in themselves pleasant and desirable, others could not become so by *association*; nor would any be chosen as *means* for their attainment. The *means* are *chosen*, because the *ends* are *desired*. Means are not chosen because they are pleasant, but because they are useful; and those are preferred which are most easily obtained and used, and most likely to succeed. Present feelings do not show the real worth of either *means* or *ends*. This can

be known only by a larger experience, our own being increased by that of others. What is not at all pleasant, but is difficult and painful, is often to be desired more than any present pleasure, because of the great good it is the means of obtaining.

5. It is accepted by all as a self-evident principle, that Man does seek, and should seek, what is evidently for his Good. This is admitted as a fundamental and unquestionable principle, whether there are other principles or not. Present enjoyment, the gratification of any appetite or passion, is a very small part of the welfare which all desire ; for it concerns only a part of human nature, and a portion of human existence. Men have many susceptibilities, and future pleasures and pains must be regarded, as well as present. They have active powers and social affections, and these must be considered, for human welfare depends much on their exercise. The health of the body is more than any indulgence of the senses ; and the health of the soul is more than any mental delight. We have to seek for the welfare of both Body and Soul ; and as an increase of bodily health and strength, especially of the higher organs, is the best thing for the Body, so an increase of mental health and energy, especially of the higher capacities, is the best thing for the Soul ; and the improvement of both, and especially of the latter, is the best thing for Man.*

* Good, with similar words in all languages, is of very wide application ; and alone means very little. The various objects so named have something in common ; but the *signification* of the word, when it stands alone, is very little ; the *adjective* separately denoting merely a small relative abstraction. But when combined with other words, the *sense* of the expression becomes definite, and has much meaning. Objects are *good* in several ways, and the way in which any are *good* is not part of the *signification* of the word, but belongs to the *sense* of the whole expression. It may be said that, in the phrases "good

2. Natural Right.

1. NATURAL RIGHT is less extensive than Natural Good, but it refers to this, and is equally independent of choice and knowledge. Right, as the term is commonly used, denotes some relation,—a *fitness* to some end, or *agreement* with some rule. Right is commonly, if not primarily, applied to *material* objects; and it is so with similar words in other languages. (rectus, δίκαιος, recht.) Nearly all words that now denote what is *spiritual*, were first used for what is *corporeal*. The road is said to be *right*, when it leads to a desired place; the tool, when it is fit for some required use; the work, when according to some pattern or purpose. An action is *right*, when adapted to secure an object; a statement, when it agrees with facts; a request, or a command, is *right*, if proper for the best ends, and according to the best rules. A watch is *right* in structure, when so made as to show the time; and it is *right* in movement, when it agrees with the position of the sun. The action of the bodily organs is *right*, when regular and conducive to health, or any end that may be desired.

food” and “good men,” the word *good* has different *significations*. But it is more correct to say, that the *sense* of the phrases differs. The *sense* is not generally gained by adding together the separate *significations* of the words, but by observing the usage of the composite expression. All that is called *good*, is in some way connected with what is in some way pleasant and agreeable. But all pleasures are not of the same nature. The higher are not multiplications of the lower.

Some words denote merely the *effect* produced in the perceiving *subject*, but most have also an *objective* signification. A circle *is* not what it is, because of our knowledge; but our knowledge *is* what it is, because the circle *is* what it is. A stone, a plant, an animal, a man, are *known* because they exist. They are *perceived*, but not *produced*, by our minds. So what is *good*, is not so simply because it pleases; nor is the apparent *best*, that which pleases most at any *moment*.

2. The value of any *rightness* depends on that of the *good*, in relation to which an object is said to be *right*. Rules are either themselves *good*, or the *means* of attaining what is *good*; so that all natural *right* depends on what is naturally *good*. The *right* and the *good* are perceived by the mind, but not produced by it. They belong to objects, apart from our choice or knowledge. We enquire for the *right* road, that we may take it, and for the *right* tool, that we may use it. Something is naturally *good*, or nothing could be naturally *right*; and what is *right*, is so before it is chosen, and is sought for that it may be chosen. Nothing is more certain than that some objects are naturally *good* and *right*, and therefore proper objects of choice. What they are may be unknown, and when known they may be regarded, desired and chosen; or the contrary. What things *are* in themselves, what we *think* them to be, and what we *choose* respecting them, are very different. Nothing is made Good or Right in nature, by our thinking it is so; nor can our will in the least change the nature of objects, their qualities and consequences. What is naturally Good is so, whether known or not; and what is naturally Right is so, whether chosen or not. It may be right only in reference to some particular *end* or *rule*, or in reference to the general Good.

3. What is Best for mankind,—the greatest good for the greatest number,—cannot possibly be known by children; and is seldom regarded by any persons, when considering what is Good and Right. What is really Best for any single person throughout life, cannot be learnt from any simple consideration of *natural* objects,—their qualities and consequences. Still less is it possible to know what is the greatest good for all, apart from *moral* considerations. But the intelligence of children can discern what is *apparently best*—the *best* they can know and do. This is

learnt, partly from external objects and their effects; and partly from the internal faculties and feelings, concerned with one course of action or another. Internal *capacities* are the highest and most comprehensive, and internal *consequences* are the surest and greatest. Therefore to children and adults the apparent Best is generally easily known, by a little reflection and consideration of their own experience and the testimony of others.

CHAPTER II.

HUMAN CHARACTER.

1. CHARACTER denotes commonly the permanent qualities of any object, as distinguished from the states and circumstances which are ever changing. It is the inferred cause of characteristic actions and effects. Human character is known from the dispositions which are habitually chosen, and from the actions habitually performed. There is a *character* which belongs to all human beings, by which they are distinguished from animals; and there is a *character* which belongs to some from their birth, by which they are distinguished from other human beings. There is also a *character* which comes from frequent choice, without reflection; and there is a *character* which is the result of frequent deliberative and reflective choice.

2. All men have a measure of forethought, sympathy, compassion, respect; these are the common properties of human nature; coming from their larger intelligence, their more varied sensibility, their wider activity. Some are by their natural constitution more than others, thoughtful, sympathetic, compassionate, respectful; more active, cheerful, hopeful, affectionate; or more dull, reserved, gloomy, irritable. These differences come from the bodily or mental constitution, and are original, not chosen. Men are not always the better, or the worse, for their natural peculiarities; as they are not permanently better, or worse, for their out

ward condition and circumstances. What men become depends chiefly on what they themselves choose ; and in all things it is found that some of the “last become first, and the first last.” Character is in some degree the effect of constitution and circumstances ; but to a much greater degree it is the result of repeated choice. The choice of transient feelings produces permanent dispositions, and the choice of actions produces habits. By choosing associations and sympathies, men choose to increase or decrease affections, to strengthen or weaken motives. Thus character is *voluntary*, though it cannot be changed by any single act of Will ; and it may be formed without reflection, and without the knowledge of remote consequences. They who are industrious, sober, considerate, affectionate, have become so by habitually yielding to the better tendencies of their nature, and resisting the worse. They who are indolent, intemperate, careless, ill-tempered, have become so by habitually yielding to lower propensities, disregarding and resisting the higher. Neither result was necessary ; the higher and the lower principles of human nature have grown, because they were voluntarily exercised ; and the *good* and the *bad* in the condition of men have increased, because they were habitually *chosen*.

3. Character is that which is most important to individuals and to society. It belongs to every one more fully than anything he has or does. It includes what he has been, is now, and probably will be ; and is with him at all times and in all places. So far as it is *voluntary*, it is his own *production*, as well as his own *possession*. The character of animals is given them, and they cannot change it ; but men can and do greatly change their characters, for the better or the worse. All are capable of improvement in what is of most worth, and it is the common privilege and duty of all, to *seek to become wiser, stronger, better ; for their own good*

and that of others. All seek improvement in some things, for themselves and their children ; though few seek it in all things, and with proper earnestness and perseverance. What is commonly called a good character, is deservedly prized and honoured. It gives some satisfaction under the worst circumstances, and sooner or later it generally changes them into better. Through a wrong use the best things become hurtful, and through a right use the worst may become beneficial.

4. Character is not formed by single actions, and it is seldom known by them. In some cases a single act of courage, fidelity, generosity, may show character as surely as a thousand would ; and what was done once, we know would be done always. So there are single wrong actions which are decisive of a bad character ; and it is known that they could not be alone. But in most cases neither good principles, or bad, are to be inferred with certainty from single actions. The *conduct* of men is sometimes contrary to their *character*, through the influence of associations, sympathies, transient impulses, and circumstances. Character is most shown by what is deliberately chosen, under common conditions and circumstances, when the nature of the action is sufficiently seen, and the motive is evident to all. The nature of good and bad actions appears more clearly when many are considered, than when only one is regarded ; and the character of men is shown by what they deliberately prefer under the influence of general considerations. There are differences of opinion, respecting the pleasantness and profitableness of *single* right and virtuous *actions* ; and respecting the offensiveness and injuriousness of *single* wrong and vicious *actions*. But all agree respecting the *dispositions* and *habits*, from which these actions proceed. Virtuous *dispositions* and *habits* are acknowledged by all to be pleasant and profitable ; they are *good* for each and all, according to the

constitution and condition of human beings. Vicious *dispositions* and *habits* are in like manner offensive and injurious; they are *bad* for each and for all. These general truths are clear and certain, and therefore all men are more or less influenced by them, in the ordinary course of life, whatever they think of the nature of Virtue. Whatever may be the origin of Character, all agree that it is of supreme importance. Its improvement is the *greatest good* that can be sought, for ourselves or others; and its deterioration is the *greatest ill* that can be inflicted.

5. Animals have a Natural Character, which to some extent may be modified by circumstances, and transmitted to their descendants; and it is susceptible of some change through human agency, in feeding and training. But human beings differ from animals, in their universal need of improvement, and in their large capability of progress;—in their power of knowing what is better than they are, of doing better than they have done, and of becoming better than they have been. A *natural good* is shown them, which they have to secure, to preserve and increase; and a *natural ill*, which they have to avoid, resist, and remove. A *natural right* is shown them which they have to *choose*, and a *natural wrong*, which they have to *refuse*. The *natural good*, when chosen with reflection, becomes a *moral good*; and the *natural right*, in like manner, becomes when chosen a *moral right*. The natural Good precedes the natural Right, but the Moral Right is the beginning of Moral Good.

6. What is naturally pleasant and useful have been too much regarded by some, and too little regarded by others. The Good and Right shown to men, in their natural powers and opportunities, are some revelation of the character and will of their Maker. The faculties and surroundings of *animals* are the gifts of God to them; and so the higher

capacities, and the larger means of enjoyment and improvement, possessed by men, are His gifts to them, to be used for their own good and that of others. The disregard of Utility overlooks some of the reasons of Moral right and good. Expediency is often contrasted with Duty, but then the term is used with a very low and restricted application. That is said to be *expedient*, which has a small present advantage. What is really *expedient* is for the whole welfare of the individual, and therefore for the good of others also. Nothing can be more clear and certain than that there is a Natural Good, apart from human knowledge and choice. The higher Moral Good requires knowledge, and belongs to Choice or Volition.

DIVISION II.

MORAL RIGHT AND GOOD.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF VIRTUE.

1. **M**ORAL Good and Right, like the Natural, belong to agents, to dispositions, to volitions, and to actions; but they differ in many respects. They are often combined, but not always; the latter is found where the former cannot be. Some difference between what is simply Natural, and what is Moral, is acknowledged by all. The Feelings with which we regard what is Morally right or wrong, good or bad, are manifestly peculiar, and differ from all others. More is sometimes felt by all than pleasure and pain, desire and aversion. Moral sentiments are a part of human experience, for all are sometimes conscious of Approbation and Disapprobation, in reference to their own conduct and that of others. The Feelings are unquestionable, whatever difference of opinion there may be respecting their nature and origin; and their importance is equally clear and certain.

2. No other Emotion has such power to strengthen, elevate, encourage, gladden the hearts of men, as the sentiment of Approbation, awakened by the consciousness and *contemplation* of Moral Right. None can weaken, depress,

alarm, and grieve, so much as Remorse. None move men, singly and collectively, so powerfully as the Indignation excited by great and manifest injustice. The literature of the world testifies to the supreme joy and strength given by a *good conscience*, and to the unutterable wretchedness of an *evil conscience*. The consciousness of guilt enfeebles and terrifies the strongest, embitters all the pleasures of life, renders all its possessions worthless, and often drives to self-destruction. These Feelings are realities in human experience, not nervous disorders or mental delusions; and they are first to be considered, though not always right. When knowledge is *imperfect*, Instinct may be a better guide than Reason; and so sometimes Affection is a better rule than Judgment, and Moral Sentiment than any exercise of Reflection. But the largest and surest knowledge must give the best guidance, and therefore Intelligence, with sufficient knowledge, is superior to every description of Feeling; though this is always to be regarded. Moral Sentiments may be defined, as sensations commonly are, by merely mentioning their causes,—they are the peculiar feelings excited by Moral objects. In the same way Moral right and wrong, may be said to be the qualities which cause the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, being approved or condemned by Conscience.

3. But more is known of Moral Right and Wrong, than that they excite certain Feelings. We ask why we feel towards the actions of human beings, as we do not towards those of animals? Feelings are transferred by association, and their present existence does not prove that they are produced by the objects now in view. Feelings are often misdirected, owing to prejudice, passion, partiality; and we cannot be sure because we have them now, that we shall have them at another time, or that others have the same. We must know *something* of the *objects*, by which *feelings* are produced, to be

sure that the feelings are primary, constant, and universal. We commonly ask, Why this disposition, or action, is approved? and we desire to know a *reason* for the sentiment, as well as a constant antecedent. It is not enough to say that we approve, because such is our nature. Conscience is not always right; it varies much in different persons, and in the same person at different times. Moreover the *sentiment* appears before the Faculty is known; and nothing can be known of its authority, but from the *feelings* experienced and the *objects* perceived. Nor can any *general* proposition be referred to, as a primary proof or reason; for some *particular* real right and wrong must be known, before the *principle*, which is a generalized abstraction.* We want to find something, in what is approved and disapproved, which will in some measure account for the peculiar feelings they produce, as well as show their *constancy* and *universality*.

4. Some things, are evidently indispensable to Moral Right, and these may be first noticed. Nothing is regarded with

* This must be the nature of the *principle*, as a *proposition*. The knowledge of *propositions*, whether particular or general, requires a corresponding mental *capacity*; but this is unknown, till experience shows something to be true and right; and from an unknown capacity, nothing can be inferred.

In reply to the question, What is morally Right? the simplest answers are,—That which is approved by Conscience,—or that which is commanded by God; moral Right being agreement with these rules. But neither of these answers can be final. The first gives rise to the question, What is Conscience?—and the answer is, The Faculty which approves what is morally Right. But the question remains, What is this? Conscience shows what is Right, but does not make it right. To the second answer, it will be said, that the statement, Whatever is commanded by God is morally Right, means more than it is the Divine Will. That it is the Will of God is one thing; that this Will is Right is another. That God is ever righteous, is the most important of truths; but it becomes a useless truism, if the Divine Will is the cause of moral Right; and if to assert that an action is Right, is simply to say it is the Will of God.

moral approbation, which is unconscious and involuntary ; therefore, in the first place, the actions and feelings approved must be *conscious* and *voluntary*. Involuntary actions or states can have no other *right*, than that which belongs to animals and plants, to the structure and movements of a machine. Their right is *natural*, not *moral*. When *involuntary* feelings and actions are regarded with *moral* approbation or disapprobation, it is because they result from many previous *volitions*, and are viewed as their effects. No one praises *involuntary* beneficence, or condemns *involuntary* hurt.* Only *voluntary* states have a *moral* nature, but not all of these.

Actions, in the second place, have no *moral* quality, unless the Agent has a certain degree of knowledge and ability—is capable of comparison, reflection, self-control ; and it is the same with Feelings. These larger capacities of Intelligence and Will are requisite to any moral actions or feelings. Nothing *moral* is found in the conduct of animals and infants. They must choose according to the influence of present objects, and the excitement of present feelings. Moral agents know that there are other objects which will affect their welfare, and other feelings which will soon be felt. They can bring these objects before the mind for consideration, compare them, and choose according to their apparent worth—according to what they know will be their feelings when the future becomes present. As children advance in mental capacity, and the power of self-govern-

* That Moral right and wrong belong to the Choice or Intention, and not to the outward Act, is clear and certain. For (1) Actions without any *intention* have no moral quality ; and the same *action* is right or wrong, according to the *intention*. The excuse often made, that the wrong *done* was not *intended*, is valid when there is not present *carelessness*, or previous *voluntary* wrong doing. (2) Intentions not fulfilled have the same moral qualities as *actions*, when the actions are fully foreseen and chosen, and would have been completed, if there had been opportunity. (3) The measure of *moral* right and wrong is always according to the Intention, whether the action be really beneficial or injurious.

ment, they become *moral* agents, and are held to be *responsible* for their actions. This increase of intelligence and ability are necessary, and nothing more is required. Without *comparison*, nothing can be known to be better or worse. Without *reflection*, it cannot be known whether, or not, what is present in consciousness is all that may be seen and felt, and should be regarded. And without some power over the mental states, it is impossible to regard more than what is already in view, or comes of itself. These powers—Comparison, Reflection, Self-control—are evidently necessary to Moral choice.

It is quite certain that only *voluntary* actions have any *moral* character, and it is equally evident that *moral* conduct has always some relation to the *capacity* of the agent. A measure of *intelligence* and *ability* above the lowest are necessary, and without these nothing is commended as *morally* right, or censured as *morally* wrong. With the entire absence of this knowledge and power, there is no moral nature; with the increase of capacity there is more of a moral nature, and with the decrease of capacity there is less. Only as the *capacity* is known, can there be any true judgment on the *conduct* of any agent. Right or wrong *moral* conduct is not only *voluntary*, but the *right* is according to, and the *wrong* is contrary to, the greater knowledge and ability of the agent. The objects of Moral approbation and disapprobation must be in that, which only the greater intelligence can know, and the greater ability can do.*

* The Affection of animals for their young is not chosen, and is not *morally* right, however tender and self-sacrificing. It is involuntary, and soon passes away. Their Resentment is not *morally* wrong, however cruel and useless; nor their Licentiousness, however wild and excessive. Animals may choose their *actions*, but they do not choose their *passions*; and they can act only according to present impulse. There is no moral quality in voluntary actions, if there is no capacity for reflection and self-control; if feelings and dispositions are entirely *involuntary*. Men can choose their feelings and dispositions, as well as

5. It is evident that the Moral nature of Feelings and Actions depends, in the first place, on their being in some measure voluntary; and secondly, that the Moral quality of Volitions depends on the capacity of the agent; it is something that is discerned by Reflection and Comparison, and cannot be felt and seen without these. Reflection,—some consideration of what we and others are, and of what may be known and chosen,—is always necessary. Without some regard to our own *capacity*, there is no approbation or disapprobation of our own choice; and without some regard to the *capacity* of others, there is no approbation or disapprobation of their conduct. The question then arises, What are the things compared on reflection? Two statements are made, often as though they were fundamentally different, and might be opposed. It is said by some, that the comparison is between different Principles of action, in respect to their *worth* and dignity. By others, that it is between the expected influence of Volitions on the *welfare* of those concerned.

These comparisons refer *directly* to different objects, but their results are *similar* when properly made, and they rest ultimately on the *same* foundation. The deliberate choice of the *best* that can be known, is approved as morally *right*; and so is the deliberate choice of a higher principle of action, when opposed by a lower. Both may be said to be *fit*, or *proper*, or *right*, or *according* to human nature,—to be the dictates of Conscience. According to both, the *moral* right

their actions. They can compare the objects presented for choice, the means to be used, the probabilities of success, and the principles of different courses of conduct. They can survey all their tendencies to action, and foresee many consequences. They may choose as animals do, without consideration, and according to *inclination*; or they may choose with reflection and deliberation, according to *judgment*—according to Reason and Conscience. Animals have some power of comparison, but no forethought, or reflection, or power of self-government, or capacity of self-improvement.

differs from the *natural*; it belongs to the Will, and is known intuitively. In some cases one mode of statement may be more obviously correct than the other. The one will be preferred by those whose mental tendencies are *objective*, while those who incline to the *subjective* will prefer the other.*

* It is self-evident, that of two opposing principles of action, the preference of the higher or better is *morally* right; but this does not show that any one should be preferred to all others, for there may be a principle superior to both. The *highest* and *best* cannot be known without some reflection on the *whole* of human nature and welfare, so far as they may be known. Therefore, above all other principles is that which surveys all, and sees which should be exercised—when, where, and in what manner. This is what Butler calls the principle of Reflection or Conscience. Without the sanction of this *highest* principle, the choice of the apparent best, or of the higher against the lower, is not *morally* right. Previous reflection may make present consideration needless; but it can never be right for human beings to choose and act without Reflection, merely from present impulse, or appearance; whether the feeling be strong or feeble, the principle high or low. Principles are high or low, according to their comprehensiveness, and their influence on the happiness and well-being of the agent and others.

Human intelligence can regard the whole of human *welfare* that is known, and all the *capacities* of which we are conscious. This *comprehensiveness* is superior to any single state of thought or feeling, and the faculty to which it is referred, the Conscience, must therefore be superior to all others. Conscience moreover regards what is *intuitively* known, that which is present, certain, highest, and most enduring, in ourselves and others. It is not simply *subjective*. What is seen in our own *volitions* has an *objective* reality. The *right* or *wrong* of choice and conduct may be known by others, as by ourselves; and *moral* properties are as necessary as *mathematical*. What is *right* at one time must be always right, as what is *equal* must be always so; and what is *known* to be right by one, must be so regarded by all who know what is true. The comprehensiveness of Conscience, its reference to the whole of our nature and welfare, its certainty, immutability, and universality, are sufficient *reasons* for the supremacy assigned to it. Because human welfare depends mainly on Character, the consideration of *motives* is a much surer guide than the calculation of *consequences*.

6. A child desires some fruit, the eating of which will give a few minutes' pleasure ; but dreads the pain of several hours, which will follow the gratification. These two objects are compared. If only capable of the involuntary comparison of impulses, there is no *moral* choice. But if there is a capacity for voluntary reflection and self-control, there is a moral *right* in choosing not to take the fruit, and a moral *wrong* in choosing to take it. It may be said of the one choice, either that it is the choice of the *best* that can be known, or that it is the choice of the *higher* principle of action ; and it may be said of the other choice, that it is the choice of the *worse* state rather than the *better*, or that it is the choice of the *lower* principle rather than the *higher*. To take another instance,—a child is inclined to go out, thinking this pleasant and useful ; but is forbidden by one who is known to be kind, and to be wiser than the child. The one belief and desire respect the child alone, and the other belief and desire respect also the parent or teacher. The desire of self-direction and indulgence is on one side ; the desire for the guidance, the pleasure, the approval of another person, is opposed to this. If there be the capacity for reflection and consideration, there is a *moral* right in obedience, and a *moral* wrong in disobedience. Obedience is seen to be *better* than disobedience, because two persons are certainly pleased in the former, while only one can be pleased by the latter ; and there will be no gain to self, but loss and injury, if the judgment of the other should be superior. It may therefore be said that the choice of obedience is *right*, because it is the *best* that can be known ; or that it is *right*, because it comes from a *higher* principle, and regards the feelings and judgments of others, as well as one's own. It is the same with all moral conduct.* There

* A man is morally *right* in providing for his family, doing this because it is *best* for himself and for them ; or because prudence and parental affection are *higher* principles, than present self-indulgence. A soldier is morally *right* in standing to his post, doing this because it is *best* for himself and for his companions ; or because courage

can be none, without the capacity for reflection and comparison,—a comparison which respects what is known, and may be known. It is not the relative strength of inclinations that is regarded, in the consideration of what is right or wrong *morally*; but the relation of what is chosen to the pleasure and welfare of ourselves and others; or the comparative worth of the motives of choice, the principles of action.

7. In most cases it is not difficult to determine what is *morally* right. A little consideration is sufficient to show what is apparently *best*, if this is sincerely sought; or what is according to the *higher* principles of human nature; but it is not always so. What primarily respects Self, and what is present or near, are known and felt without effort, and often without choice; but what is remote, and what concerns others, require voluntary consideration, often more attention than is easy and pleasant. Therefore when what is right for ourselves is not quite obvious and certain, we should suppose the case to be that of *another*; and ask, if it would be right for him, and for *all* to do so. What is *morally right* for one, is so for another in the same case; and is so universally in all similar cases. But it is not right for one, if it would not be right for another and for all. These are practical rules, and not moral principles. That which is *right* for ourselves is not

and fidelity are nobler principles, than a dread of danger. What is thought to be *best*, is not that which is at present felt to be most easy and *pleasant*; but that which appears to be most *desirable*, when the future is considered as well as the present, others as well as ourselves. Apart from *moral* considerations, what is really *best* for any one cannot be surely known, and still less what is best for all. But what *appears* to be the best is known by every moral agent, and this determines what is *morally* right. Not the choice of whatever *seems* best is approved, but the *deliberate* choice, when the comparison respects what is known by consideration and reflection, as well as what is known without. Persons are approved, only for choosing the best that they can know and do; and they are censured, only when they could know and do better than they choose.

so, because it would be *right* for others; but *right* is more clearly and surely known, when we look to the case of others as well as to our own. Therefore the direction is given, "All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also thus to them." (Matt. vii. 12.) It is not true that choice *must* be according to what is thought to be *best*; but it certainly is true, that no other choice can be approved.*

8. As Moral Good and Right are conscious and voluntary, so are Moral Evil and Wrong; and as in the former there is a preference of the *higher* and *better*, so in the latter there is a preference of the *lower* and *worse*. Without some capacity of Reflection, there could be no Moral Good or Evil; but men choose to consider their ways, or refuse to do so. They choose to do so fully, or very partially. They choose to seek and follow what is Best, or they turn away from it. They prefer what is Right, though difficult and painful; or they take what is Wrong, because it is more easy and pleasant.

Moral Right may be defined as the *fitness* of Choice to

* It is often said that Moral Right is agreement with Law, this being a general statement of *fact* or of *duty*. But *single* objects are known before *classes*, and *particular* propositions before *universal*. The certainty of the latter follows that of the former, it cannot produce or precede it. Single intuitions and convictions are made by repetition more clear and strong; but *generalizations* can never be the beginning of any knowledge. In the Natural Sciences, convictions or beliefs are according to the extent of Experience; in the Abstract Sciences, according to some apparent Necessity. Necessity does not appear without repeated observations; in which we see again and again, that the contrary is impossible. But what is believed to be *universal*, is first believed to be *necessary* through repeated observations, either on the same object, or on several similar. The repeated consideration of one triangle shows what is *necessary* and therefore *universal*, as well as the consideration of many. So in Morals. Simple single cases are known by Intuition; but the complex are known by comparison with these, and all *universal* propositions are *inferences*.

what on *reflection* appears *best*, according to the capacity and condition of the agent. Or, as the *agreement* of Choice with the *higher* faculties, by which what is *best* is known and done.

What is merely a *natural* good when *involuntary*, becomes a *moral* good when chosen with reflection and deliberation. It is not necessary or desirable, that Moral considerations should be the *only* motives. This would indeed be *morally wrong*; for Conscience requires the exercise of natural affections. But it is requisite in all *moral actions*, that a regard to *moral right* should be present, and be the *supreme* motive, so that nothing is done without its permission. Virtue is Wisdom, knowledge ruling; and Vice is Folly, knowledge disregarded.

9. Natural Good and Right are according to *consequences*, which are the same whatever the *intentions* may be. Moral Good and Right are according to *intentions*, which are the same whatever the *consequences* may be. What is Natural depends on the qualities and effects of objects, which are the same whether known or unknown. What is Moral is internal,—belonging to the Will or Self, and is according to the objects and motives of Choice. The former are estimated by the amount of enjoyment they afford, directly or indirectly; and by the little trouble they occasion. The latter by the excellence and purity of the motive; and by the opposition overcome,—the loss, labour, and trouble willingly taken, for the sake of what is *morally* Right and Good. That which is naturally Best, must be according to all capacities and conditions, known and unknown. That which is morally Best, for any agent at the present time, must be according to what is known and chosen.

10. Moral Right is always connected with the Natural, but it is always different. Beliefs depend on thoughts, and feelings on beliefs, but they are not the same. Triangles

must have equal areas, if they are on equal bases and between parallel lines ; but *superficial* and *linear* magnitude are not the same. So *moral* rightness and *natural* rightness are connected, but they are never the same. Often an action is *right*, because it is *expedient*, and would not be *right* if it were not *expedient*. But the natural *expediency* of the action is one thing, and the moral *right* of the choice is another. We can easily suppose that what is pleasant and expedient should be the reverse. We cannot suppose that what is *morally* right should be *morally* wrong. That it *must* be approved is a *logical* necessity, if the *predicate* is contained in the *subject*. It is a *moral* necessity, when the predicate is not contained in the subject, but inferred from it. The inference of *moral* from *natural* right, is known by Reason, as that of *superficial* from *linear* equality. In all such cases we know what *must* be, the antecedent and consequent being necessarily connected.*

* Reflexive Volitions have the properties which distinguish Moral judgments and sentiments. (1) They are *peculiar* mental states ; and therefore they excite the *peculiar* feelings of approbation and disapprobation. (2) They are the highest states of consciousness, those in which the Self is most active and most known ; and therefore they make and manifest *character*, and have a corresponding permanence and importance. (3) They combine the variable with the invariable ; both that which *is* best, and that which is thought to be so, are in part changeable, and in part unchangeable. And so Moral judgments vary, while Moral principles never can change. (4) Reflexive Volitions are known intuitively, and with the highest certainty. And so men know by looking within whether the *best* has been sought, or not ; whether it has been chosen, or not ; and therefore know directly and surely, whether their choice is morally right, or not. (5) Consciousness shows fully in such volitions, what is *real*, and thought to be *possible* ; and so Moral judgments are unconditional, referring only to Volitions. No means, or external conditions, are required for a right choice. Moral right is not affected by unknown impossibilities, nor by unavoidable mistakes, nor by results that could not reasonably be expected. (6) In some things all men agree. All have some consciousness of human faculties, and know something of their use and abuse ; and therefore universally they see, and acknowledge, that some actions are morally right, and some morally wrong.

11. The inducements to the preference and practice of Virtue are of various kinds.

There is first, the *natural good* existing in what is chosen, and which is the same, whether chosen or not. This belongs both to dispositions and actions. Temperance and kindness contribute to health and happiness, in animals and in men. So many other acts and habits are pleasant and profitable in themselves; and the *good* in them is often without any reflection or consideration. But in human beings this good is not a large and permanent possession, without choice and deliberation.

Secondly, there is the *moral good* which belongs to a deliberate choice. This is internal, nobler, more certain, more lasting than any natural good. The highest pleasure attends the exercise of reflection and self-government; and the greatest benefits are thus obtained. The quiet satisfaction of a good conscience, is better than any mirth or gladness. The consciousness of increasing wisdom and goodness, is a gain surpassing all other attainments and acquisitions, more sure and enduring.

Lastly, what is inferred from individual Moral experience, greatly increases its value and importance. The delight of a good conscience, and the remorse of a bad conscience, are enhanced by the consideration, that all good beings join in the same approval or censure; and still more by a regard to the Author of our being, the Maker and Governor of all. As surely as the Eye is made to be used, so surely is Conscience given to be exercised. Good is shown, that it may be sought; and Evil is shown, that it may be shunned. The true judgment of men, is the judgment of God. The Divine Will is declared in *facts*, as well as in *words*. Rewards and punishments come as the certain consequences of human conduct, according to the constitution of human nature. Not the less, they are signs of the approbation or condemnation of God.

When the Right seen and felt in human choice and conduct, on a consideration of the capacities and welfare of men, is generalized and made universal, it has all the dignity and authority of Moral Law. And this, when human nature is referred to the First Cause of all things, becomes some expression of the Divine Character and Will.

In the Book of Proverbs, consideration and teachableness are inculcated as the primary lessons for all men. Wisdom speaks to all, to instruct and warn, to invite to ways of pleasantness and peace, to guard against what is injurious and destructive. The practical lessons of the Bible are comprehended in the direction, "*Cease to do evil, and learn to do well.*" The highest authority commends to us the choice of all Moral Right, and promises satisfaction. "*Happy they who hunger and thirst after Righteousness; for they shall be filled.*"

12. Some have supposed that the first notions of Moral right, and all sure knowledge, come from the Bible; but this is evidently impossible. Words cannot give the first knowledge of any qualities, material or mental or moral. These must be seen and felt, or they cannot be known. The Bible is full of statements respecting Righteousness, but presupposes some knowledge of what is Right. It is not scientific or systematic, but historical and practical. It is of inestimable value for the guidance, correction, elevation, enlargement, and invigoration of Conscience; but it assumes its existence, and never claims to supersede its exercise. General precepts are never to be taken unconditionally; and the best examples are not to be copied in all things, at all times, in all places, under all conditions. All rules are to be taken in the *spirit*, rather than in the *letter*; and the best are injurious, unless their use is according to Conscience. The natural knowledge of what is good and right, is the first expression of the

Divine Will respecting human conduct; and only through this can it be known, that the Will of God is Right.

"*Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?*" (Gen. xviii. 25.)

"*Is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?*" (Ezek. xviii. 25.)

"*Why even of yourselves do you not judge what is right?*" (Luke xii. 57.)

"*We know that the judgment of God is according to truth.*" (Rom. ii. 2.)

The general nature of Virtue is best seen by considering the special Virtues to which we proceed.*

* Morals and Ethics refer principally to *habitual* actions,—to Character. Both terms, according to their etymology, denote what is *customary*, (*mos* and *moralis*, ἤθος and ἔθος); but they are not used for all customary dispositions and actions. It has been argued that the term *moral* means merely *customary*, because such is the radical signification. But the meaning of words often changes. Moral judgments generally refer in some way to what is *customary*, because Character is known by habitual states and actions, these being more or less voluntary and at times deliberate. The quality of the *act* is most manifest, when many similar acts are considered; and the character of the *agent* always refers, to many actions. According to Aristotle "Moral Virtue arises from the Habit, whence also it has its name, which is only in a small degree altered from ἔθος." (*Nic. Eth.* Lib. ii. c. i.) He says "Virtue is a habit of action, deliberately chosen, and a mean in relation to us between two extremes, being determined by Reason, as a wise man would determine." (Lib. ii. c. 6.) The *mean* is not given as the *reason*, but as a help to the discernment of what is reasonable.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα, τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ, καὶ ὡς ἀνὴρ φρόνιμος ὁρίσσει. (Lib. ii. c. 6.)

CHAPTER II.

SPECIAL VIRTUES.

VIRTUE, in common usage and according to its etymology, is *manliness*, or special *energy*. It is a quality of human beings, and may belong to any who possess equal or greater intelligence and ability.* It is not so described because it is a common property of men, as seeing and speaking, but because it is according to the higher capacities of human nature, requiring these, and resulting from their exercise; it is becoming, proper to Man. It is that of which all are capable in some degree, and of which none are always and entirely destitute. They who disregard *virtue* in their own practice, praise it in others; and generally wish to be thought, in some things, more *virtuous* than they really are. No human beings, after early childhood, are without some knowledge of Moral right and wrong. They find that they have a faculty of discerning moral qualities, as they have a faculty for discerning natural qualities. They know they have eyes, when luminous objects are presented to their view; and they know they have Consciences, when moral objects are perceived and regarded.

The consideration of the dispositions and habits called Virtues, will show clearly, that there are mental states and

* Thus *virtus* is from *vir*, *vis vires*; and *αρετή* from *ἀρετή*, *ἀρετή*, *ἀρετή*. The same words were also used for *vigour* of any kind; and so we speak of the *virtue* of plants and medicines.

actions, which are themselves *good*. They are pleasant and beneficial when *involuntary*, but they are not strictly Virtues till they are chosen. They are a manifest *natural good*, and when chosen with reflection they become a *moral good*; besides securing a large measure of the pleasure and profit which are simply *natural*. The instincts of animals, and the tendencies of young children, are simply natural. These when chosen become moral; producing Virtues if properly ruled, and Vices if allowed to rule. The dispositions and actions which are naturally good, apart from reflection and choice, are only partial, occasional, and transient. According to natural constitution and circumstances, they are sometimes easy and pleasant, and then they appear; but they show no preference of what is morally right. Reflection and deliberate choice are requisite to completeness, constancy, and permanence, in the performance of all duty, in the pursuit of all that is morally good.

There can be no consciousness of a Moral Faculty, unless its proper *object* is presented to the mind; and the nature of these objects, and of the Conscience which discerns them, will be most clearly seen, by considering the various classes of objects which are called Virtues and Vices.

Some Virtues primarily regard the individual, as (1) Prudence, (2) Industry, (3) Temperance, (4) Courage;—some primarily refer to others, as (5) Gratitude, (6) Compassion, (7) Benevolence, (8) Respect, in which the inward *disposition* is most concerned;—while in others, (9) Justice and (10) Veracity, the outward *conduct* is chiefly regarded,—what is done and what is said. All differences in objects, do not make a difference in the dispositions, with which they are regarded. Gratitude is the same virtue, whether it regards one who has done for us little or much; and Justice is the same, whether it regards a few or many obligations,—the rights of inferiors, equals, or superiors.

I. Prudence.

PRUDENCE, as a virtue, is *forethought*, (*prudentia*, *pro video*) and this includes some consideration of the past and present; since there can be no regard for the future, without some regard to past and present. It is the habit of thoughtfulness, respecting all that is known. Human beings would perish in infancy, if others did not provide for their wants; and through the whole of life, their welfare depends on the use they make of the lessons of experience. Their natural instincts, and the impressions made on them by surrounding objects, are never sufficient for their preservation and progress. They are capable of remembering the past, considering the present, and anticipating the future. Men cannot live, as animals do, without reflection and forethought. They live as *men*, only when they exercise their higher faculties; and so gain beneficial influences from the invisible and distant, as well as from the visible and near. All human beings make some use of their superior intelligence. Little children soon learn to take some care of themselves; and the lowest of mankind are not entirely indifferent to the unseen. But human welfare requires habitual, voluntary thoughtfulness; the recollection of former experience, the consideration of ourselves, our circumstances, our associates, of those who depend on us, and of those on whom we depend; some anticipation of the future, and preparation for it. We have to look onwards, for ourselves and for others; and to make some provision for the future, which will soon be as real as the present. Prudence should regulate the choice of *ends*, preferring those which are best and surest; and the choice of *means*, taking those which are most suitable and available. Prudence is not always pleasant, nor is it always successful; but thoughtfulness and consideration are always proper, and always beneficial. The habit is unquestionably good, for each and for all. The

partial prudence, which respects *self* alone, fails of the greater ends, when it gains the less ; and the lower prudence, which regards only the outward condition, is satisfactory only for a time. Such conduct is really Imprudence. But the Prudence which is comprehensive of ourselves, and of others,—of the whole of man's nature and destiny, so far as they are known,—is always right. It is approved and honoured. Knowledge is only partial, and the most prudent schemes and efforts do not always succeed ; but the value of Prudence, to individuals and society, is certain and universal. It is so great and manifest, that Prudence has a primary place among the Virtues. It contributes to the culture, and to the proper exercise, of all virtues. Prudence is higher, and better, than the enjoyment for which it provides. It is a present and certain good in its exercise, even when it fails.

2. Industry.

INDUSTRY, as a virtue, is the habitual exercise of mind and body, directed to some end more or less important, and maintained while requisite. Aimless, desultory, lawless activity is not *industry*. Human wants cannot be thus supplied, nor human safety secured, nor human desires satisfied. Men are capable of seeing and using the relation of *means* to *ends*, both near and remote. By well chosen, vigorous, and continued exertion, they easily and surely obtain innumerable objects, according to their various wants and wishes. They are capable of such exercise of their faculties, and without this they must lose much and gain little. This is manifest to all who exercise any reflection on themselves, and on their condition. Industry is useful and noble, and is therefore plainly proper for all. It is pleasant and profitable, but it is something more. Its choice is according to the higher nature, by which men are raised above animals. He who is industrious lives as men alone *can* live, and receives the benefits of larger endowments.

Industry is not always agreeable, nor always advantageous for the ends directly sought. But it is always morally right, since it is always good for human nature ; its present and internal benefits are sure. It is indispensable to human progress, to all real welfare ; and therefore deserves a foremost place among the virtues. Great natural ability, and much assistance from others, may partially supply the place of personal industry ; but only partially and imperfectly.

3. Temperance.

TEMPERANCE is the regulation of desires, especially of those which respect the gratification of the senses. They are *temperate* who govern their appetites and passions, restraining them whenever indulgence is hurtful to body or mind. Temperance is directly for one's own good, indirectly for that of others. Little experience is required to show, that natural impulses often tend to what is injurious to ourselves and to others. Men need not yield to their propensities, but can resist them. They find that those which are most useful under certain conditions, are destructive under others. No desires are to be indulged at all times, in all places, for all objects, under all circumstances ; and therefore all must be governed. Men know when and where and how their appetites may be satisfied, safely and beneficially and properly ; and they can control their inclinations. To follow without consideration the promptings of appetite and passion, is merely animal ; while consideration and self-control, are human. Men's conduct is worse than brutish, if knowing the evil consequences of actions, they rush forward to injurious and pernicious indulgences. Temperance is more easy to some than to others, but it is possible to all and beneficial to all. It becomes difficult and painful only through improper self-indulgence. The habit is pleasant, and profitable for the health of body and of mind, for the actions which are most beneficial to ourselves and to others.

Without it there is no competence for right conduct, nor security against wrong.

Chastity, personal purity, is a form of Temperance of the highest importance to the individual and to society. Human affections are in every way immeasurably superior to animal passions, and the latter should ever be subordinate to the former. The proper connexions of the sexes are therefore permanent and exclusive, for in all others a greater good is sacrificed for a less. In polygamy and concubinage, the equality of personal rights is always disregarded. Animal passions are transient and indiscriminate, but permanence and exclusiveness are ever the purpose and promise of uncorrupted human affection; and the dictate of nature is supported by the largest experience. The lower tendencies of human nature, when properly regulated, minister to the higher; but left to themselves they defile and degrade, brutalize and destroy. Deception and cruelty, not to one but to many, can be avoided only by the preservation of chastity. The maintenance of this virtue is human, as manly in the one sex as it is womanly in the other.

4. Courage.

COURAGE respects the endurance of *pain*, as Temperance respects the enjoyment of *pleasure*. It is strength and steadfastness in the presence of danger. Fear is in some animals an instinct prompting to flight; and in human beings it is a natural feeling in peril, sometimes securing self-preservation. But experience soon shows that *resistance* is often better than *flight*; and that when it is better to *flee*, it is always well first to consider where and how safety may be gained, or seeking to escape one ill may lead to another and greater. The excess of Fear makes men weak and miserable, helpless and useless; and much loss and suffering are caused when it is needless, or misdirected in its objects and effects. Courage is universally esteemed because it is

easily seen, is manifestly proper, and is useful to all. By directing thought and repressing feeling, by considering chiefly what is to be done, by regarding duty and honour, men meet danger without shrinking from it. Courage is not thoughtlessness and insensibility, but the proper government of thought and feeling ; and the consequent steadfastness of purpose. Rashness is no virtue. There are times when the bravest ought to flee, when the object to be gained is not worth the probable sacrifice, when both prudence and benevolence forbid the useless continuance of strife. Only those whose courage is doubtful, or whose capacity of reflection is small, will persist in perilous and hopeless undertakings. Moral courage has respect to pains and perils that do not affect the senses, but the higher sensibilities. Many are more afraid of censure and ridicule, than of any outward danger. Courage is shown in maintaining what we believe to be true and proper and right, though many think and act otherwise ; though contempt and opposition must be borne, for the sake of truth and duty. There is often more courage in discharging the common duties of life, in ministering to the sick, in seeking to raise the fallen and degraded, than is ever shown on the field of battle.

Fortitude differs from Courage, in that the ill is present, as well as future.

5. Gratitude.

GRATITUDE is the recognition of Love in another, with the return of some similar affection, disposing to its expression in speech and action. Social affections are as much a part of human nature, as any bodily appetites, or any mental desires which respect self alone. They are found in all, in little children and in the lowest and worst of mankind. None are utterly insensible to respectful kindness, and none are utterly indifferent to the opinions and welfare of others. Social affections give to human beings much of their worth, and most of their happiness ; and no one can

live a human life, apart from their exercise. Of these affections Gratitude is the earliest, the most common, and the most important. A ready acknowledgment of kindness in benefits received, and a cheerful response to every expression of love, require human intelligence and affection, and most certainly are proper in the highest degree. Gratitude is pleasant to all, to the giver, the receiver, and all beholders. It is not the pleasure of remembering past, or anticipating future benefits; but the joy of seeing and feeling an affection, which is nobler and better than any desire and delight with which self only is concerned. Inconsiderateness, pride and selfishness, too often prevent the proper exercise and expression of Gratitude; but the affection is so natural that it is commonly expected, and therefore is not much commended. He would be less than *human*, who was never grateful to any one; and he is most *human*, who most quickly discerns all manifestations of kindness, and most fully returns all the love he receives. Such are most happy themselves, and do most to promote the happiness of others. In some cases Gratitude may be entirely involuntary, and requires no moral nature. But they who are habitually grateful, have often chosen to be so. It is always right to have the affection; but it is not always right to act according to its prompting. That which is injurious is not to be done to a benefactor for the sake of pleasing; nor that which is unjust to others. To consent to any moral wrong in order to oblige another, is the greatest injury to him and to all.

6. Compassion.

COMPASSION regards those who from their wants and weakness, suffering and danger, require special assistance from others. It is a natural affection for those who are in the helplessness of infancy and sickness, or who have peculiar privations and pains. Those who feel no pity for *great* and manifest distress, and refuse the aid which is easily

given, are declared to be *inhuman*. Men are naturally dependent; they know the need of others, and are able to give some succour and relief. Human intelligence and ability are generally requisite for Compassion; and its exercise is necessary for individual and social well-being. When the feeling is involuntary or has no practical influence, it has no moral worth; but as the affection is chosen and operative, Compassion is a virtue. It has more of this character, as the objects are not necessarily seen, but are sought for and considered; and as the assistance given requires some effort and sacrifice. Compassion is attended with some pain, from the present ill that requires help; but it gives more pleasure, from the expected benefit, and from the exercise of affection in the endeavour to afford relief. When the effort fails, it is not entirely lost; for much comfort is given by the expression of compassion, and some satisfaction is felt in having tried to relieve. Compassion is evidently according to the nature and condition of men. It is pleasant, profitable, proper. When little more than a natural instinct, it lessens the sufferings of life; but when it is habitually chosen and wisely exercised, it elevates, strengthens, gladdens, and benefits all. It does much to change the character of outward events, turning sorrow into joy, and making transient ill the occasion of permanent good. There is no Compassion in removing present ill, if thereby a greater ill is occasioned.

Gratitude and Compassion are affections limited to certain objects, the former respecting those from whom we receive favour and help, and the latter those to whom we render these. But there are always objects for both these affections, if human intelligence and ability are exercised in discerning all expressions of kindness, and in using all occasions for helping those who need help.

Mercy is compassion to the guilty, a willingness to remove deserved punishment, when this is not demanded by the

welfare of others; and a desire for the reformation of the wrongdoer that punishment may be dispensed with.

7. Benevolence.

BENEVOLENCE is the most comprehensive of the affections, embracing all who are intelligent and sensitive, from the lowest to the highest. It is the delight and desire felt for others, like the delight and desire which respect only ourselves. The feeling is natural, according to the manifold and manifest correspondences and connections, which are known and regarded. It respects especially, but not exclusively, human beings—those who are nearest to us, who are most like in nature and condition. Thus the members of one family, companions at school, fellow-workmen, sailors in the same ship, soldiers in the same company, residents in the same town, natives of the same country, have similar possessions and privileges, and are in some degree one body. They share one another's joys and sorrows, and have some care for the welfare of others as well as their own. This is the ordinary experience of humanity. Benevolence is repressed and prevented by whatever hinders the perception of our common human nature, difference of colour, race, language, customs; and by all that occasions the apprehension of hostility and opposition.

As the larger intelligence of Man gives the knowledge of many objects, so larger affection increases his capacity of sharing the happiness of many, of receiving and communicating good. What respects self only, must be comparatively small in magnitude, short and uncertain in duration. As we make the joys of others our own, individual happiness increases and continues. The capacity of loving others as ourselves, is the highest human endowment. He who is benevolent to all has the largest portion of happiness, and communicates most. No change of circumstances or condition can make him miserable or useless. Those who are

nearest, who are best known, and for whose good most may be done, are the first objects of Benevolence, according to the dictates of Nature; and Experience shows that most good is done to all, when affection is primarily directed to those who have the strongest claims on our regard. But Benevolence has no limits, and seeks the good of all, and finds joy in all known joy, especially in that to which it can contribute. There is a low benevolence which regards merely the present pleasure of others, and may be so exercised as to be hurtful to its object, to the benefactor, and to all.

Benevolence is due to all, to the good and to the bad, and the latter need Compassion. Other forms of Benevolence respect different classes of persons. Benevolence towards the feeble, shown in thoughtful tenderness, is Gentleness; towards the violent, shown in preferring kindness to force, is Meekness; towards the offending, shown in readiness to forgive and desire to restore, is Mercy. As the moral character is to every one more important than any other good, external or internal; so to promote moral improvement, and preserve from wrong, is the highest exercise of Benevolence; and the increase of religious convictions and sentiments is the greatest good, when it contributes to the increase of all righteousness and goodness.

8. Respectfulness.

RESPECT is an affection that regards all Excellence, as Benevolence regards all Happiness. Only by the exercise of human intelligence, can we discern the objects which are worthy of respect, admiration, and reverence; and the delight which these afford is very great, and on many accounts most desirable. It is extensive and enduring; it requires only personal effort, and is increased when shared with others. All works of Art interest and please, not by the sensitive gratification they give, nor by their common utility,

but by the skill and genius they show,—the mental and moral qualities they manifest. These give the highest worth to all social intercourse, and make it most good for men to live with their fellow-men. There is something in all, and much in many, to be respected, esteemed, and honoured. Books are of the highest value because they give the best thoughts of the wisest of mankind, and exhibit the sayings and sentiments, the doings and sufferings, of persons distinguished for greatness and goodness.

The works of Nature far surpass those of Art, in excellence, variety, and extent. They are always around us, open to our observation, and give endless occasions for admiration, wonder, and delight. Some effort of attention, mental culture, diligent and patient industry, are required of those who would use and enjoy these inexhaustible treasures. Personal intercourse with the wise and good is in many ways beneficial; but the companionship of good books is larger, loftier, and more easily obtained by most, than that of living persons, and is invaluable for enjoyment and improvement. They who have been the leaders and benefactors of their age, call us to emulate their virtues, to profit by their wisdom and courage and generosity. What is admirable in character, in words, actions, and achievements, is imperishable. It delights and encourages, directs and strengthens now, as in former generations. Men only are capable of receiving all the good influences that come from distant lands and ages; and they who find most to respect and admire, find most to use and enjoy. It is pleasant to respect and to be respected. It is an exercise of the higher faculties and sensibilities, seen to be good and proper for all.

9. Justice.

1. JUSTICE, as a mental quality or habit, is a disposition to act *equitably*, or *equally*, to others, because of some *common* nature. Fair dealing one with another is univer-

sally regarded as proper, when any *equality* is acknowledged. It requires human intelligence and sensibility, and is required by all societies, approved by all. Children, in their games and contests, demand that *equal* advantages should be given to all. Associates in any undertaking, if they have *equal* strength and skill, divide the work into *equal* portions, and receive *equal* rewards. In every society where there is anything to be done or received, the rule of *equality* is accepted, unless there is some reason for allotting to one more than to another. It is only fair and just, that they who do more than others, should receive more. This is not simply for the sake of the individual, but for the benefit of the whole community, who profit by the promotion of industry and skill, by discoveries and inventions. It is *just* that each person should have a proper share in what is naturally given to all; and it is *unjust* for any one to take away by force or fraud the portion of another to increase his own. Such conduct is according to animal propensities, but not according to human faculties and affections.*

2. Distributive Justice awards to all the members of any society *equal* shares in what has been given to all, and *proportionate* share in what has been procured or produced. Retributive Justice directs that good conduct should be rewarded, according to the service rendered; and evil conduct be punished, according to the injury done. But it does not forbid benefits which are not deserved, nor demand deserved suffering, unless this is required by the general

* Nothing is fair, equitable, and just in the conduct of one to another, which he would not be willing should be done by another to him. Nothing can be right for one, which would be wrong for another in the same condition. Nothing is right which requires concealment from those most concerned, and is contrary to the confidence which has been sought and obtained.

welfare.* In both, what is *morally* proper and equitable, rests on some *natural* equality or proportion. This is generally definite and manifest. Men know *exactly* what *justice* demands of them, but not what *gratitude*, *compassion*, and *benevolence* require; and the demands of *justice* are known by others. He who is *just* is known to be so; and by his example maintains the virtue which is fundamental to society. He who is unjust is known to be unjust; and his moral influence is worse than a material injury. The peace and prosperity of society are impossible, if *justice* is not maintained. A little dishonesty may cause very little material harm to any one; but it causes to society an injury greater than can be measured. Justice is never estimated by the gain it secures to any one; nor *injustice* by the loss it causes. Fairness is demanded of all and by all, and unfairness condemned. In some matters the claims of Justice are universally acknowledged, and they who disregard them are the outcasts of society; but in other matters there is much inconsiderate injustice. Justice refers to words as well as to actions, to reputation as well as to property, to mental as well as to bodily feelings. They who are truly just render to all their *dues*, in things little and great, in what is required by law and custom, and in what is not so enforced.

3. No human society can exist without some Rights, and their recognition must precede their observance. Custom confirms natural *rights*, but does not create them. All persons see and feel that they have some *rights*, which are to

* "Punishment is not simply because wrong has been done. He who with reason undertakes to punish, takes vengeance, not on account of the wrong deed that is past,—for that which was done cannot be undone,—but for the sake of the future, that this man may not again act wrongly himself, nor another seeing this one punished."—PLATO, *Prot.* 39.

be respected by others; and that the violation of these *rights* is a greater wrong to individuals and to the community, than any loss or hurt in which there is no injustice. Men see and feel what is just and unjust; they know that justice is for the good of all; therefore the choice of that which is just, rather than what is unjust, must always be morally right. Equality may be *objective* or *subjective*. In distribution, the measures may be equal themselves, or in *relation* to the recipients. So in retribution, the rewards and punishments may be equal in themselves, or relatively.

4. The special obligation of Justice, arises from various causes. The *definiteness* of what is just and unjust in action, makes the apprehension of moral right and wrong peculiarly clear and strong to every agent. The *manifestness* to others of the moral character of just and unjust actions, causes a peculiar sense of right or wrong in those who are benefited or injured; and a general sympathy, which strengthens all that is declared by the conscience of an individual; and adds to this the approval or disapproval of others. The moral character being evident to all, has its moral influence on all. Just actions, because known by others, promote justice, and unjust actions promote injustice. The material consequences may be uncertain and small, the moral are sure and immeasurably great. It is chiefly on this ground, that Justice is held to have the highest place among the Virtues, though the merely just man is not much commended. Nothing unjust is to be done from Gratitude or Compassion or Benevolence. Apparent injustice may be right, but very rarely; and real injustice never is.

10. Veracity.

VERACITY is primarily one form of Justice, having respect to the use of signs in human intercourse. Like other social virtues, it may become independent of any regard to the

rights of others, and be maintained as inherently proper ; but the reason and measure of its obligation, are in the relation of human beings to one another. Truth in speech and action is due from man to man, and especially where there is any trust. Fancies may be more pleasant than facts, but no one likes to be deceived. Deception is felt by all to be painful and degrading ; it is an injury to the individual and to others, not only by the loss and hurt it causes, but still more by lessening the mutual confidence which is the bond of society, without which all human intercourse becomes unpleasant and unprofitable. The reality, excellence, and usefulness of Truth, are discerned by human intelligence ; and according to its exercise, is the estimate of the worth and importance of Truthfulness, in things great and small, for ourselves and for others. Falsehood is expected in a foe, but not in others ; and the measure of its *injustice*, is the confidence that is violated, more than the mischief that is caused. There can be no *injustice* in deception, where no rights are violated, as with animals, mad men and criminals. But all persons sane and innocent have natural rights, which are violated by deception, as well as by dishonesty and violence. Truthfulness is pleasant and profitable, to the individual and society ; and it is *proper*, being according to the higher faculties of men, and their social relations. It is also esteemed because its absence shows weakness, cowardice, and selfishness. In every family and village, in every city and state, those who are most truthful are most trusted and honoured. They are respected for their character, apart from any consideration of consequent advantages. They whose words are always sure,—whose promises are never broken, whose contracts are invariably fulfilled, whose practice ever agrees with their professions,—are esteemed for their Truthfulness, when not distinguished by other virtues ; but generally this one virtue is associated with a *similar* regard to other virtues that are equally Manly.

They who would give to others only what is True, must seek this in all their judgments. If not Truthful for themselves, they cannot be so for others.*

* The four Cardinal Virtues,—first distinguished by Plato, adopted by Augustine, and generally maintained—are Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, Justice. Benevolence is thus included in Justice, good-will being due from one to another. This division is too general to be of much use, and it is not according to any one principle. The first refers to Intelligence, the second to Pleasure, the third to Pain, the fourth to Society. Wisdom is not a single Virtue, but the source of all, or any one, referred to the exercise of intelligence. It is knowledge ruling; and therefore it includes all that concerns conduct, and only this. A wise man may be ignorant of many things, but he knows what is to be done, how, and why; and he tries to do it.

CHAPTER III.

SPECIAL VICES.

VICES are contrary to Virtues, and though they do not deserve the same attention, they require some consideration. All objects are most fully known when what is opposite to them is also known; and we have both to seek for what is good, and to guard against what is evil. Vices as well as Virtues presuppose the higher faculties of human beings, for the conduct that is deemed *vicious* in Man, is not so regarded in animals. It is according to their nature, but it is not according to his. He knows better, and could do better; and therefore Vice has a badness and wrong, of which men are capable, but brutes incapable. Vices are pleasant for a while, but they soon cause more and greater pain; and they have some advantages, but afterwards more and greater disadvantages. If it were not for present gratification, or expected gain, none would be vicious. Vice is the choice of what is known to be the worse, instead of the choice of what is known to be better. Where there is helpless ignorance and incapacity, there is merely a *natural* ill; but this when voluntary becomes a *moral* evil.

1. IMPRUDENCE is the neglect of Prudence, and must cause the loss of all the benefits, which consideration and forethought could have secured. In addition to this, are the *dissatisfaction* and *disgrace*, which are sure to come, when

neglected faculties and opportunities are remembered, and the future has become present.

2. **INDOLENCE** is the contrary to Industry, and must cause the loss of all the benefits, which would have been obtained by steady and well-directed efforts. Besides this, there are the lessened disposition and capacity for useful exertion; and the painful conviction that manifold privations and pains have been produced, by a preference of transient ease and self-indulgence, to the pursuit and possession of the better objects, which might have been sought for and gained.

3. **INTEMPERANCE** is the opposite to Temperance, and takes away the health and strength, the peace and purity, which attend the control of all appetites and passions. All kinds of licentiousness enfeeble, degrade, and defile. The pursuit of *pleasure* as the chief good, of mental *excitement* as a means of gratification, are as hurtful as the grosser forms of intemperance.

As human intelligence and affection are incomparably superior to animal instincts and propensities, there must be loss and injury to body and soul, in oneself and others, when the latter are allowed to govern human conduct, in opposition to the former. This choice is manifestly unmanly, for it is brutish. The violation of Chastity is an injury to the soul; it involves deception and falsehood, and is the greatest injustice and cruelty not to one only, but to many.

4. **COWARDICE**, or the want of Courage, takes away all the advantages of self-possession and self-direction. It increases opposition and danger, unfits for self-defence, and for the help of others. Unwillingness to encounter personal danger for the benefit of others, is often a selfish prudence; but cowardice is imprudence, and is the consequence of the habitual neglect of self-control. It is a fault which excites the

contempt of all, men and women and children. Valour has been regarded as a virtue by the most degraded; not because it is useful to others when hurtful to oneself, but because it is seen and felt to be proper to all, who have the intelligence and ability which are common to men.

The Vices which are primarily and principally hurtful to oneself, naturally excite Contempt; those which directly affect the welfare and rights of others, as naturally arouse Indignation.

5. **INGRATITUDE** is not natural, utter insensibility to manifest kindness is never found in children, and seldom in men or women. There may be unwillingness to make the proper or expected return, to do all that is desired; but some acknowledgment is willingly made. By habitual sensuality and selfishness, men make themselves indifferent to the greatest kindness; and the hearts of fathers and mothers may be broken by the ingratitude of their children. But this is so unnatural, as to rouse the indignation of strangers. Law cannot produce gratitude, but it sometimes enforces the expression—the return due to kindness; and society stamps with ignominy notorious indifference to benefactors. The pain caused by ingratitude is the greatest that human hearts experience; and no regrets are more bitter than those which it inflicts, when there is any restoration of natural affection.

6. **INHUMANITY** is the absence of Compassion, when the sufferings of others are obvious, and some relief may be easily given. They who will give no aid to others seen to be perishing from want or sickness, from fire or water, are deemed inhuman. They too are inhuman who, for the excitement of suspense and strife, can enjoy the spectacle of painful struggles and terrible sufferings. It is natural to desire the decrease of the pains of others, and not their *increase*; their speedy termination, and not their continu-

ance; and the reverse is not natural. The indignation of society is the natural punishment of great and manifest inhumanity; and to those who show no pity, no pity is shown.

Indifference to the sufferings of others, is often the effect of inconsideration. Animals and men are not thought of as sensitive beings, capable of suffering; but merely as the occasions of amusement, enjoyment, gain or advantage. Anger and resentment often lead to an utter regardlessness of the pains of others. So the pleasure connected with the exercise of power, or with any supposed good, may be alone regarded; and there may be in consequence entire indifference to the feelings of others. Suffering sometimes causes selfishness, and in sickness of body or mind, persons often seek only their own relief, unmindful of all the pain and trouble they cause to others.

Often thoughtlessly that is said and done before others, which tends to moral deterioration. No greater injury is possible, than that which lowers the moral character; and it is a poor excuse, that such injury was not intended or thought of. It ought to have been considered and avoided.

Grief is caused by any loss or suffering; Anger by voluntary actions, causing opposition and hurt; Resentment by adverse intentions, continued hostility; Indignation by moral wrong. These are right on some occasions, in some measure, with some expression; but all are wrong when excessive, misdirected, the causes of needless pain and injury.

7. **MALEVOLENCE** is still worse, being a desire for the ill of others, a delight in their pain. As Benevolence is natural, so the contrary is unnatural. It is not common, but it is produced by many associations of one's own pleasure with the ill of another; and the habitual disregard of every

thing but self-gratification. It is monstrous to all but the most selfish.

8. DISRESPECTFULNESS is the indisposition to recognise in others, what should be respected. It appears in two forms which are the same in nature, the one referring to superiors, the other to inferiors. Insolence, the want of respect for superiors, is always judged to be wrong, and the habit is a Vice censured by all. To show no respect to age and wisdom, to more than common ability and goodness, to those who by station and authority are representatives of law and order,—the leaders, rulers, judges of a people,—is manifest folly and wrong. The want of respect for inferiors is more generally called Arrogance and Pride. Pride, as a social offence, is not merely thinking too highly of oneself, and claiming more than is deserved; but it is the withholding from others the respect which is due to them. The proud are always more or less indifferent to the claims of others, and thus cause pain and injury to many. All these Vices, like the contrary Virtues, belong to mental dispositions, which cannot be repressed by law. The two other vices have a definite expression, and refer chiefly to conduct. They often admit of forcible restraint, being illegal as well as immoral.

9. INJUSTICE is a violation of the Rights of others, respecting personal safety and liberty, the security of property and reputation. Some such rights are universally acknowledged, they are prescribed by law, sustained by penalties. The wrong done by any act of injustice is fully known and felt by the sufferer, and the judgments and sentiments of many support and confirm those of the injured person. Injustice breaks through the restraints of law, and does a public as well as a personal injury, for the sake of some supposed *private* advantage. Injustice tends to the subversion of

society, to the destruction by fraud or violence of all the benefits of human association. The injury done to many, by acts of dishonesty and injustice, cannot be excused by the benefit which may be gained by the wrong doer, or given by him to a few. Rights of every kind may be forfeited by crime; but when not thus lost, they are to be always respected; for the safety and welfare of the whole community, the good of all. Therefore criminals are the objects of a just and universal indignation, which requires punishment, though it does not prevent pity. The violation of law—rebellion against those in authority—has the nature of Injustice. There is dishonour to the supreme authority, and injury, it may be very great, to all whose welfare depends on the maintenance of Law and Justice and Order. The obligations to obedience are not limited to what individuals would deem best; for there would be no government, if each might do what was right in his own eyes. But public obligations rest on the general welfare, for which all Rulers are appointed. If they perform no useful service to the community, they have no rightful claim to submission. And if they enjoin the practice or promotion of wickedness, no obedience can be for the general good. “We ought to obey God rather than men.”

10. **UNTRUTHFULNESS** is Injustice. Human rights are violated by false statements, as well as by broken contracts and promises. More real hurt and injury may be done by words, than by acts of violence; and untrue sayings, when outwardly harmless, are often most mischievous and pernicious. Falsehood is sometimes practised, not with any purpose to injure any one, but simply for self-exaltation; from a desire to be thought of more highly than is true, to be esteemed richer, wiser, better. Excessive regard to appearances, and to the opinions of others, belong to *vain* persons, and the name testifies to their usual emptiness,

hollowness, and superficiality. Vanity is a foolish delight in admiration, whether deserved or not; and is often associated with meanness and falsehood. Pride and vanity are different vices, the former showing too little regard to the feelings of others, and the other too much regard to their opinions. Untruthfulness is condemned as unjust; and it is the more despised and censured, because of its common connection with weakness, carelessness, and cowardice.

CHAPTER IV.

SEVERAL important truths appear in the preceding survey of virtues and vices.

1. It is quite clear and certain, that there is some Moral Character in all men, which they discern in themselves and in others. This character appears in habitual actions, and though not unchangeable, it continues the same under great outward changes.

Personal welfare, and social influence, depend chiefly on character. What a man is and does, is more important to himself and others, than any position or possessions. This is the common experience and acknowledgment of mankind. All virtues and all vices are voluntary habits; and the former are more beneficial to the individual and society than any other causes, and the latter are more injurious. Both are pleasant, but the pleasures of the former remain, while those of the latter soon pass away. These are facts which are unquestionable, and universally acknowledged. Virtuous actions may be painful and unprofitable, and vicious actions pleasant and profitable; but it is never so with the *dispositions* and *habits*. A virtuous character is always the best for each and for all; and a vicious character is the worst.

2. But the pleasures and advantages of *good* dispositions and habits, and the pains and disadvantages of those which

are *bad*, are not the only things to be regarded. These are evident in common experience, without any consideration of the capacities of human beings; and they are the first lessons which are learnt. But when there is any reflection on human nature, more is directly known. Some actions are seen to be good for all, and to agree with the intelligence, affection, and ability, which distinguish all human beings from the brutes; while others are seen to be bad for all, and to be contrary to these higher endowments. The *choosing* the former is *morally* right—Virtue; and the *choosing* the latter is *morally* wrong—Vice. When *actions* are chosen, without any knowledge of what is proper or improper for human beings, they have no moral quality. But after early childhood, there can be no habitual actions, without some knowledge of what is properly *human*, or the contrary. Right conduct is not habitually chosen, without a conscious preference of what is morally right; nor wrong conduct, without a conscious preference of what is morally wrong. No one is censured by himself or others for any wrong conduct, but on the ground that he knew better, and might have chosen it.

3. Lower principles are too often allowed to determine human conduct; but this is no proof that higher principles do not exist in men's minds, and are not universally acknowledged. Little children, and the lowest of mankind, show that there is something nobler and better in human nature, than the appetites and propensities which are common to the brutes; or the mental desires that respect self only. What is *virtuous* is preferred by all, when it is equally easy, pleasant, and advantageous; and by most, when it is not difficult, painful, and attended with some apparent loss. The affectation of any virtue is despised, but not the reality. Prudence, Industry, Temperance, and Courage, are seen to be good for men—good in themselves, and in their con-

sequences ; and so are Gratitude, Compassion, Benevolence, Respectfulness, Justice, and Truthfulness. They belong to the higher nature of Man, and are beneficial to all. Character is known only by habitual actions, as a tree is known by its fruit ; and character has a greater worth and importance than any single actions, as a vine is more precious than any cluster of grapes, an oak superior to its branches.

4. The knowledge of some virtues and vices is enough to show, with absolute certainty, that Moral right and wrong are not human fancies, but the most important realities.

Some knowledge of distance and magnitude is requisite, before we can ask and answer the questions, Is it near or far off ? large or small ? And so some *general* knowledge of moral right and wrong, commonly precedes what is particular. We ask respecting conduct, Is it right, or is it wrong ? because we know that it may be one or the other ; and that other inquiries respecting actions are of less moment than this.

It must be reasonable, and right, to seek after and choose the best that can be known ; to use all our faculties, especially the highest ; to prefer the greater to the less, the higher to the lower, the noble to the base ; to choose that which is known certainly and intuitively to be right and good ; which gives inward strength and health and joy, is approved by the wisest and best, and is more sure of permanent advantages than any other. It may surely be said of such choice that it is *fitting* and *proper* and *good* ; and that the contrary choice must be unbecoming, unreasonable, and wrong ; contrary to Nature, because contrary to what is highest and best.

5. It is quite true that none would ever prefer vice to virtue, what is morally wrong to what is morally right, if they knew and considered what these really are. But ignorance and inconsideration are more or less voluntary. All wrong is not the result of ignorance; for if there were no knowledge of good and evil, there could be no moral wrong in any conduct.

If the best possible for mankind were *right actions*, apart from motives and dispositions,—as the best thing for a watch is correct movement,—the whole system of the world would doubtless be different from what it is. Virtue would be less difficult, and vice less seductive; right would be fully and immediately rewarded, and wrong punished; no voluntary attention to motives would be required, but their consideration would be compelled. All would act rightly, if this were as easy as to raise the arm; none would do wrong, if it brought pain as quickly as when the hand is put into the fire. But in such a state there would only be mechanical or animal correctness, instead of moral and human rectitude. Some difficulty and danger are apparently necessary for the highest good; and the prize is worth the cost.

6. What is Morally good is not so because it is commanded, but it is commanded because it is good. And what is Morally bad is not so because it is forbidden, but it is forbidden because it is bad. The goodness and badness of things, and the right and wrong of actions, may be shown in objects, or stated in words. Instruction is both *real* and *verbal*; and the first is necessary for the second, by which it is enlarged and corrected. The rewards of good conduct, and the punishments of bad conduct, are not arbitrary; they come from the nature of outward objects, and the nature of human souls. Morality cannot be taught by any language, and general precepts and prohibitions can be of use, only as *they* are explained and enforced, by the presentation of the

real objects in which moral good and evil, right and wrong, are to be seen and felt.*

* A few passages in the Bible may seem to declare that God is the author of *evil*, as well as of *good*; but it is not so. It is nowhere taught that He produces the *sin* He prohibits, or hardens the hearts of men *lest* they should repent. It is impossible He should command that something should not be done, and then Himself absolutely cause it to be done. The *evil* which he is said to create, is natural *ill*, not moral *evil*. He makes light and darkness, prosperity and adversity; and overrules all events and actions. But there is that which is contrary to His will, as well as that which is according to it; all being ultimately subservient to the good He has chosen. The Hebrew *points*, which represent God as causing the evil forbidden, have little authority; they are not followed in the Septuagint or the New Testament. (Isaiah vi. 10, Matt. xiii. 15.) Men are represented as hardening their own hearts, before God hardens them. There is first a voluntary disregard of truth and opposition to right, this is *sin*; and then there is involuntary blindness and insensibility, this is *punishment*. In the quotation by S. John, the *people* collectively are the subject at the beginning of the sentence, "They have blinded their eyes," and God is the subject at the close, "I will heal them." (John xii. 40.) Evil is *permitted*, because it is to be overruled for Good; but for this end it must be resisted and overcome; as contrary to the will of God, in its existence, as well as in its continuance. "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil." (Isaiah v. 20.)

DIVISION III.

CONSCIENCE.

CHAPTER I.

ITS NATURE AND ORIGIN.

1. CONSCIENCE is the capacity of knowing what is *morally* right and wrong. As in the knowledge of *material* objects, feeling and perceiving are combined, so it is with *moral* objects. Moral sentiments and perceptions are always associated, though in different proportions; sometimes what is *seen* being the chief thing, and sometimes what is *felt*. In present use, Conscience is distinguished from Consciousness, though formerly in English, as in most languages, the same name has been employed for both. (Conscientia, Συνείδησις.) Consciousness is the *direct* knowledge of every kind which respects *oneself* alone. Conscience respects only that which is *moral*; but it includes that which is *indirectly* known, and therefore respects *others* as well as *oneself*. As there is no Consciousness of *vision*, without the presentation to the eye of something visible; so there can be no consciousness of Conscience, without the presentation to the mind of some Moral object. Conscience is a Mental Faculty having its special objects, and may or not be exercised. Consciousness is not a faculty, but necessarily belongs to the exercise of all.

2. The first Moral apprehensions must respect ourselves. *There could be no knowledge of the pain and pleasure of*

others, without a previous experience of these feelings ; and so there could be no knowledge of the *right* and *wrong* of others, without a prior consciousness of *right* and *wrong* in ourselves. But though the primary knowledge of moral right and wrong must come from within, many judgments respecting right and wrong refer primarily to the conduct of others. More attention is naturally given to outward, than to inward objects. The conduct of others towards us is more considered, than our conduct towards them ; and what we expect from them is more thought of, than what they expect from us. Men commonly recognise what is wrong in others, more readily than what is wrong in themselves ; and will sincerely condemn in others, what they have done without any self-condemnation. Conscience begins with some judgment of ourselves, but it is enlarged and improved by our own judgment on others, as well as by their judgment on us. Because of the similar nature of all human beings, the same moral judgments are extended to all, with only those differences which belong to differences in capacity and condition.

What is morally right for *one* is so for *another* ; and therefore we can often see most surely what is right for ourselves, by supposing the disposition and conduct to be that of another. What is right for *one* is right for *all* ; and therefore every judgment respecting ourselves, may be tested by making the statement *universal*. But these changes only serve to remove the influences of prejudice, passion, and partiality, which often obscure and pervert what we think of ourselves. The first knowledge of right and wrong must come from within ; and the references to others only help to the full and correct discernment of what is in ourselves.

3. Feelings belong to Conscience, and these correspond to the peculiar objects it regards,—the Moral right and wrong

which are in ourselves and others. Approbation and Disapprobation are not simply intellectual states, there is some special sensibility. The *sentiments* which are felt on the consideration of *virtue* and *vice*, differ from any feelings with which we regard what is merely pleasant or painful, advantageous or disadvantageous. The *approval* felt for a flower, a tool, a house, is not the *approbation* felt for the good conduct of a human being. With the *sentiments* that are exclusively moral, other feelings are associated in various degrees. There is a natural tendency to express in speech and action, the approbation felt for any conduct that is unusually good, and the disapprobation felt for that which is unusually bad. Every one wishes that great courage and generosity should be honoured and rewarded; and that treachery and cruelty should be punished. Some desires to join in the reward of what is morally right, and in the punishment of what is morally wrong, are commonly felt. Without any thought of private or public profit, these desires are excited. They are natural instincts, not to be taken as the proper rules of action; but prompting to that, which experience and reason show to be generally beneficial to all.

The sentiments with which we regard the good and bad conduct of others, are equally natural and proper for our own conduct. Where there is the consciousness of right, there is a degree of complacency and satisfaction, which is both pleasant and salutary; and where there is consciousness of wrong, there is a degree of dissatisfaction and remorse, which is painful, but may be beneficial. No pains of body, or distresses of mind, are so dreadful as the anguish of remorse sometimes is. The self-censure of a guilty conscience is intensified by sympathy and fear; and often drives to confession, to voluntary suffering, to a surrender to public justice; as the only compensation which can be made for *past* wrong, the only evidence of a true repentance.

4. Conscience is a form of Intelligence, as well as sensibility, and this part of its nature is also to be considered. Moral right and wrong are seen only in voluntary dispositions and actions. These are chosen, being directly or indirectly subject to the will, the conscious self. The moral quality of actions is seen, only when there is some consideration of the capacity of the agent, and some comparison of choice with capacity. In these agreement and disagreement are sometimes perceived intuitively. When there is agreement, moral *right* is seen; and when there is opposition, moral *wrong* is seen. The right and the wrong are peculiar, different from all other right and wrong, because they belong to the Will, and to the relation of conduct to capacity. A larger measure of intelligence is requisite for comparing capacity with choice, than is necessary for most other perceptions and comparisons; but this is all. Much moral right and wrong are seen only with voluntary reflection, but some are perceived without this. Men cannot act without some knowledge of what they do, and often they have unwillingly the consciousness that what they do is contrary to what they could do, and ought to do. It is seen to be contrary to their welfare, and to their higher and better nature. They could not know anything of this higher and better nature, if they had not some knowledge of the consequences of actions to themselves and others. But these consequences belong to the future, and are generally more or less uncertain. Conscience regards the capabilities of the individual, and the expected consequences of actions. The moral right is the agreement of choice with capacity, and the moral wrong is the contrary; and they are the same, whatever the consequences may be. This is a present certainty. It is as sure as any other intuition; and it cannot be changed by any future event.

5. For the perception of Moral qualities, the objects to which they belong must be presented to an adequate intelli-

gence. The right and wrong are not made by the mind that perceives them, but pre-exist in the objects ; and must be the same for all. A circle and a square are such, to all who know what they are. Things really equal or unequal are perceived to be so, because they are so ; and they cannot be known to be not so. If nothing were ever seen to be morally right or wrong, and all apparent perceptions were delusions, there could be no Moral Science. But if there is a real difference between what is voluntary and what is involuntary, and men are superior to brutes, then the agreement of their conduct with their higher nature and real welfare, or the contrary, cannot but be in some things real and manifest ; and what is intuitive in Morals gives the foundation for Moral Science, as what is intuitive in Nature is fundamental to all Natural Science.

6. That Conscience is a present reality is shown by the experience of all men, the good and the bad. If its perceptions and sentiments are peculiar, they must belong to the very nature of Man. If different from all other perceptions and feelings, they cannot be derived from them. Merely *natural* perceptions and feelings come first, without any reflection ; and *moral* perceptions and feelings come after, with reflection. The earlier precede the later, but they do not produce them. Sensations precede thoughts, and thoughts precede beliefs, and beliefs precede desires, and common feelings precede the affections which are felt for human beings. Each subsequent condition shows something more of the mind, the Self, than could possibly be known or conjectured from the preceding. It is the same with Conscience, the last known and the highest of human capacities, which pre-supposes and includes all the others, being for their direction and control.

7. It has been said that Association, Sympathy, and

Authority, are sufficient to account for all moral experiences; and show that Conscience is no part of our original constitution. This opinion comes from disregarding the peculiar nature of moral objects and feelings; and from attributing to association, sympathy, and authority, a power which no experience has ever shown. They who suppose that thought and belief are only material forms, and that desire and affection are only molecular movements, will suppose that Morality also is a property of Matter; but those who admit any spiritual nature in Man, find it most manifest in that which pertains to the Conscience. They who suppose that nothing is directly known but the conscious states of a single self, will of course suppose that all knowledge of right and wrong is entirely subjective, and without any objective certainty; but those who admit that some objective realities are surely known, find the same evidence for the reality of moral and natural objects. The body is as real as the clothes, though their nature is not the same; and the soul is as real as the body. Acts of thinking and choosing are known in the same way as sensations and motions of the body, by consciousness; and the Faculties of thinking and choosing are known with the same certainty as any natural powers. Character is as real as any substance; and the agreement and disagreement of abilities and actions, are as real as the equality and inequality of things that may be measured and weighed. If any external objects are known to exist, it is because of the properties they really have, and the capacity we have of knowing them. No change in our feelings could make the *whole* to be not greater than a *part*; or the right to be not better than the wrong.

8. Association, Sympathy, and Authority have a great influence on the minds of men, generally beneficial, sometimes injurious; but always confined within evident limits. Association and Authority transfer beliefs from one object to

another, and Sympathy intensifies feelings of every kind ; but they originate nothing. Through *association* a distance which is not real may be *believed*, but only when some distance has been already perceived. Association cannot give colour to the blind, or sound to the deaf. Authority may direct the exercise of faculties, but it can produce none. No one sees or hears, because commanded to see or hear. Faculties are strengthened and improved by exercise, but never self-formed. Men improve in work and walking by practice, but they never gain hands by work, or feet by walking. They do not acquire eyes by trying to see, or ears by trying to hear. The sympathy of the blind with the blind has never caused any to see ; nor has the sympathy of the deaf with the deaf ever caused any to hear. Persons may be liked through their connection with things that are *liked* ; but they are not therefore *loved*. They may be valued as *useful* through associations of advantage ; but they are not therefore *respected*. No associations of pleasure and pain, of profit and loss, can give any knowledge of the right and wrong which Conscience discerns. No authority can enable any one to *approve* or *disapprove* ; except as it is *evidence* that there is the moral good or evil, of which something is already known. When some things are *felt* to be pleasant and painful, other things will be *believed* to be so ; and so when some are *directly* known to be good and evil, others will be *believed* to be the same. Moral sentiments and perceptions are transferred by Association, and increased by Sympathy. Men approve and condemn more strongly, when others feel with them ; but it is because a measure of feeling already exists that it is increased by sympathy. All good dispositions and affections are confirmed and strengthened by sympathy with the good ; and the bad are fixed and increased by sympathy with the bad. We believe *as* others, and then more firmly because they believe ; and so we feel *as* others, and then more strongly because they feel.

9. But if these *supposed* causes of Moral perceptions and sentiments had all the power attributed to them, experience shows that they are not the *real* causes. There may be always some associations, authority, and sympathy, when there are moral perceptions and sentiments; but there may be all the former without the latter; and the measure of the one is never that of the other. Considerations of pleasure and profit, may be some occasion and excuse for wrong conduct, but they cannot make it morally right. Our convictions of duty are not strengthened by anticipating what will be gained by it; but by remembering what is due to ourselves and others. Honest men and women are insulted by the supposition, that their conduct is regulated chiefly by a calculation of consequences, what they are to gain or lose. Children when capable of knowing *character*, make this their rule of judgment. They know what is noble, just, kind,—what is mean, unfair, selfish,—before they know the remote results of actions; and they know the differences of character as well as men do, though they know much less of consequences. Therefore the judgments of children, in respect to moral principles, are often true, however small their experience may be. The supposition that what cannot be accomplished in men's minds by their individual experience, may be inherited from many previous generations, is an admission of the insufficiency of the causes once maintained; and can pretend to no support from any real experience in the history of mankind. Some knowledge of moral right and wrong is universal, though it may be very imperfect, often erroneous. It appears in all ages of the world, in all countries, in all classes and conditions. One organ of the body never produces another, and one faculty of mind never produces another; though one may be first known, and give occasion to the exercise of the other. We see objects before we put them in our mouths, but seeing does not give the sense of taste. We

know actions to be pleasant or painful, before we consider the motives for choosing them, and know them to be morally right or wrong; but the later perceptions and feelings are different from the earlier, and not less real. They show another and higher capacity, and are manifestations of Conscience; the Moral faculty being known, whenever any Moral perceptions and sentiments are known. It is one thing to say, that an action is *pleasant*, or *profitable*; that it is *beneficial* to some or many or all: and a different thing to say, that it is *right*, *obligatory*, *approved* by the Consciences of all men. The last fact is *additional* to all the others.

10. CONSCIENCE has its Laws, similar to those of the Senses, Memory, Desires, Affections; and all other mental capacities and natural objects. These are Natural Laws, real, or verbal, generalizations. They show what *is*, not what *must* be, or *ought* to be.

Besides these there are Laws, which may be distinguished as Ethical, similar to the *necessary* truths of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Logic. These refer to abstractions; and so Ethical Laws refer to *abstractions*, formed from the *objects* of Moral perception.

Moral Laws, as the expression is commonly used, are different from the *natural* and *necessary*; and like the Laws of any country or society. They state what is required, what *ought* to be, not what *is*; they are expressions of *duty*, not of *fact*. These three kinds of Law are often confounded, but should always be distinguished. The first refer to *facts*, the second to *necessity*, the third to *duty*.

CHAPTER II.

ATTRIBUTES OF CONSCIENCE.

1. CONSCIENCE is said to be Indicative, because it shows some moral right and wrong. It often gives an intuitive knowledge of the moral quality of what we have chosen, or are about to choose. Conscience does not discern the natural qualities and relations of actions, whether or not they are pleasant and profitable—good for ourselves or others. But this being known or believed, Conscience sees and shows that the choice of such actions is morally right or wrong—that they *ought* to be chosen or rejected. The judgment on what is natural, may respect the future, may depend much on what others think and say, may be only probable, and may prove to be erroneous. But the primary judgment on what is moral respects what is present to the mind—the choice of actions remembered or anticipated. We perceive intuitively that such choice is morally right or wrong; no help of others is needed to know that which we directly perceive in ourselves. When the intuitions of Conscience are clear and complete, there can be no uncertainty or change; but when they are obscure and incomplete, there is uncertainty, and further consideration may lead to another judgment respecting ourselves. No new information respecting natural things can at all affect primary moral judgments; but they are altered, when reflection shows the influence of motives to be different from what was at first supposed.

Moral judgments are *inferential* as well as *intuitional*. Many

things are morally right, because they are naturally useful ; but the morality is not an inference from the expediency alone. Moral *inferences* are from moral *intuitions*, when the actions are judged to be right, because they are like others seen to be right. They are like in that which belongs to the moral character ; though from inward and outward conditions, the right and wrong are more readily perceived in some cases than in others. Conscience tells us to be prudent, compassionate, and just ; but does not show what actions will be most beneficial to ourselves and others ; this must be learnt from experience and common-sense. Morality has its axioms as Mathematics, gained and generalised in a similar way. There are abstract moral propositions, absolutely certain, universal, immutable as the Mathematical ; but the application of both gives only approximations to certainty. This is all that human faculties can reach, and all that human welfare requires.

2. Conscience is Attractive, because it draws to what is best, showing the joy, beauty, and nobleness of Virtue, of all moral goodness. It first speaks in gentle whispers, and invites to what is lovely and good ; and not till the "still small voice" is disregarded, is any thunder heard. It points to "ways of pleasantness and peace," and calls to the pursuit of imperishable excellence and honour. It encourages to all that is noble, directing to what is difficult but not impossible, arduous but not inaccessible. It allures by the promise of successful labour, and victorious strife. It invigorates for strenuous and persevering exertion in every good cause, increasing the charm of every pure emotion, and the preciousness and power of every right desire and affection. It gives dignity and glory to the smallest actions, and to the lowest service. There is nothing in human experience more beautiful than Virtue, *nothing* nobler than Duty, nothing more satisfactory

and enduring than the testimony of a good Conscience. This has the consenting approbation of the good ; and of that Judgment which is always true, all-seeing, ever present, and over all.

3. Conscience is Imperative. It speaks to command and threaten, as well as to invite and persuade. The clearest and strongest moral apprehensions respect what is hurtful to others ; and the prohibitions of Conscience are heard in the hearts of all. Thou shalt not kill—Thou shalt not commit adultery—Thou shalt not steal—Thou shalt not bear false witness—Thou shalt not seek to make thy own what belongs to another,—were written in men's minds, before they were engraved on stone. Negative precepts are the most definite and sure, they are supported by the resentment and indignation which their violation at once excites, when there is any impartial consideration. They who can do no good to others, can abstain from doing ill. Men are not asked to accept prohibitions, requested and advised to observe them. Whether they like them or not, they must obey, or they will suffer as they deserve. There may be for a while concealment and impunity, but there will be certain retribution from within and without, if the prohibitions of Conscience are disregarded. This warning is given, to deter from evil ways those who will not listen to the counsel of Wisdom, and follow that which is good.*

* That Conscience *commands* some things and *forbids* others, is evident to all ; but it may be questioned, whether all the moral right shown is commanded. Parents do not always *command*, what they wish their children to do ; nor do masters always thus treat their servants. There are cases in which it is best to declare *will*, and require *submission*. But there are other cases in which it is best to show what is right, and to leave the choice of others free ; that it may not be done, simply or chiefly, because commanded, but from personal affection, and the perception of propriety. The highest excellence and service are thus secured. A command requires obedience *uncondition-*

4. Conscience is Retributive. There are few who have not felt at times the deep and quiet satisfaction of having done what is right, or sincerely striven to do so. This is better than any noisy mirth, any fame or honour; and more lasting than the pleasure belonging to any involuntary emotions or affections. A good conscience is its own reward. Joy in the consciousness of integrity, is the sunshine of the soul. Besides this, there are the peace, courage, and hope, which are its immediate fruits; and in addition the respect and confidence of others, with the outward success to which they contribute. On the other hand, there are few who have not felt the painful self-censure and contempt, which come with the consciousness of doing, or intending, what is morally wrong. The uneasiness and fearfulness of a guilty conscience will mar all the pleasures of life, and darken the brightest lot. The agony of remorse has often made life intolerable. The consciousness of guilt is attended with the apprehension of exposure and punishment, the conviction that what is wrong must be condemned also by others. The present misery thus produced is certain, even if the deserved and dreaded punishment should never come. It has been said, that the feeling of *demerit* comes wholly from the fear of *punishment*. But there may be the certain *expectation* of punishment, and the conviction that it is not *deserved*. In animals there is only the *fear* of punishment, but in men there is more. They know they have *deserved* punishment, and therefore they expect and fear it. The consciousness of ill desert is worse than any other punishment.

ally, but the presentation of good is simply a testimony that it is good, when chosen without command, though it might not be good, if chosen merely because commanded. Sympathy in goodness is better than submission to authority, more acceptable to the superior, and more profitable to the inferior; but neither can claim reward as earned by service. S. Paul said that a *necessity* was laid upon him to preach the Gospel, and that he was *free* to choose one way or another of *doing* this. But he disclaimed all thought of earning any reward.

CHAPTER III.

DIVERSITIES OF CONSCIENCE.

THE differences which are found in the Moral judgments and sentiments of men, have been supposed by some to show, that all result from outward influences ; and to disprove the originality and authority of Conscience. But similar differences appear in other exercises of intelligence. Men differ greatly in their estimates of the distance and magnitude of visible objects ; but all who are not blind see something, and know surely that there is some distance and some magnitude. So they differ greatly respecting moral right and wrong ; but all agree that certain actions are right, and that others are wrong. Some remembrances, and some inferences, are doubtful, but no one can believe that all are. Every sane person is sure of some past events, and of some natural conclusions ; and so they are equally certain of many moral intuitions and convictions. Men have the same faculty of Reason, though they do not use it in the same way, nor agree in their common judgments ; and they have the same faculty of Conscience, though they have very different moral judgments.

There are many manifest diversities in Conscience.

1. It may be active or inactive. If there be no reflection and little consideration, if the relation of conduct to

individual capacity and general welfare be not regarded, no Moral right or wrong will be perceived. If the pleasantness or unpleasantness of actions be alone considered, nothing is seen for approbation or disapprobation. Some voluntary reflection is generally requisite for the discernment of moral objects; and their qualities cannot be known if these are not attended to. Many material objects must be brought near to the senses, or their form and colour do not appear; and so many moral objects are imperceptible if they are not attentively considered. They who care for nothing but ease and enjoyment, gain and loss, look only to these things, and often see nothing more; but they who care for right and wrong, look to objects less obtrusive—to their own capacities and their relation to others; and then they at once discern some moral right and wrong. They who are properly conscientious seek after moral right. They do not ask respecting everything they say and do, Is this right? as they do not ask respecting every step they take, Is this safe? or respecting every morsel of food, Is this wholesome? The general superintendence of Prudence is always requisite, while more is sometimes hurtful rather than beneficial; and it is the same with the general superintendence of Conscience. There should be that habitual thoughtfulness which will secure our going in the proper way, and taking the proper food, and prevent a contrary action; and so there should be the consideration which will secure the choice of a right course of conduct, and preserve from what is morally wrong. He who is truly conscientious must be so habitually, in respect to things little and great, easy and difficult, pleasant and unpleasant. There will be a consideration of what is right and wrong, in health as well as in sickness, in regard to what is private and what is public, respecting those things in which the right is commonly regarded and honoured, and those in which it is neglected and despised. The perceptions of Conscience depend much on what men choose to consider,

and therefore many moral diversities are like the differences in what men see. Their eyes are alike, but they are directed to different objects.

2. Conscience may be comprehensive or partial. If it is good to be conscientious in some things, it is so in all. If right and wrong are to be considered in respect to some part of our nature, and some of our relations, they should be regarded in respect to the whole of our nature, and all our relations. If the just claims of some are to be respected, so are the similar claims of all. But it is very common that some duties should be carefully fulfilled, and others neglected. Men think of what is due to some, and not of what is due to others. They are mindful of the right and wrong which are seen without consideration, but know little or nothing of what is not to be seen without inquiry and reflection. Their attention is given to what is pleasant and profitable, and to what is brought before them in the conduct of associates, and then they see some right and wrong; but they give little attention to other things, and see not the right and wrong in them. Their own claims and interests seem large, as objects near; those of others seem small, as distant objects. When different sides of the same object are regarded, men see and judge differently in what is moral, as in what is natural.

3. Conscience may be quick and sensitive, or slow and obtuse. Quickness and slowness are often the same in mental and in moral apprehensions, the latter depending on the former. The judgment which respects only what is obvious and is readily seen, must differ from that which respects all that can be known by greater penetration or greater patience. Mental habits do much to help or hinder moral perceptions; and moral habits do much to help or hinder moral sentiments. They who come to the light, see more

and more ; and they who turn from the light, see less and less. They who obey Conscience, recognize its voice, while they become deaf who disregard it. All virtue becomes increasingly lovely, and all duty increasingly desirable, to those who do right ; while sin hardens the conscience, so that evil is preferred and chosen without shame or fear. Increase of perception and sensibility is some sign of improved health, but their decrease shows the progress of disease ; and entire insensibility leaves no hope of recovery. As it is with the Natural, so it is with the Moral.

4. Many differences in judgment and conduct have been taken to show diversities of Conscience, though there is the same exercise of the moral faculty—the same moral judgment—the cause of difference being simply intellectual. To give a patient some medicine, is judged morally right by one, and morally wrong by another ; but both agree that what is beneficial should be given. They differ physically, but not morally. In many cases all agree, that what is useful is to be done ; but they differ in their judgments respecting what is really useful to the individual and to society. They may be of one mind, that the will of God should be obeyed, but they think differently respecting this will—one supposing that to be required which another thinks is not required, or supposes to be forbidden. Most moral conclusions result from the combination of a moral principle with some supposed facts ; and there is certainty and agreement respecting the former, when there is uncertainty and difference respecting the latter. Thus great difference of judgment may show no diversity of Conscience, and this is not shown even by differences of conduct. Men often do that which their conscience forbids, and do not that which their conscience commands. Actions are the best proofs of *character*, for they show the principles allowed to prevail,

but they do not show those which are resisted, repressed, disregarded.*

* The theft, which was sanctioned by the laws of Sparta, was not taking from others what belonged only to them. The laws which gave the aged their *right* to what was placed on the table, gave the young their *right* to what they could take away unnoticed. They were chastised for the want of dexterity, not for dishonesty. Wherever infanticide, or patricide, have been deemed duties, they have been regarded as beneficial, preserving from future ill. Where human sacrifices, and the prostitution of women, have been regarded as *right*, they have been first supposed to be the will of some power that *ought* to be obeyed.

CHAPTER IV.

AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE.

1. CONSCIENCE is evidently the most comprehensive of the Mental Faculties. Others are but part of human nature, and respect only a limited portion of human welfare; but the knowledge of what is Morally Good and Right includes the whole of human nature and welfare, so far as they are known. All the senses, all the desires, all the several affections, are limited in their action and influence. Conscience both sees and shows what is apparently the Best for all; regarding the distant as well as the near, the future as well as the present. It is not the first of the Active Principles, nor the strongest, nor the most manifest, nor that most frequently exercised, nor that which gives most present enjoyment. But it is superior to all. Its place in human nature is the highest; and its influence on the character, the conduct, and condition of men, is most beneficial. It is good and does good, and occasions ill only when perverted and abused. It is not one of many desires and affections, which may alternately take the highest place, but it claims this as its due at all times. Others have the marks of uncertainty and limitation, this of certainty and universality. What Conscience shows to be right, is best for all. Its voice is that of Mankind, of Nature, of God.

2. But, like all other Faculties, its use and authority come from its whole object, and from its proper exercise. The

Eye has authority because of what is seen, and the Ear because of what is heard. The knowledge received by them is according to their structure, and the objects presented to them. It is the same with Conscience. The organs of themselves show nothing. Nothing is learnt of things to be seen and heard, by examining the organs of seeing and hearing. The utmost benefit thus obtained, is some correction or confirmation of the knowledge which comes through them. In like manner the study of Conscience is corrective and confirmatory; but it teaches nothing of itself. No examination of the Faculty, can show the nature and laws of Moral objects. There is no seeing or feeling, unless material objects are presented to the senses, and mental objects to the Mind; so there are no Moral perceptions and sentiments, unless Moral objects are presented and considered.

3. Conscience being receptive, its Authority comes less from what is *felt* than from what is *perceived*; and this depends chiefly on the manner in which it is exercised. Its supremacy results from its comprehensiveness, certainty, and universality, when properly used. But it does not follow, that all its dictates are *right*, and that whatever is thought to be a *duty* or *obligation*, is really *right*. The many contradictions and errors respecting *moral right*, show that it is not so. Men may think it a duty to revenge injuries, to vindicate honour by risking their own lives and the lives of others, to persecute those who hold different opinions; and some have believed, that in killing innocent persons they were serving God. There are some things in which the consciences of men always agree, and so far the testimony of Conscience is certain, and its authority unquestionable. But the great difference in men's moral judgments make it quite certain, that Conscience is no infallible rule or standard. Conscience requires primarily, that what is right should be

sought for; and has authority in other things, only as its first direction is followed.

4. Conscience is not to take the place of any natural principles, but to direct and control all. All require guidance and government, and cannot safely be left to themselves, for their proper expression and influence. No appetites give the rule for their indulgence; and no desires can be always gratified, without injury both to ourselves and to others. Resentment always needs to be restrained; and the best affections prompt, at times, to what would injure those whom we wish to benefit. Appetites, desires, and affections are all parts of human nature, and requisite to human welfare, for proper action and enjoyment; but their best use is taught by Experience. This shows the time and place, the manner and measure, best for each and for all. A good appetite, a noble desire, a disinterested affection, may often be accepted, both as motive and as rule. Feelings are sometimes better guides than calculations; and spontaneous actions, wiser and more beneficial than partial consideration. But the full use of Experience requires the exercise of Reflection, Reason, and Conscience. Conscience itself directs, that natural desires and affections should be cherished. They are good in themselves, better often than the actions to which they prompt. Good dispositions are the best security for good conduct; and give to it the highest worth.*

* Food is not so beneficial without an *appetite*, as with it; and therefore it is not to be taken simply as a *duty*, but the inclination is to be cherished and gratified. Knowledge is not so well pursued without a *desire*, as with it; and therefore it is not to be sought simply as a *duty*, but the *desire* is to be excited, that the pursuit may be successful. The good of others is not to be effected without benevolence, so fully as with it; and therefore beneficence is not to be practised merely as a *duty*; but kind affections are to be cultivated and exercised. The *affections* are themselves required by Conscience, as much as the *actions*; and even more, because they are themselves a greater good. A steers-

5. The regard to Self, involved in the exercise of Conscience, is always proper ; for it is not the pleasure of Self which is regarded. But the attention to Self may be misdirected and excessive, in the exercise of Conscience as well as in other actions. Subjective considerations may hinder those which are objective, and equally needful ; and needless attention to self will be a hindrance to right feeling and action.

Nothing is morally right, simply because commanded by Conscience, but it is commanded because it is right. Conscience has authority only so far as it is enlightened, and discerns what is true. The *use* of all faculties, of body and of mind, depends on their healthy condition and proper exercise. Prudence has no authority, but as it takes account of all that concerns individual welfare. Benevolence has no authority, but as it looks to the whole welfare of others. Conscience, in like manner, has authority, only so far as it considers all that may be known of the capacities and relations of those whose conduct is judged.

6. The Feelings of approbation and disapprobation may be transferred by Association to objects that have no moral character, and to those whose real character is the reverse of what is supposed. Where there is no consideration, or only that which is brief and partial, the apprehensions of Conscience are likely to be erroneous. When there is little care to avoid the influence of prejudice, passion, and partiality, the Judgment is not more to be trusted in respect to

man and an engineer do not supersede natural forces—wind, current, steam—but control and guide them. Every part of the body has its use, and so has every active principle. Conscience is to guide and govern all, but not to destroy any natural desires and affections. It secures the proper exercise of all, and adds to their worth. The same may be said of Religion. It is not to supersede natural desires and affections, but to direct all to the best ends ; and to add an excellence and permanence which Nature alone cannot give.

duty, than in respect to truth. It is the first duty of all, to seek to have an enlightened and purified Conscience; and when this has been neglected, it cannot be right to do all that seems to be Right.

7. The knowledge of what is Morally Right or Wrong may be increased or decreased, improved or injured, by Association, and by Authority. The first knowledge of Right and Wrong cannot be gained from others, but must come with personal experience, as the knowledge of colours and sounds, pleasures and pains. But association is equally necessary in what is moral and what is natural. As authoritative teaching is useful in some things, and unnecessary in others, so it is in Morals. Each person alone can know the real motives of his actions; but all may profit by the experience of others, respecting what is morally right or wrong, and respecting the way in which good may be gained and evil avoided. The testimony of those who are wise and good is some *evidence* of a good and evil, which may not be at first seen; but what if true for any is true for all men, will have its confirmation in the experience of all. Sympathy has the same importance in Moral Sentiments, that it has in all other desires and affections. They are increased in intensity and efficiency when shared with others.

8. Conscience is often spoken of as the voice of God. It is the faculty through which the highest instruction is given; but all other faculties are likewise His gifts, and what is learnt by their proper exercise is His teaching. What is received by seeing and hearing, comes to us from Him; and so what we find in Consciousness, is shown to us by Him; and what we gain by the exercise of Reason, on what is without us and within, comes from God. All we receive and gain, by the proper use of our mental *faculties*, should be referred to Him, as the source and

giver of all light and truth. But it is not the less necessary, that the signs by which instruction is given should be carefully considered; or we may attribute our own fancies and errors to the Divine Teacher. If our *faculties* are properly exercised, and all available *evidence* is duly considered, then the voice of Conscience is the voice of God; but not otherwise.

DIVISION IV.

MORAL JUDGMENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PRIMARY JUDGMENTS. INTUITIONS AND AXIOMS.

1. **M**ORAL Judgments respect actions and agents, like all other judgments. They are of two kinds, being either Intuitive, or Inferential. I see or hear, rejoice or regret, approve or disapprove,—are examples of the former; and of the latter,—the sun will arise, the plants will decay, all animals are mortal, the good will be honoured and the wicked dishonoured. Intuitive judgments cannot be proved, they need no proof, and are the means by which other propositions may be proved or disproved. They require the capacity of knowledge, and the object known. The capacity exists before it is exercised, but it is known only when exercised, and as it is or has been exercised. Intuitions can be obtained, only as the proper objects are presented to the mind,—the *real* objects in presentative knowledge, and *thoughts* of them in representative. Intuitions become more clear with repetition and attention; they are self-evident, and are the foundation of all knowledge, common or scientific. There could be no Judgment respecting form and magnitude, unless some were directly seen and felt. So there could be no Judgment respecting Moral right and *wrong*, if some were not known intuitively.

2. Of all objects our first knowledge is singular. Single states of body and mind are first known, single portions of space and duration, single emotions and affections, single perceptions and sentiments respecting moral right and wrong. From what is singular, we advance to the plural and general; from what belongs to ourselves, to what belongs to others. Universal propositions can never be the beginning of knowledge. What is true of many, is first known to be true of one. Generalization in the Natural Sciences always requires many observations, and is according to their extent; but in the Abstract Sciences only a few observations are required, and one is enough if clearly and completely apprehended. This is evident in the generalizations of Arithmetic, Geometry, and Logic; and it is so in Abstract Ethics.

What is seen in *thoughts*, is known of *actions* and *persons*, if the *thoughts* agree with their objects. Much that is not perceived at the time in our own conduct, and in that of others, is perceived on subsequent reflection; but the judgment formed on our *thoughts*, can be transferred to real objects, only when these are truly and adequately represented.

3. AXIOMS are general propositions, *worthy* of reception (*ἀξιωμα*), and the name is often given to the most comprehensive statements of some Science. It is most frequently used in the Abstract Sciences, for what are considered to be primary truths. What in a small simple case is self-evident, and such that the contrary is seen to be impossible and absurd, must be believed of all similar cases. Mathematical and Logical Axioms have this character. They are universal propositions, limited by definitions, stating what is believed of a whole class, because first known of one or more. What is perceived to be *necessary* in one case, is known to be equally so in all *similar* cases. Axioms are valuable, because what is easily perceived in some cases, is not so easily perceive

in others; and established propositions are readily received and applied. By their use all reasoning may be put into a syllogistic form, and its principles made evident. Axioms are never primary proofs, they are not the foundations of knowledge. If denied, there can be no reasoning; not because all particulars are inferred from universal propositions; but because what is not true universally in such matters, is never true. It is the same in Morals as in Mathematics. What is true of any actions and persons, *must* be true of all that are completely similar. When all Necessity is denied, Moral Axioms have only the certainty and extent of Natural Science; but they are equally sure.*

4. There are Moral Axioms which may be compared with those of Euclid. All may be deduced from the first, but they are alike self-evident.

The Choice of the *greater* Good rather than the *less*, is Morally right; and the contrary is Morally wrong. And so, The Choice of the *higher* Motive rather than the *lower*.

The Choice of continuing *causes*, rather than present *effects*.

* Primary Judgments refer either to *real* objects, or to their *signs*,—thoughts and words. A single intuition is sufficient for a primary Judgment, and this is expressed in a singular proposition. Propositions are self-evident (1) when the *real* object is directly perceived to agree with the statement; or (2) when the *logical* subject contains the predicate, or is contained in it; or there is some other relation equally evident. Thus I see, or remember, or approve,—are *real* self-evident truths. Self-evident *verbal* or *logical* truths are such as,—Gold is a metal, horses are animals, pleasure is desirable, virtue is praiseworthy. All these are Primary Judgments, being known by Intuition of objects or conceptions. Secondary Judgments are all Inferences; and Axioms are as other generalizations. But those of the Abstract Sciences require only a single experience; and the Axioms follow from the *intuitions* of what is represented in Thought, and perceived in necessary convictions.

The Choice of *health*, bodily and mental, rather than *enjoyment*.

The Choice of the *certain*, rather than the *uncertain*.

The Choice with *consideration*, rather than without.

The Choice with *reflection*, rather than without.

The Choice of the *social*, rather than the *unsocial*.

The Choice of the *permanent*, rather than the *transient*.

Such Volitions are at once perceived to be Morally Right, and the contrary to be Morally Wrong.*

* If for any *real* object a *defined conception* is substituted, we may obtain many propositions *certain* and *necessary*, as those of Mixed Mathematics ; but all such truths are *abstract*, only approximately true of real objects.

CHAPTER II.

SECONDARY JUDGMENTS.—INFERENCES.

MORAL Inferences are of two kinds, the first are entirely Moral ; the second are partly Moral and partly common.

I. Simply Moral.

1. In these both premises of the argument have a moral nature. Moral principles are often used, as the axioms and established propositions of Geometry are used. They are applied to particular cases, because these are already included in them. The use of general principles is most important *practically*, as well as *speculatively*. Only in this form have Moral judgments the dignity, authority, and influence of Moral Law.*

2. Actions alone, apart from the capacities of the Agent, have no Moral nature ; and the quality of the action is

* Secondary Judgments are Inferences, and require two or more *facts*, if the reasoning refers to *real* objects ; and two or more *propositions*, if the reasoning respects terms and *conceptions*. In most reasoning, particular statements are combined with general propositions already known. Syllogisms are the full expression of such arguments ; but not the only, or always the best mode of reasoning. If the premises are not both certain, the conclusion is not ; and if one premise is doubtful, the conclusion is equally so. But in *moral* arguments, as in others, the conclusion from many often exceeds the sum of all. The combined *probabilities*, of independent evidences, soon become as *certain* as any demonstration. The conclusion is *moral*, if one of the premises has this character.

according to the capacity of the Agent. If the action is good, so is the agent; and if the action is bad, so is the agent. The Moral character of both Action and Agent depend entirely on the Objects and Motives of choice. The *general* character of Actions is according to what are generally the *objects* and *motives* of such Choice; but the *actual* object and motive may, or may not, be what they usually are; and the Choice of an individual may therefore be better or worse than it generally is. Moreover while the good or evil of every single action must belong to the Agent; single actions are not always signs of character. A man is best known, by what he chooses deliberately and repeatedly. A good man will sometimes do what is bad, and a bad man what is good. Single actions may show more of *circumstances*, than of *character*. It is not always easy to judge truly of ourselves; and it is never easy to judge truly of others. There is most of Moral goodness, when *moral* motives are alone, and when strong contrary motives are overcome.

3. Motives are often mixed; high and low, good and bad, being combined. Actions may be attributed *chiefly* to good motives, because these are not entirely absent; though the little influence they really have appears, whenever the lower motives are wanting. Of ourselves we may know, by self-examination, what motives are resisted as well as what are accepted; what our knowledge, ability, and intentions were and are; but little comparatively is surely known of others. The adverse judgments, which are so readily pronounced on others, are as unreasonable as uncharitable. There is seldom, if ever, that complete knowledge of others, which is requisite for a true judicial sentence. We cannot know the *intentions* of others, as we know our own; still less can we know their *motives*—those which they resisted, and those by which they were influenced.

4. Moral Right and Wrong are generally evident to all, who honestly seek the truth; but not always. Often the help of others is needed, that the whole subject may be duly known and considered; and that there may not be the partiality, which is caused by personal feelings and interests. But the *judgment* of others should always be regarded as only a part of the *evidence* by which, in all moral questions, the *judgment* of each is to be determined. The exercise of Conscience is generally of more moment to all, than outward correctness; and the assistance of others will be injurious, if a subordinate rule takes the place of that which should be supreme. Good examples are better than any rules, for they increase moral perceptions, and by sympathy strengthen moral sentiments. One who did not profess to be a Christian—but was eminent for moral worth, and had no intellectual superior—has given his final judgment. No one, he judged, can do better, for himself and others, than to consider, whether his dispositions and actions are such as Jesus Christ would approve. This rule is worth more than volumes of casuistry, or any professedly infallible guidance.

2. Mixed Judgments.

These are of various kinds, for in many ways *common* judgments are combined with *moral* considerations.

1. EXPEDIENCY is of great importance, though never the *same* as Right, nor alone the *reason*. It is not the *same* thing, to say that an action is *right*, and that it is *useful*. Nor is Utility ever the sole *reason* of any action being right, for *ability* and *intention* must also be regarded. Men often agree in moral principles, but differ in the judgments connected with them. It is a *duty* to give the *best* medicine, to use the *best* means, to follow the *best* guidance; and here all agree. But respecting what is Best, there are diverse *opinions*. So men differ respecting what is lawful, just,

useful ; when they agree that such things *ought* to be done. What is *best* is learnt by experience, our own and that of others. Utility is often the *condition*, without which an action would not be morally right ; it is sometimes a *criterion*, or *sign*, of its being right ; but it is never identical with Right.

2. ANALOGY is much used in moral judgments, but it is not sure evidence, and is the cause of much diversity and error. Objects often have some similarities, but greater differences. Unless the known similarities are of the kind always accompanied by more, the evidence is of little value. When it is known that the rightness of the action depends on what is common to men, we may infer that what is right for one is right for all ; but not otherwise. What is known or supposed of all objects, natural and moral, consists generally of two parts. There is that which respects only the particular object observed ; and that which respects some class to which it is referred. If it really belongs to this class, there is the supposed agreement, and the argument is from experience. But if it does not belong to this class, the argument is merely from Analogy, and is never certain. Precedents and precepts are often improperly used, the cases being really different. Children reason by analogy, when they conclude that whatever is proper for their elders, is also proper for them.

3. SIGNS are of the same use in Moral arguments, that they are in others, and they are equally liable to abuse. Whenever any objects have been found to be *connected*, the presence of one is a *sign* of the other, according to the *frequency* of the connection, whatever its nature. When the qualifications of any person are unknown, we can judge of the truth of his testimony, or opinion, only by the frequency of the cases, in which such evidence has been found to be right. We believe with the many, or with the few, as we

have found their statements to be true. But the belief can never be certain, if the qualifications of persons to testify and judge be unknown. Signs, which have no *causal* connection, are uncertain evidences. Colour may be a *sign* of bodily health, and commendation may be a sign of moral worth ; but they are very uncertain. The *mean* may be a *sign* of Virtue, but the *right* is not known by measurement. The *reason* of Right is a sure *sign*, and some commendation may be very satisfactory ; but most signs are only partial evidences, with only some probability of truth. The opinions of others are often taken as a *sign* of moral right or wrong. Men adopt the judgment of their associates as a rule for their conduct, and think they are *right* when they do what others do. What has some pleasantness and profitableness is thus known ; but not what is morally right.

4. AUTHORITY has the same place in Morals as in other things, having respect either to conduct or belief. Some submission and obedience are requisite to the welfare of society, and are evidently proper and right. Generally, children should obey their parents, servants their masters, soldiers their officers, without questioning. But the reasons which make this rule right, are not universal. The will of the superior determines that of the inferior, not merely because it is wiser, but also for the order necessary in society. Responsibility for the required action belongs, always chiefly and sometimes entirely, to the one who commands. If it is manifest that the action of one, is only obedience to the proper authority of another ; it may be right to obey commands that are wrong. But this does not justify obedience, if actions are commanded which are morally wrong ; for these are always in some degree voluntary, and in a high degree injurious to all. To kill, or steal, or lie, because ordered to do so, is to submit to Evil, and to become the servant of Sin.

Authority may be a reason for *belief*, as well as a rule for action; but this must entirely depend on the personal qualities which make the judgments of some, *evidence* to others of moral right. Superior moral wisdom is the only ground, on which the decision of another should be accepted, as better than one's own separate judgment. Conscience requires the use of all *evidence*, respecting what is to be preferred. If the judgment of another is more likely to be true, it should be accepted as our own. There are questions, in which the judgment of others may be more trustworthy than our own; but none of these refer to our intentions. It may be right for others to do, what we see it could not possibly be right for us to.

5. The measure of Moral Good, or Evil, in any action is partly, according to the measure of natural good or ill expected from the action, and contained in the choice; but this is not alone to be regarded. There is little virtue in choosing the right which is easy and pleasant, to which natural feelings urge; but more in choosing the same, when it is difficult and disagreeable, requiring effort and self-denial. So there is more evil in choosing that which has little to make it attractive, and much that is contrary to common natural feelings. But there is less evil when the temptation is great, and there is little knowledge and self-control. Agents are more or less good or evil, chiefly according to the moral *quality* of their actions; in a less degree, according to their *quantity*. Every person is judged, "according to what he has, and not according to what he has not."

6. The longer persons continue to be morally good, in dispositions and actions, the *better* they become in character and condition. And so, the longer they continue morally bad, the *worse* they become. But it does not follow, that the *actions* in like manner become *better* or *worse*. The

contrary is often true. Right and wrong *actions* may become *involuntary* and *unconscious* through *habit*; and then the *actions* cease to be *moral*. When the effect of *habit* is similar, though less, the *moral* nature of the *actions* is in the same degree lessened. Thus the good *actions* of a good man may have less of *moral* worth than they once had, and the bad *actions* of a bad man, less of *moral* evil. The measure of good or evil, in any single right *choice*, is according to *present* thought, feeling, and effort; but the more of these there *has been*, the less there may be afterwards. The right conduct of one accustomed to sobriety and honesty, may be without any moral choice; while the same conduct in one accustomed to drunkenness and dishonesty, would be impossible, without much moral consideration and exertion. And it is the same with wrong conduct. The habit which makes the present action less moral, is proof of many similar actions; and therefore the same facts have a double significance. There may be less of *goodness* in the *act*, because of a previous good *habit*, but this is the sign of a good character. And there may be less of *badness* in the *act*, because of the bad *habit*, but this is the sign of a bad character. Actions *may* become better or worse, as the Agent becomes better or worse; but this is not *always* the case. It is so, only when the *moral* consideration is *habitual*, as well as the outward action.

The dispositions and actions which are Virtues, in those by whom they are possessed, are Duties and Obligations, in relation to those to whom they are due. And so the dispositions and actions which are Vices, in those who are subject to them, are Offences and Crimes, in relation to those whose claims and rights are disregarded. All duties and obligations to others, become, with religious knowledge, duties and obligations to the Creator and Governor of all; and the disregard of these is Sin. Duties and Obligations

require separate consideration for their practical observance; but they are always plainly connected with Virtues and Vices. The statements already made respecting these, may be sufficient to show the nature and evidence of the Duties, which respect self—society—and God; and of the Rights and Obligations, which respect person, property, reputation; and are either natural, or the result of contract. Duties are not based on Rights; but both depend on what is Morally Right, in relation to individuals, to society, and to the Supreme Ruler.

* Duties and Obligations,—what ought to be felt and done,—depend on what is Morally Right. That is a *duty* which is *due*, and that *ought* to be which is *owed*. Both terms generally denote what it is morally right to give and receive. Duties are spoken of as Obligations, when there are contrary motives, and moral considerations have peculiar cogency. Generally there is some *indefiniteness* in what is simply a Duty, and some consciousness of *freedom*. Gratitude is a *duty*, but the mode and measure of its exercise cannot be prescribed. S. Paul said that he was under a *necessity* to preach the Gospel, but *free* to do it in one way or another. (1 Cor. ix. 16.) Duties have a higher value, when there is no sense of constraint. Obligations are of different kinds, as men feel themselves *bound* in various ways. There is nothing *moral*, in mere *physical* obligation; there may, or may not be a *duty*, with the obligations of *custom* and *law*. Duties have their corresponding Claims, and with Obligations there are Rights. Rights are possessions, material or mental, the *use* of which by the owner is *right*, and its hindrance by others *wrong*, legally or morally. They are *definite*, and are often defined and enforced by Civil Law. There may be a legal *right* to do many things, which are morally *wrong*. Morality respects all Duties. Jurisprudence regards only Obligations, and general Utility. Law cannot secure more than *actions*; and should not, to prevent one wrong, occasion a worse; or to produce some good, hinder what is better. Some Rights are natural and universal, prior to Law; others are adventitious, consequent to Law, and only special; being given to individuals, for the good of all. The welfare of all men requires Society, and this requires Government and Law; therefore submission to the one, and obedience to the other, become Moral duties and obligations, where they are not contrary to Moral Right. This is more important to society than any external advantage; and is required by a Law above all other law,—an Authority above all human governments.

DIVISION V.
SUPPLEMENTARY.

CHAPTER I.

MORAL DISCIPLINE.

BODILY health requires some care and discipline, proper food and exercise ; and so does Moral health. For this there must be right thinking, feeling, and action. Some right *thinking* must precede right *feeling*, but the former is not complete without the latter. Some right *feeling* must precede right *action* ; but right thinking and right feeling are preserved and perfected by right conduct. Bodily health is injured by inaction, by wrong action, and by unwholesome air and food. Moral health in like manner is impaired by bad habits, and by immoral influences. Common-sense is sometimes sufficient for the preservation of natural health ; and Conscience sometimes is a sufficient guide for moral conduct. But more is always needed than men can find in themselves, for recovery from wrong, for growth in goodness, for complete rightness in thought, feeling, and conduct.

1. Right Thinking.

In the simpler cases of Duty, nothing more is required than consideration. A little reflection on what we are and have, and on those with whom we are connected, will show *what is morally right and good*. We have only to look at

the *whole* of the case which is before us, and guard against the exaggerations which naturally result from proximity and partiality, passion and prejudice. In complicated cases more is required; and where Duty is not easily discerned, reference should be made to acknowledged principles and precepts, and to cases that are apparently similar. The aid of others is often useful. We may overlook that which should be noticed, and forget what should be remembered. Counsel is especially needed in Mixed Morals, where *expediency* is to be considered. What is most *useful* is often best learnt, from the testimony and judgment of others. What is most excellent can be learnt, only by looking to a goodness higher and better than we have attained.

2. Right Feeling.

This can be produced, only by the consideration of the proper objects. We feel desire, when what is desirable has been presented to our view; we can feel moral approbation, only when something worthy of approbation is regarded; and disapprobation, only when moral evil is considered. Steady and repeated attention are requisite for moral sentiments, because their objects are not so readily apprehended as those of other feelings. The consideration of good examples, and sympathy with the good, promote goodness; but right feelings are hindered, and wrong feelings are increased, by all bad companionship. The consideration of evil examples, in books or society, is injurious, unless accompanied with moral censure and aversion. Right and Wrong feelings grow, become more frequent and strong, as they are habitually cherished and indulged.

3. Right Actions.

Some present right thought and feeling must accompany all moral action. Inconsiderate right actions may have some practical use, and be some safeguard against doing wr

but they have themselves no moral worth, and do not help to moral improvement. Right thinking, respecting what is to be done, is indispensable to right conduct, and strong moral sentiments are most desirable. The excitement of other feelings may help to awaken these, and facilitate right action; but choice and conduct are most moral, when they result from moral thoughts and feelings. These should be followed at once by some exercise of Will. Volition requires more effort, when it is deferred. Duties easy and pleasant, do not contribute so much to moral progress, as those which are difficult and require self-denial; but there is no moral good in self-imposed tasks, voluntary sufferings, that are not useful. Next to consideration and prompt decision, association with those like-minded is of great importance, for steadfastness in right conduct. Imitation of the good, sympathy with them, a regard to their counsel, are very beneficial, especially at the beginning of a right course of action. There is a moral fellowship with those who are absent, as well as with those who are present; with those who are in other lands, and those who lived in former ages. Guidance, encouragement, and assistance are sought and found, in remembrances of the wise and good. In the insufficiency of all human aid, men cannot but desire the better help which is ever near, and is offered to all who strive to be good, and to do right. Human perfection is the purpose of God, which the Son of God came to accomplish. Apart from Him the hope is vain, with Him it is sure.

The Discipline and Service of Life consist, partly in *doing*, and partly in *suffering*. Of these, different kinds and degrees are appointed. Some have to *do* more than others, and some to *suffer* more; but a portion of each is needed by all, and is given to all. Difficult and painful duties strengthen and elevate; they exercise and manifest more self-control, more faith and love; and therefore are more *beneficial* to all. Suffering of every kind becomes profitable,

when it is the means of increasing patient hope, and sympathising compassion ; of subduing pride, self-will, selfishness. Men are made perfect through suffering. Progress in goodness, and in usefulness, require this discipline. The sorrows and disappointments of life, not less than its joys and successes, become occasions for thankfulness, when rightly received and used. They will not be always needed for improvement and usefulness ; but they are needed now.

They who take the position of heathen peasants or philosophers, are consistent in ignoring Christianity ; but they who have any Christian faith cannot do this. Sin and Death cannot be ignored ; and the consideration of these dark realities alone, cannot be pleasant or profitable. We must look to the Righteousness and Life, now revealed as the purpose of God for mankind. Prayer and Praise are but the expression of human wants and affections, the acknowledgment of the Divine presence and goodness. Both are equally reasonable and proper, apart from the consideration of what will be gained by them. Prayer is not to change the will of God, but to seek the highest good in the appointed way. As it differs from all other antecedents, so it has consequences only thus to be obtained. Men are made dependent beings, to receive good from God, in the way He has chosen, and in the fellowship of His children ; not to attain it by their own unaided efforts. The moral nature and condition of man cannot be understood, unless we look beyond the visible and present.

Nature does not teach that the present life is the whole of human existence. Hopes and fears respecting a future life, have had some influence on men in all countries and in all ages. Scripture makes a doubtful expectation, a blessed certainty to many. If there be a continuance of any life in the soul, when the life of the body comes to an end, it cannot be right to regard only the visible and temporal. The persistence of mind is as reasonable, as the pr

of matter. If the present short life is to be any preparation for the future, there must be something common to both. But character is the only possession which we can take with us, at the end of our earthly life. This is retained, when all else is left and lost. Therefore evidently, what is moral and spiritual must be, to each and all, of supreme importance. Things highly esteemed by men, are of no value in the judgment of God. Nature and Scripture teach, that all will receive according to their moral conduct and character.

The appearance of Jesus Christ on the earth has changed the moral history of the world. His personal influence is the highest and best, to be found in any age or country. It is good for all, and only good. Many ills have come from perversions of His religion, but none from Himself, or from what He really taught and did. All who have received Him as their Teacher, Leader, and Saviour, have found that a Divine influence comes to them, as they seek to learn of Him and to follow Him. They receive light and strength, purity and peace; power to overcome evil, to do good and to become good,—a new life of love and hope. The salvation of Christ is a deliverance from sin, and this is freely offered to all, to the weakest and the worst. (Matt. i. 21.) No statements in the Bible, nor any facts in human experience, support the suppositions, that a mere profession of religion, or any outward observances, can affect the moral and spiritual welfare of men. But testimonies, more than are given to any law or scheme for the improvement of mankind, show that such Faith as Christ required of disciples, does enlighten, strengthen, cleanse, and comfort—help to all goodness and usefulness; and that such Prayer as He taught men to offer to their Father in heaven, is never in vain.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL THEORIES.

THESE give various answers to several questions,—What is the nature of Virtue, or Moral Right? What is its proximate *cause* or *reason*? What is its ultimate foundation? What are *signs*, or *criteria*, of Right,—*causes* of knowledge,—besides the *reason*, because of which it both *is* right, and is known to be so? What is the *faculty* by which Moral Right is discerned? Erroneous Theories recognise and explain some *facts* in human experience; but they disregard others which are equally certain, or fail entirely to account for them. The different Theories may be referred to four classes. (1) The Selfish, (2) the Social, (3) the Personal and Intuitional, (4) the Theological.

I. Selfish Theories.

It has been said by some, that men always seek their own pleasure and interests; that this is the only real motive of all their actions. Of this opinion there are two forms. A few have maintained, that men *consciously* seek only what they desire for themselves; and that all apparent regard to duty, or the good of others, is mere pretence. But most supporters of this system suppose, that men *unconsciously* delude themselves in fancying they are benevolent. When they see the present joys and sorrows of others, Memory, it is said, brings back their own former joys and sorrows; or Imagination leads them to think, that the pleasures and

pains of others are their own; or Association transfers to others, the feelings which primarily respect themselves. The consciousness of wrong is only the fear of punishment, and that of right is a liking for praise and gain. These theories disregard the peculiar nature of the *social* affections, and of the *moral* sentiments. What respects *self* alone must *precede* what is known of others; but it cannot *produce* what is felt for others. What is *natural* must precede what is *moral*; but there is more than a change of form.

The more self-interest is considered, the less social affection is felt, and moral right regarded. Memory, imagination, and association do much, but they produce nothing new; and they neither have the power supposed, nor are they exercised in the way described. It is contrary to the consciousness of mankind, that gratitude, compassion, and benevolence, are merely forms of self-seeking, having no different and higher nature; and equally so, that doing one's *duty* is merely a form of self-pleasing.

2. Social Theories.

These affirm that Social Affections are as much a part of human nature, as the desires which respect Self. It is as natural to seek the good of others, as to seek one's own. One set of principles may be earlier and stronger than the other; but both are natural and necessary to human welfare; and the weaker may be the nobler.

Some Social Theories are *subjective*, referring most to what is *felt*; others are *objective*, referring most to what is *perceived*. Benevolence is the chief principle of the former, Utility of the latter. Benevolence certainly is a Virtue of the greatest importance; but it is not the only right disposition, nor can all others be deduced from it. We do not seek the good of others, simply for our own advantage; and neither do we seek our own good, or act rightly, simply for the advantage of others. If Benevolence were the only

duty, there should be the same love for all, and the measure of good to be done would be the only rule of action. But both these consequences are unnatural, and unreasonable. All have not the same claims on all others, nor the same duties to all others. Sympathy contributes much to the increase of Benevolence, and the Moral Sentiments; but it differs from both. The remembrance of one's own suffering, or the supposition that what belongs to another is our own, cannot produce true Compassion, or a sense of Duty. Benevolence is not a Virtue, if it is simply a natural and involuntary feeling.

The Utility of actions is unquestionably of great importance, and many duties depend on expediency. But the utility to be regarded, is not that which concerns self alone, and respects some outward advantages; but that which includes the whole welfare, internal and external, of ourselves and others, in the present and the future. What is really most beneficial to all, is also that which is morally right. But no human intelligence can have that complete knowledge of the consequences of actions which is necessary, if conduct is to be determined by foreseen results. Utility and Right are never opposed, but their agreement is not always evident. What is *useful* is known by the prior knowledge of what is *right*, more surely than what is *right* by the prior knowledge of what is *useful*. It is never the same to do anything *because* it is useful, and to do it *because* it is right. We are *pleased* with the former, but *approve* the latter. We may be doubtful of the one, and quite sure of the other.

3. Personal and Intuitional Theories.

These recognise fully the essential difference between *persons*, who have *rights* and *duties*, and all other objects. This primary difference is *intuitively* known. These theories also are mainly *subjective*, or *objective*. Some refer primarily to the Moral Sense, or the Conscience;

and others to the Practical Reason, or the Nature of things. Moral sentiments are a most important part of human experience. Men agree in moral feelings and judgments, as they do in other matters ; and in like manner they differ. All regard some actions and persons as morally right, worthy of honour and reward ; and some actions and persons as morally wrong, deserving disgrace and punishment. These sentiments are very different from the common feelings, with which all agreeable and disagreeable objects are regarded. Approbation and Disapprobation are primary Feelings. They are original, but they are modified by others, and they are not sufficient alone to show what is right. They respect only voluntary conduct—the dispositions and actions that are chosen. As with bodily *feelings* there are material *perceptions*, and with mental *feelings* mental *perceptions*, so with moral *feelings* there are moral *perceptions*. Reflection shows that there is that in the objects of moral approbation and disapprobation, which is their cause and reason ; and that as the *feelings* are different from all other feelings, so the *objects* are different from all other objects.

Some moral truths are self-evident ; they are intuitions, and not inferences. There may be mistakes respecting what is *really* best, but there can be none respecting what is *apparently* the best. The intentions of others may be unknown, but our own are self-evident. These are approved or condemned, and the Moral Judgment is intuitive and unconditional. The moral consequences of choice may be uncertain, as well as the natural, but its character is a present certainty, which nothing can make to be different from what it is, and is known to be.

That the greatest known good should be *chosen*,—or, that the higher principles should rule the lower,—is a *moral* principle which contains its *reason*, and is intelligible to all. It is suited to every diversity of condition, and is applicable to every stage of moral life, enlarging with its progress. The

best when voluntary, is far better than the best that is involuntary. The promptings of inclination, and the calculations of expediency, are variable and uncertain; they have no moral character or authority. But the intuitions of Conscience are universal and certain; they belong to the highest faculties, and they respect the greatest good of mankind. They are indications of the Divine will, given to men for the direction of conduct, and the improvement of character. Man is not made perfect, but is to become perfect; and that not without choice and effort, but voluntarily; for only thus can moral progress be attained or received.

The simple command of Conscience, the categorical imperative of the Practical Reason, has alone little power, and no moral authority. The mere expression of Will can produce only slavish submission. There is merely a *physical* obligation to a Superior Will, unless this is known to command only what is *morally* right. General principles cannot be the beginning of moral knowledge. Only abstract conclusions follow from abstract principles. There is with these a *logical* necessity, which is merely *formal*; and this can give no knowledge of *real* existence, human or divine. From the *facts* of men's moral nature, much may be learnt of the moral character of their Maker; but abstract principles give no knowledge of real existence, and supply no motive to action of any kind. Fitness and agreement refer to some end or rule, and are most intelligible when referred to the capacity of the agent, and the welfare of all.

4. Theological Theories.

THE DIVINE WILL has been regarded by some, as the one Cause of all that is Moral, as well as of all that is Natural. The utmost simplicity is thus given to facts, and to questions; but the difference between what is *voluntary* and what is *involuntary*, between the *moral* and the *natural*, is dis-

regarded and theoretically destroyed. There is no reason for referring all things to the Will of God, as their Cause. He does not make the properties of number, space, and duration ; nor the resemblances and relations which necessarily belong to all objects, according to what they really are. All human faculties are determined by the Will of God, but not the way in which they are used. The measure of power is from Him, but not the mode of exercise. If it were so, nothing could be contrary to the Divine Will : obedience and disobedience, right and wrong, good and evil, would be equally from Him. Benevolence and justice might have been made Vices, and cruelty and injustice might have been made Virtues. All *right* might have been made to be *wrong*, and all *wrong* to be *right*. If the Will of God were the origin of Moral Right, this could not be an attribute of the Divine Will. To say that He is *righteous* and *just*, would be merely to say, that He does what He requires, that He wills to do what He wills. The statements of the Moral Perfection of God, lose all their meaning and importance, if nothing is right or wrong, but as made to be so by precept or prohibition.

The Will of a parent, or a master, is a *rule* and *reason* for the conduct of a child, or servant ; and many things are to be done *because* commanded, and avoided *because* forbidden ; but no persons make the right and the wrong. So it is with the Will of God. The Divine Will, which is always perfectly wise and good, ought ever to rule the conduct of all creatures. A measure of freedom is commonly allowed in every house, though it may be abused ; because a willing service is so much better, than any service secured by force and constant interference. Evil is permitted, but never produced by the Supreme Power. It must be *possible* to imperfect beings, if they are *free* agents ; and they could not *be moral*, unless they were *free*. It is allowed to become *real*, *because it is* to be resisted and overcome ; and thus it is over-

ruled for the highest and best results. Sin is not the mere semblance of Evil, but is in itself, and in all its effects, bad and hateful. It is not so merely in present appearance, to those who see not final issues ; but it is Evil in the sight of God, more than in the sight of Man. The *good* which is occasioned by *evil*, is not to be attributed to it, being utterly contrary to its nature. Good can be gained, only as the *evil* is avoided, opposed, and removed. Evil has its origin in the creature, and not in the Creator : it was foreseen and permitted by Him, but not caused.

4. All things that have come into being, owe their powers and properties to the First Cause ; and in the Supreme and Infinite, there is the foundation on which all finite existence must rest. And so the Will of God, however exercised and manifested, is the expression of His Eternal and Perfect and Immutable Being. He does what is right and good, and requires what is right and good, because He is Right and Good. Men are to become perfect, as their Father in Heaven ever is, and was, and will be.

5. Whatever is known to be the Divine Will, is known to be Morally Right ; but most things are known to be the Will of God, because they are first known to be right. Morality does not owe its existence to Religion ; but it is thereby enlarged, supported, corrected, encouraged, made permanent and perfect. Children know something of right and wrong, before receiving any religious instruction. Some irreligious persons have been distinguished by conscientiousness, real though limited. Philosophers in Greece and Rome, the Sages of India and China, Christian writers in ancient and modern times, have maintained Morality apart from Religion ; but they have also taught, that the former is to be sustained and perfected by the latter.

It hardly need be said, that no works on Moral Science are more valuable than Bishop Butler's *Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue*, and *Sermons on Human Nature*.

Much that is stated in the preceding pages, respecting the foundation of Moral Right, agrees with the admirable work of M. Paul Janet, lately published, *The Theory of Morals*. Many difficult questions are there discussed with much learning, clearness, and ability, and made highly interesting and instructive. He gives, as the principle of his system, the saying of Leibnitz, "The natural good of the mind, when it is voluntary, becomes a moral good." (*Bonum mentis naturale, quum est voluntarium, fit bonum morale.*) This he says is the principle of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and many others. It agrees also with all the teaching of the Old Testament and the New. "He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (*Micah vi. 8.*) "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever are honourable, whatsoever are just, whatsoever are pure, whatsoever are lovely, whatsoever are of good repute; if there is any virtue, and any commendation, consider these things." (*Phil. iv. 8.*)



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